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THE  following dissertation  is  an attempt to discuss  the 
rise,  character,  and  influence  of  the  United  States  Steel 
Corporation.  So much has been written about this organ- 
ization that little can be said of its history that is absolutely 
new.  The works  which  have  treated  this  subject,  how- 
ever,  have  generally  been  either  descriptive  rather  than 
analytical in nature,  or confined  to certain limited  phases 
of  its development  and financial  policies.  The purpose  of 
this essay is not  so much  to give a detailed  description of 
the Steel Corporation as to discuss the influences which gave 
it birth,  and to interpret its general character and reaction 
upon  industrial  conditions  in  the light of  those  influences. 
The sources upon which the writer has mainly  relied have 
been  the annual reports and other publications  of  the Steel 
Corporation itself; several trade journals, of  which the most 
important are the Iron Age and Commercial and  Finarccial 
Chronzcle;  and  certain  governmental  documents,  particu- 
larly the Report of  the Industrial Commission.  The writer 
has also derived aid from interviews with officials connected 
with the S~eel  Corporation and other steel companies.  He 
is  also  under  obligations  to Drs.  E. R.  A.  Seligman and 
H. R.  Seager  who  have  looked  over  his  manuscript  and 
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fj I.  The making of iron and steel has probably advanced 
farther along the line of  capitalistic development  than has 
any  other  manufacturing  industry.  It  has  had  a  large 
share of the attention of  trust promoters; and it is doubtfur 
if any other industry better exemplifies the general charac- 
ter  and operations of  the so-called  trust  movement.  The 
conditions  which  have contributed  toward  consolidation  in 
iron and steel manufacture have in many respects been sin+ 
lar to those which  have  facilitated  the  formation of  com- 
binations  in  general;  and  the  reactions  of  consolidation 
upon the conditions contributing toward  this movement  il- 
lustrate  some  of  the  most  salient  tendencies  inherent  in 
large-scale production. 
The concentration  of  production  which  had been  going 
on in the iron and steel industry during the closing decades 
of  the nineteenth  century-and  especially during the  clos- 
ing years of  that century-reached  a  climax  in  the  form- 
ation of  the United States Steel Corporation in 1901.  The 
forces or conditions which evolved this organization cannot 
be  stated in a  few  categorical  sentences; nor can  their  in- 
fluence be properly gauged by  mere statement.  In the de- 
velopment of  this great consolidation several forces, imme- 
diate  and  remote,  industrial  and  financial,  co-operated. 
Some of  these, though usual  accompaniments of  the evolu- 
tion  of  large-scale  production,  have  exercised  only  subor- 
dinate influence; others stand out prominently as determin- 
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ing factors in the iron and steel situation.  It is with refer- 
ence to these latter forces or conditions that the existence, 
character,  and  influence  of  the  Steel  Corporation  can  be 
best interpreted. 
2.  Fundamentally, the conditions which  gave birth  to 
this  great  combination  are  similar  to  those  which  have 
given  rise  to other  consolidations.  In several  character- 
istics, iron and steel goods resemble those which are ordin- 
arily produced  under trust management.  They are subject 
to standardization-to  certain  uniformities  of  shape,  size 
and quality.  They are in general demand over a wide ex- 
tent  of  territory.  They  are most  economically  manufac- 
tured  on  a  large  scale.  At  distances  from  certain  local 
points,  or  places  of  manufacture,  freight  charges  enter 
largely  into their prices; and in  so  far as large producers 
have been able to secure better terms in the matter of  trans- 
portation  than  their  smaller  rivals,  the  movement  toward 
concentration  has been accelerated. 
In certain particulars external to the mere manufacture 
of iron andsteel, the industrial situation has been influenced 
by  conditions  similar to those  contributing to the growth 
of  other  combinations.  Intensity  of  competition,  due 
partly to mal-adjustments between the number  and size of 
competing producers and the strength and extent of  the de- 
mand for goods, have furthered the desire for consolidation. 
'The  protective tariff, too, by  limiting the area of  competi- 
tion  has encouraged  producers  to combine  in  the hope  of 
securing control over  certain  branches  of  the trade  in  the 
home market.  The geographical distribution of  the sources 
of  raw  material, in so far as these sources are conveniently 
located  for a single corporate or unified control, has helped 
to the same end. 
These influences and others which  might be  mentioned, 
are not peculiar to the iron and steel industry.  The condi- 
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tions,  however,  which  exercised  the most  determining ef- 
fects were  peculiar  in  magnitude  and  mode  of  operation. 
Such were the influences exerted by the existence and geo- 
graphical  distribution within the country of  large ore and 
coal  fields; by  the  superior  efficiency of  large  over  small 
capital; by  the extreme fluctuations in the demand for iron 
and steel goods; and by the restrictions imposed on foreign 
trade by the protective tariff.  All these influences co-oper- 
ate in promoting the growth of  concentration. 
As is well known, the existence of  the iron and steel in- 
dustry on any large scale  is  dependent upon  adequate  ore 
and coal supplies and facilities  for the easy  assembling of 
material.  With these essentials the United States is richly 
endowed, and it is to-day leading the world in the production 
of  iron  and  steel.  The greater  part  of  this  industry  is 
carried  on in  the  northeastern  part  of  the  country  where 
the leading producers depend, for their raw material, upon 
the Lake  Superior ore districts and the  Pennsylvania  and 
West  Virginia  coking-coal  areas.  Aht  eighty  per  cent 
of  the country's iron and steel is produced  from ores mined 
in the region about Lake Superior.  The localization  of  so 
much ore within such a limited area with cheap transporta- 
tion over the Lakes to Ohio and Pennsylvania  has favored 
combination.  Dependence  upon  the  same  or  adjacent 
sources of  raw  material, common  transportation  facilities. 
and trade in  the same market have brought producers  into 
relations with one another which  have not  infrequently led 
to pooling or consolidation of  interests.  Geographical con- 
ditions, therefore, have favored the growth of  the industry 
in the United States, and have facilitated to a very appreci- 
able extent the tendency toward concentration. 
More  potent  even  than  geographical  conditions  in  de- 
veloping  this tendency has been  the superior  efficiency  of 
large capital.  There are other  industries  which  require  a 14  THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION  [236 
great outlay of  capital for the most economical production, 
but the making of  iron and steel  is in a pre-eminent  sense 
the industry of  large capital.  The proper equipment of  a 
steel plant  for effective competition involves  extraordinary 
costs.  Not  only  must  the rolling  mills  be  furnished  with 
elaborate  and  adequate  machinery,  but  the  producer  must 
be prepared to manufacture his own iron and steel, and even 
secure his own ore and coal fields.  Such a condition is in- 
compatible  with  mere  individual  or partnership  manage- 
ment.  It necessitates  not  only  corporate  control,  but  in- 
volves  a  consolidation  of  interests  engaged  in  different 
stages  of  production.  The nature  of  the  industry  itself 
thus  tends  toward  large-scale  production;  and.  this  helps 
to limit  its management  and  control  to a  relatively  small 
number of  producers. 
Co-operating  with  these  influences  making  for  concen- 
tration there have been  violent  oscillations  in  the demand 
for iron and steel due to alternating periods of  prosperity 
and depression.  No other industry is  more susceptible to 
general  trade  conditions  or has  been  more  influenced  by 
such susceptibility.  The fluctuations which have character- 
ized  the  iron and steel  industry  explain  much  of  the ten- 
dency  toward  consolidation  and  in  no  small  degree  the 
special character which  consolidations have assumed.  The 
demand  for iron and  steel  is  great  or small  according as 
the  times  are  prosperous  or  dull.  The opening  up  and 
shutting down of  furnaces and mills, incident to this chang- 
ing demand, involve much  waste; and hence the necessary 
cost of  production is greater than if  the demand for goods 
were normal and steady.  During a prosperous epoch, also, 
an unduly  large number of  producers  are induced  to enter 
the industry; and this makes competition exceedingly severe 
and  even  ruinous  during  a  period  of  depression.  These 
considerations make some control over the conditions of the 
trade peculiarly desirable from the standpoint of  producers. 
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Furthermore, this varying demand for iron and steel has 
influenced the character of  the resulting consolidations.  It 
was the stress of  competition during dull times that led the 
manufacturers of  finished material to reduce as far 'as pos- 
sible their  costs by  securing the sources of  their raw  ma- 
terial  and the producers  of  crude material  to extend their 
markets by  manufacturing  finished goods.  This tendency 
has  resulted  in  making  the  more  important  combinations 
largely  independent  and self-sufficient-a  feature which  is 
pre-eminently  characteristic  of  the industry.  Capitalization 
has  also  been  influenced  by  these  oscillations.  Combina- 
tions, as a rule, are formed during periods of  prosperity or 
rising prices.  Capitalization  is  generally  based  upon  real 
or supposed  earning power.  As  earnings  are more than 
normal during so-called brisk times, capitalization tends to 
become inflated.  It is true that monopoly  advantages re- 
sulting from consolidations have been  capitalized;  but the 
fluctuating  character  of  the  iron  and  steel  trade must  be 
looked upon as a prime cause of  what has been considered 
the over-capitalization of the Steel Corporation and its con- 
stituent companies. 
The influence of  the  tariff  has been  not  unlike  that  in 
other industries.  In restricting foreign competition it has 
rendered control of  the industry within the country easier 
of  attainment.  As great consolidations are usually  formed 
with  the  object  of  controlling  trade,  the  existence  of  the 
tariff  has  been  an  important  factor  in  fostering  their 
growth.  Such  combinations  as  the  American  Tin  Plate 
Company  and  the  American  Steel  and  Wire  Company, 
whose  aims  were  monopoly  control,  would  hardly  have 
been  formed  without  tariff  protection.  These  companies 
included  practically  all  the plants  of  the country  in  their 
respective  lines,  and  were  enabled  to  secure  temporary 
monopolies  by  virtue of  the  high  duties  on tin  plate  ant1 16  THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION  1238 
wire goods.  The tariff  co-operating with other influences 
has  thus  facilitated  combination  by  limiting  the  area  of 
competition. 
The conditions,  therefore,  under  which  iron  and  steel 
have been produced  in  the United  States have been  favor- 
able  to  a  considerable  degree  of  concentration.  Funda- 
mentally,  it may  be  said  that it  was  the  co-operation  of 
these conditions that developed the Steel Corporation.  The 
geographical  distribution  of  ores  and  coal  favored  the 
growth of the iron and steel industry in this country, and in 
large measure  facilitated consolidation.  The large capital 
necessary for the most economical production and the pro- 
tective tariff, by shufding out foreign campetiticn, tended to 
limit the domestic  market to a  relatively  small number  of 
great  producers.  The fluctuations of  the trade,  resulting 
in much waste and uncertainty, contributed still more to ac- 
centuate  this  growth  toward  concentration  by  increasing 
the desire among producers  for some control  over the  in- 
dustry. 
The immediate cause of the formation of  the Steel Cor- 
poration  was  a  desire  on the  part  of  certain financial  in- 
terests  to secure some control  over  the  iron and  steel  in- 
dustry, and avert a threatened competition.  By the close of 
the last century the bulk  of the  trade  was  already  under 
the control  of  a  few great consolidations  or corporations. 
While some of  these organizations had  secured some meas- 
ure of  monopoly  in  their  respective  fields, the vicissitudes 
of the trade-especially  the depression  of  the latter half  of 
19-led  to  a  threatened  invasion  on  the  part  of  some 
concerns  of  one another's  fields.  The organizations most 
vitally interested in this threatened  invasion were the Car- 
negie Steel Company, the Federal Steel Company, the Na- 
tional  Tube Company,. and the  American  Steel  and  Wire 
Company.  The outcome of  this condition was a consolida- 
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tion  of  these  and  other  potential  rivals  into  the  United 
States Steel Corporation. 
g 3.  By  the  formation  of  this  great  corporation  more 
than half  of  the country's  iron and  steel  production  came 
under the control of  a single organization.  While the ori- 
ginal purpose of the Steel Corporation was to avert threat- 
ened competition and exercise some measure of control over 
the steel industry of  the United States, the conditions which 
fostered the tendency toward concentration have not  oper- 
ated, thus far, to promote permanent monopolization.  The 
sources of  raw  material have  not  as yet  come  under  the 
control of  this organization.  The Steel Corporation, like 
other great concerns engaged in the same business, owns or 
controls its sources of  ore and coal supply.  While holding 
some of  the best  ore lands in the Lake Superior region,  it 
has not gained full possession of the productive forces of this 
district.  Notwithstanding several additions to its holdings 
in this region, probably more than a fifth of  the ore lands 
of  the Lake Superior district are owned or held on lease by 
concerns in competition with it.  The existence of  consider- 
able ore in other parts of  the country under the control of 
independent  companies renders any monopoly of  the coun- 
try's  deposits of  this material improbable  in the imncGIate 
future. 
Nor has the Steel Corporation, by virtue of  its size, been 
enabled to secure control over the output of  crude and fin- 
ished products.  The iron and steel industry requires large 
capital  for the most  economical production;  but  the prin- 
cipal economies seem to be achieved long before such a high 
capitalization  as that of  the  Steel Corporation is reached. 
One of  the officials of  the Jones and Laughlin Steel Com- 
pany declares that at least twenty or thirty million  dollars 
are necessary to equip a steel plant for effective competition. 
The nominal  capitalization  of  all  the  companies  in  the 18  THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION  C240 
United States, engaged in the manufacture of  steel, is about 
two billion dollars, of  which amount a billion and a half  is 
represented by the Steel Corporation, and the remaining five 
hundred  million  by  ten  or twelve  large  companies.  Not- 
withstanding the preponderating position  of  the Steel Cor- 
poration, its size apparently gives it no competitive advant- 
age over its smaller rivals.  During the six years of  its his- 
tory, it has absorbed other concerns,  increasd its holdings 
of ore and coal, and expended large sums on improvements 
and additions to plants.  Yet its relative share of  the coun- 
try's  output of  iron and steel has shown no tendency to in- 
crease,  and  in  some  important  lines  of  manufacture  has 
even  appreciably  diminished.  During  its  career  its  net 
earnings, while large, have not been extraordinary in com- 
parison  with  its  huge  capitalization,  and  in  view  of  the 
prosperity of the period  during which  it has existed.  For 
more than two years these earnings were not deemed suffi- 
cient to pay  dividends on the common stock. 
The Steel Corporation, while organized to avert a threat- 
ened  competition, has been  compelled  to  withstand  not  a 
little rivalry.  Outside of  a few lines of  manufacture guar- 
anteed by patents it has achieved no monopoly.  Paradoxi- 
cal as it may seem, it is less of  a monopoly than were some 
of the companies out of  which it was formed.  These com- 
panies, being consolidations  of  practically  all  the concerns 
of (the country engaged  in  ce~.tain  lines of  production  at 
the time of  their  formation, were  enabled to control their 
markets.  This control was safeguarded, so far as foreign 
con~petition  was concerned, by  the protective tariff.  How- 
ever, domestic competition soon developed; and by the time 
the Steel  Corporation was organized  much  of  this control 
was ;being undermined, and to-day most of  it is entirely gone. 
5 4.  In forming any estimate, therefore, of  the stability 
of the corporation,  its reaction on the conditions that gave 
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it birth, and its probable future evolution, we must remem- 
ber its character as a great, but not monopolistic  organiza- 
tion.  Its financial integrity and its influence on trade con- 
ditions do not rest upon any present control exercised  over 
the steel  industry.  Its tendencies  and significance  for the 
future must be  interpreted in the light of  conditions which 
characterize the iron and steel trade as a whole. 
Viewing the  Steel Corporation as a competitive concern 
and at the same time the largest industrial organization in 
the world, the question of  its financial stability is one of  in- 
terest  and  significance.  This  organization  started  on  its 
career with  a  capitalization  in  round  numbers  of  $1,400,- 
ooo,o~several  hundred  millions  more  than  the  aggre- 
gate capitalization  of  all  its  constituent  companies before 
they  became  parts  of  this  great  consolidation.  Most  of 
these companies were themselves capitalized on the basis of 
incomes earned during a period of  prosperity, or of  real or 
supposed  monopoly  achievement.  This fact  has tended  to 
give the capitalization of  the Steel Corporation a highly in- 
flated  aspect, and  has seemed  to make  its  ability  to meet 
its  corporate  obligations  extremely  problematical.  This 
capitalization,  however,  has been  defended  on the ground 
that  the constituent  companies,  both  before  and  after  the 
orggnization of  the  Steel  Corporation, have made  several 
additions to their plants, and that their ore and coal prop- 
erties have greatly increased  in value.  Indeed, the princi- 
pal  asset of  the corporation is held  to be its ore properties 
which, on account of  the increasing use of  steel, are becom- 
ing more and more valuable. 
This defense  has  a  certain  basis  of  justification.  The 
properties of  the Steel Corporation are unquestionably more 
valuable to-day  than they were at the time of  its organiza- 
tion.  Barring such contingencies as the discovery of  new 
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situated and cheaply worked, and the invention of  new pro- 
cesses transforming the character of  the steel industry, the 
holdings  in  the Lake Superior district will  remain  a  most 
valuable  asset.  In capitalizing  such  a  business,  however, 
some  discount  should  be  made  for  the  contingencies  de- 
scrihed.  This is especially urgent  in view of  the fact that 
more than  a third  of  the corporation's  capital  consists of 
a  bonded  debt  whose  obligations  must  be  met  during a 
period  of  depression  as well  as in  normal and  prosperous 
times.  When it  is  remembered  that the iron and steel  in- 
dustry  is  exposed  to great vicissitudes  in  trade  and  that 
new  discoveries  and  inventions  may  change  its  character 
and places of operation, it can hardly be said that the finan- 
cial  stability of the organization is  fully  assured.  Viewed 
in  the light  of existing conditions, however,  the assets of 
the  Steel  Corporation  are unquestionably  of  great value. 
The critics of  the financial policies of  the corporation have 
probably more frequently underestimated  its resources thall 
the defenders have overestimated them. 
5 5.  The Steel Corporation, while not  a  monopoly,  has, 
nevertheless, reacted  upon the conditions which  favored  its 
growth.  Its career has been too short to justify  any very 
sweeping generalizations in regard to this influence, but cer- 
tain facts stand out in considerable prominence.  Since the 
formation of this organization, the fluctuations in the prices 
of  iron and steel have been  less marked  than in any other 
period of  similar length since 1860.  One of the most potent 
forces in  the development  of  the tendency toward  concen- 
tration of  production has been these fluctuations incident to 
changes in demand.  To reduce these oscillations  in prices 
is an avowed  purpose of  the officials of  the Steel Corpor- 
ation.  Controlling more than  half  the steel  trade of  the 
country, this organization has considerable influence on the 
policy of  producers in fixing prices.  In times of  prosper- 
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ity  it  has pursued  a  conservative  course  in  the matter of 
raising prices; and independent  concerns have  found  it  to 
their  interest  to follow suit.  By  keeping prices  relatively 
low  in brisk times no inducements are offered  to outsiders 
to enter the industry as con~petitors. This policy  renders 
competition among those already in the field  less severe in 
times of  depression.  As a consequence prices have tended 
toward greater uniformity. 
The Steel Corporation is  favored  in  the pursuit of  this 
policy  by  the  fact  that  the  steel  industry  of  the  country 
is  nearly  all  controlled  by  about  a  dozen  concerns.  All 
these  companies  control most  of  their  sources of  raw  ma- 
terial;  and  practically  all  the  known  deposits  of  ore are 
held  by  them.  By  keeping  the prices  of  finished  material 
in periods of  prosperity  at a low level, relative to those of 
raw and crude products, producers who do not control their 
own deposits of  ore and aspire after more than a local mar- 
ket are virtually excluded.  As a result of  this policy there 
would not be such a cutting of prices in a time of  depression 
as has heretofore proved  so ruinous to many establishments 
because more firms or con~panies  had entered  the industry 
than the trade could support. 
While the influence of  the Steel Corporation has been in 
the  direction  of  greater  stability  of  prices,  its  power  to 
achieve this end has been limited.  It can exert an appreci- 
able  influence on trade in  the way  described,  but  it  does 
not  control  the  productive  forces  of  the  industry.  It is 
still exposed  in a considerable degree to the vicissitudes  of 
trade.  While the officials of  this organization disclaim any 
intention of  controlling the industry, it seems not  improb- 
able that they  will  seek to extend  the corporation's  influ- 
ence.  The holdings  of the  corporation  in  the  Lake  Su- 
perior region  have been greatly  increased  since  its forma- 
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be made.  This may indicate a desire ultimately to control 
the trade by controlling the sources of  raw material.  Such 
a consummation, however,  will be  difficult of  achievement. 
Much of  the Lake Superior district  is held by  independent 
concerns  which  have  no  present  intention  of  selling  their 
holdings.  These holdings and ore lands in other parts of 
the country are sufficiently extensive to make it difficult for 
any  iron and steel  consolidation to control the sources of 
raw material.  Even were such control secured, the grow- 
ing  public  sentiment  against  monopoly  would  probably 
show itself in a clamor for abolition of tariff  duties on iron 
and steel. 
6.  If  the Steel Corporation secures fuller control over 
the iron and steel industry of  the United States in the near 
future, it is  likely  to achieve  this end  in  association with 
other  producers.  The industry  is  still  exposed  to  great 
changes in the demand for commodities; and the desire to 
regulate  procluction  in  accordance  with  these  changes  as 
well  as to  secure  monopolistic  advantages  will  incite  to 
further attempts to gain control over the trade.  Such at- 
tempts have been made in various lines in the past by means 
of pools or associations.  These organizations have had  a 
prominent place in the history of the industry; but  in most 
cases  they  have  been  weak  on account  of  the  number  of 
concerns involved, the consequent difficulty in securing har- 
mony among the members, and the ease with which outside 
capital  could  enter  the  field and break up the  pool.  The 
relatively small number of  companies  in  the United  States 
now  engaged  in the steel trade on any large scale would 
facilitate the making and keeping  of  agreements in regard 
to production  and prices.  The small number  of  concerns 
engaged in the manufacture of  steel rails accounts in large 
measure for the success of  the steel rail  association, which 
for six years has held the price of  steel rails at $28.00 per 
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ton  In this  association, as  in others, the Steel Corpora- 
tion with  its large share of the country's  trade has had  a 
preponderating  influence.  On account  of  the attitude  of 
public opinion and the mare active enforcement of  the anti- 
trust laws many of  these associations have been  nominally 
rliscmtinued.  Tacit understandings, however, in regard to 
prices prevail  now  as ever, and seem nearly as  effective as 
dhnite pooling agreements. 
What  the  influence  of  such  associative  action  will  be 
upon  the interests  of  consumers can  only  be  conjectured. 
The number of  steel producers being relatively small, agree- 
ments or understandings in regard to prices will tend to be 
more  stable  in  the  future than  in  the  past.  There may 
be some marking up of  prices  as a result of  such associa- 
tive  action;  but  the  attempt  to raise  them  much  above 
what market  conditions  would  justify  would  in  all  likeli- 
hood weaken the ties of the association, induce outside com- 
petitors to enter the field, and provoke much public opposi- 
tion.  In Germany  the great coal  syndicate has for these 
reasons  often  resisted  the  movement  to  raise  prices  in 
periods of  prosperity.  In this country at the present time 
it is worthy of note that it is the Steel Corporation and not 
the independent  companies  that is  resisting the attempt to 
raise prices.  This opposition, of  course, is  due to the re- 
cognition of  the importance of a steady rather than fluctuat- 
ing volume  of  trade.  Unless  the steel  industry  becomes 
monopolized by the Steel Corporation or some other com- 
bination having the sanction of the law, the interests of cm- 
sumers do not  seem to be  menaced  by  the attempt to re- 
duce the oscillations of  the trade. 
In the above outline it is seen that the Steel Corporation 
is an expression of  the centralizing  tendencies  of the iron 
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a  result  of these tendencies,  and  that  it  has  reacted  upon 
the conditions that gave it birth.  In the  following pages 
an examination of this organization will be  made with the 
theory above outlined in view. 
CHAPTER  I1 
3 I.  FOR  an adequate appreciation  of  the  forces  which 
have evolved the United  States Steel  Corporation, and are 
furing  its  character  and  economic  position,  some  analysis 
is necessary of the determining factors in the iron and steel 
situation  in  this  country.  As has already been  indicated 
several forces co-operated  in the development  of  this great 
organization.  However,  the movement  toward  consolida- 
tion  and  the  most  salient  features  of  this  movement 
are  the  outcome  principally  of  these  four  determining 
conditions:  first, the  natural  distribution  of  ore and  coal 
which  made the growth of  iron  and steel manufacture  in 
this  country  possible  and  favored  in  great measure large 
scale production; second, the nature of  the industry which 
necessitated  large capital for economical production; third, 
the fluctuating  demand  for goods which  made  some con- 
trol over the trade peculiarly  desirable from the standpoint 
of  producers;  fourth, the protective  tariff  which  shut  out 
effective foreign competition and acted as an inducement to 
the great producers to combine  for the purpose of  mono- 
polistic control. 
3 2.  A.  For several  years  thC 'Jnited  States has easily 
ranked first among the world's  producers of  iron and steel. 
This pre-eminence has in part been due to the productivity 
of  the ore and  coal  fields with  which  the  country  is  en- 
dowed.  Through its ownership of land richly supplied with 
raw  material,  and  by  the  application  of  large  capital  to 
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both  mining  and  manufacture,  this  country  has  been  en- 
abled to supply nearly all the home markets and to export 
large quantities of  iron and  steel  goods. 
Of the world's production of iron ore in  1903--estimated 
by  the American  Iron and Steel  Association  to have been 
about 100,1g8,ooo tons '-the  United  States produced  35,- 
019,308 tons, or about 34.95 per cent.  The countries next 
in  rank  were  Germany  and  Great  Britain,  which  contri- 
buted  respectively, 21.19  per  cent  and  13.96 per  cent.  In 
the same year this country produced  18,009,252 tons of  pig 
iron, or 38.83 per cent of the world's total, and 14,534,978 
tons of  steel, or 30.57  per  cent.  The production  for  1904 
fell off somewhat on account of  the depression of  that year, 
the output of  pig iron  in  this country having  declined  to 
16,497,033 tons, and that of  steel, to 13,767,306 tons.  The 
years 1905 and 1906 were years of  unsurpassed prosperity 
in the iron and steel trade, not  only in this country but  in 
Europe  as well.  It is  estimated  that  the  output  of  pig 
iron in the United  States during 1906 reached  25,850,000 
tons; in  Germany,  12,300,ooo  (metric)  tons; and in Great 
Britain,  IO,IOO,OOO  tons.'  The tonnage  of  steel  in  this 
country for 1905 attained the enormous total of 19,912,757." 
From these figures it will be  seen that the United  States 
in  recent  years has been  producing  a  large proportion  of 
the  world's  iron  and steel.  Whether or not  this  country 
will  continue to retain  this preeminence  for a long period 
is  doubtful.  Much  depends upon the country's  deposits of 
workable  ore;  and  thesq have  been  variously  estimated 
from a little over ~,ooo,ooo,ooo  to more than 4,000,000,000 
tons.  The first of these estimates is probably much too low. 
Iron Age, Sept. 14  1905.  Unless otherwise ind,icated in  this work. 
the  word tons means gross  tons. 
Ibid.,  Dec. 20,  I@,  p.  1683. 
Ibid.,  March 22,  I@.  p.  1042. 
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While an estimate of this character is necessarily  very  un- 
certain, it may serve as a rough indication of  the probable 
limits of our ore capacity.  The ore fields of  Germany, in- 
cluding Luxenlburg, are thought to contain over 2,000,000.- 
ooo  tons.  Recent  discoveries  credit  China  with  ore  de- 
posits of great magnitude.  These large and less developed 
fields are likely in the near future to be worked  at a much 
lower cost than those in this country, as they are to a great 
extent surface deposits and as labor cost  is less than here. 
With  the gradual  exhaustion  of  the  more  superficial  de- 
posits,  the law of  diminishing  returns will make itself  felt 
sooner or later in  the United  States; and prices  here will 
tend  to be  higher  than  in  regions  which  have been  more 
recently worked.  The position of  the United States as the 
leading producer  of  iron and steel will, however, probably 
be preserved  for many years. 
B.  The iron  and  steel  industry  in  this country  has de- 
veloped mainly in  the states east of  the Mississippi  River. 
Within this region  are the principal coal and iron-ore  dis- 
tricts of  the country and the chief markets for iron and steel 
goods.  Outside of  this region the known fields of  ore ant1 
coal are either too limited or too unfavorably  situated for 
the assembling  of  material  seriously  to affect  the present 
trade of  the country.  Within the section  mentioned,  iron 
and steel manufacture is carried on principally  in two dis- 
tricts: a region extending from New York and New Jersey 
.on the east to Illinois on the west, and the country about 
Birmingham,  Alabama.  The first  of  these  is  much  the 
larger in extent and productivity,  and contains most of  the 
plants  of  the  Steel  Corporation.  The existence  of  large 
manufacturing establishments  in this  region  is  due to the 
proximity  of  extensive  coking-coal  fields, to the  nearness 
of  excellent markets, and to cheap  transportation  facilities 
over the great lakes from the ore regions of Minnesota and 
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Pennsylvania,  which is the center of  the industry in the 
United States, easily leads in the amount and value of  her 
products.  In 1900-the  year before the formation of the 
Steel  Corporation-the  value  of  the iron and  steel  manu- 
factured in this State constituted fifty-four per cent of  that 
of  the  entire  country.  In  1905  Pennsylvania  produced 
forty-six per cent of  all the pig iron and fifty-five per cent 
of  all  the  steel  made  in  the  United  States.'  This  pre- 
dominance is to be  attributed to the natural advantages of 
the state in the matter of  coal deposits and limestone, to the 
easy comtnunication with the Lake Superior ore fields, and 
to its excellent position as a distributing center for the east- 
ern part  of  the country.  Toward  the  east  and  south  of 
Pittsburg  is  the  famous Connellsville  coking-coal  region. 
The importance of this district to the iron industry of  Penn- 
sylvania is seen in the fact that in 1905 63.8 per cent of all 
the coke produced in this country came from this state. 
Ohio ranks next to Pennsylvania in the amount and value 
of  her  iron  and steel  products.  Illinois,  New  Jqsey, In- 
diana, \Vest Virginia, and New York are also producers in 
this  northern  section.  The industry  in  Ohio  and  West 
Virginia  may  be  regarded  as western  and  southern  ex- 
tensions  of  that  of western  Pennsylvania.  The trade  in 
West Virginia  is due also in part to the noted  Pocahontas 
coal district.  The industry in Illinois and Indiana has de- 
veloped largely on account of the excellent market for iron 
and  steel  goods  in  Chicago  and  the  West.  These states 
are also in close proximity to the ore supplies of  the Lake 
Superior region.  The niills of  New Jersey and New York 
are largely mills  for the manufacture  of  finished  material 
and are located for easy distribution to eastern markets. 
The iron and steel  manufacture  of  Alabama  is  entirely 
lBulletin of  the  American Iron and  Steel Association, Dec., 1906. 
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separate  from the  industry  of  the  northern  section.  Its 
development has been due to purely natural causes,-closely 
adjacent supplies of  iron ore and  coal.  The facility with 
which  these essentials  to iron manufacture  call  be  assem- 
bled  and the cheapness of  labor bring the cost  of  produc- 
tion down to a lower level here than in any other part of  the 
Union.  Mills and furnaces in some instances get both their 
ore and coal within half  a mile of  the plant.  While Ala- 
bama is thus favored with productive facilities, her develop- 
ment has not been so rapid as that of  the Lake states-a  fact 
which may be partly attributed to her remoteness from the 
hest markets of  the country.  Present indications, however, 
point  to a great future development of  the industry in this 
region. 
The iron and steel industry of  the country is carried on 
mainly in these two regions.  The first, which is much the 
more extensive and important, draws its supplies of raw ma- 
terial from the ore fields of  the Lake Superior district and 
the coal fields of  Pennsylvania  and West Virginia, and de- 
pends upon the cheap transportation of  the Great Lakes for 
the assembling of  material.  To a  considerable extent the 
producers of  this region sell in the same markets.  Geogra- 
phical  proximity  thus  brings  them  into  certain  relation- 
ships with each other; and both community of  interests and 
competition have favored combination.  The second is cen- 
tered mainly in Alabama, and depends upon the ore and coal 
of  that State.  Its markets are limited for the most part to 
the South; and it has therefore had much  less commercial 
influence and a  more  restricted  growth than the northern 
section. 
C.  The most  important  natural  condition  affecting  the 
status of  the  iron and steel  industry  is the supply  of  ore. 
Iron  ore  is  found  in  appreciable  quantities  in  half  the 
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exist  in  some  of  the  Rocky  Mountain  and  Pacific  Coast 
states, notably in Colorado and Utah.'  Many of  these ore 
lands are owned  by  the  Colorado Fuel & Iron  Company. 
Extensive  areas of ore deposits  are found  in  the Atlantic 
States,  especially  in  Pennsylvania, which  up  to the  early 
eighties  was the chief  ore producing  state in  the country. 
The main supply of  the country, however,  is derived  from 
the Lake Superior region,  which during the last six years 
has  produced  over seventy per cent of  the country's total. 
Owing to the fact that this ore contains a larger percentage 
of  iron than the ores of  the South and West, the propor- 
tion of  iron derived from the Lake Superior district would, 
during  these  years,  exceed  four-fifths.  During  the  last 
two years the proportion of  ore supplied by this region,has 
increased.  Of  the  42,526,133  tons  of  ore mined  in  the 
United  States in 1905,  34,522,965 tons were shipped from 
this district; and the proportion for 1906  is even greater. 
This ore region is located along the southern and west- 
ern shores of  Lake Superior, principally in Minnesota and 
Michigan.  Most of  the mines are within a hundred  miles 
of  the Lake coast,  from which easy and cheap transport is 
made to the lower lake ports.  The extent of the deposits of 
this  region has been  variously  estimated; but most  recent 
estimates place it at upwards of  2,000,000,000 
The next most important ore district of the United States 
is the Alabama region upon which the iron interests of  that 
section depend.  At the time the Twelfth Census was taken 
Alabama  ranked third among the states in the production 
of  iron ore and fifth in the production of  coal.  Its rank 
For account of  ore deposits in Utah, see Iron Age, Oct. 27, 1904,  p. 3. 
2 Richard  H.  Edmonds, in  Review  of Reviews,  Dec.,  1906. For an 
interesting  account  of  consolidation  in  this region,  see H.  R.  Mussey, 
Combinution in the  Mining  Industry, in the Columbia  Studies  in His- 
tory, Economics  and Public  Law. 
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as a producer of  ore remains the same to-day.  Notwith- 
standing this high  rank  the output of  the state is  rather 
small  compared  with. that  of  Minnesota  or  Michigan. 
Nevertheless  the  possibilities  of  the  Alabama  region  are 
great.  While the extent of  its ore fields is much  less than 
those  of  the  Lake  Superior  district,  the  facilities  for  as- 
sembling  material  make  the cost  of  utilizing  the ore less 
than at the North.  Owing to differences  in  the character 
of  their products,  the iron interests of  Alabama have not, 
thus far, come into serious competition with the industries 
depending  for their supply of  ore upon  the Lake Superior 
region.  It seems not unlikely, however, that these interests 
kvith  their facilities  for cheap producticm  will  at no distant 
day be  rivals of  the great combinations of  the North. 
The Lake Superior and Alabama regions are estimated to 
ccmltain at least ninety per cent of  the workable ore of  the 
country.  While such  an estimate is necessarily  uncertain, 
it  seems  probable  that  these  two  regions  will  supply  the 
bulk of  our native ore for many years to come. 
The ores  of  these  two  districts  differ  in  certain  note- 
worthy  particulars.  While  high  and  low  grade ores  are 
found in both  regions, the percentage  of  iron contained  in 
the Lake Superior material which  it  has been  profitable  to 
mine  ranges  from fifty-two  to  sixty-seven,  while  that  of 
the Alabama product averages about forty-five.  The Lake 
Superior product which  is ordinarily utilized  is thus richer 
in  the proportion of  iron  contents. 
Another  difference  of  more vital  importance  is  the vari- 
ation in the percentage of  phosphorus contained  in the ore. 
On this  difference depends  the  suitability  of  the  material 
for  the  n~anufacture  of  Bessemer  steel.  Ores  containing 
more than five or six hvntlredths of  one per  cent  of  phos- 
phorus are ~uiiavailable  for the Bessemer process.  The Lake 
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to fifteen hundredths of one per cent, while the Alabama ores 
contain from one-tenth of one per cent to one per cent.  Much 
of the former, therefore, is suitable for the manufacture of 
Bessemer steel, while the latter is not.  The  open-hearth pro- 
cess, however, is being used to manufacture steel from more 
phosphoric ores; and the development of  this process seems 
to be  neutralizing  the importance of  this difference  in  the 
ores of  the two regions.  The steadily increasing  demand 
for open-hearth steel is also noticeable.  The following table 
shows the  increased  production  of  steel  both  of  the  Bes- 
semer and  open-hearth  grades for the years  1900-1905  :  l 
Ojcn-hearth steel. 
Cross tons. 
1900. .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  . 3,398,135 
1901  ...........  4.656,309 
1902 ...........  ~~687,729 
1903 .......... 5,8;9,91 I 
1904 ...........  5,908,166 









Total for  country. 
Cross tons. 
1o,oe2,go5 





The steady  increase  of  the  production  of  open-hearth 
steel is noticeable, and its increasing relative importance is 
significant.  The fact that this product seems fully the equal 
of  the Bessemer material,= and is  even  supplanting it, has 
allayed  much  of  the fear  once  felt  concerning  the  effects 
of the possible monopolization  of  the Lake Superior region. 
From this brief consideration of  the ore atld coal districts 
of the country and of  the industries depending upon  these 
districts, it will be  seen that natural conditions have deter- 
mined  the  location  of  iron  and  steel  plants.  The great 
combinations of these regions have been formed among cor- 
porations either  engaged  in  different  stages of  the manu- 
1 Iron Age, Mar. 22,  1906, p.  1042. 
2 Ibid.,  Feb.  8,  1906, p.  513.  See  account of  meeting of  American 
Society of  Civil  Engineers. 
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factuie of the same class or classes of  commodities in one or 
other of these regions, or depending upon the same sources 
of raw  material and competing  in  the same  markets.  In 
neither  district  has  the  trade  been  monopolized.  In the 
North, where consolidations have attained their greatest de- 
velopment,  there  is  still  much  competition.  The ore and 
coal fields hhve thus far proved too extensive for monopoli- 
zation.  Even  if  these  fields should  come  under  a  single 
control,  there  would  still  be  much  effective  competition 
from the South, and possibly from the West. 
5 3.  A. Another factor of  prime importance in determin- 
ing the iron and steel  situation is the large capital  neces- 
sary for economical  production.  This condition  has  fav- 
ored  the  formation  of  large  corporations.  The fact  that 
only large concerns can compete successfully tends to limit 
the number of  producers and facilitates combination among 
these producers.  In order to form some estimate of  the in- 
fluence of  this condition we may note, first, the fact of  con- 
centration, and then consider the question of  the economies 
achieved. 
The tendency toward concentration has been very marked 
during the last two or three decades.  During this period 
an increasing  amount  of  capital  has been  used  to equip 
properly  blast  furnaces  and  rolling  mills,  and  secure  re- 
quisite mining  and transportation  facilities.  The acquisi- 
tion  of  mining and  transportation  facilities  was  not  con- 
sidered essential  to an efficiently  organized  manufacturing 
company until the later nineties; but it is now almost indis- 
pensable  to a  corporation  aspiring after  more  than  local 
trade.  The trend  toward  more  elaborate  equipment  can 
be  seen in a comparison between  the number  of  iron and 
steel  establishments  and  the  amount  of  capital  invested. 
During the twenty years from 1880  to 1900  the number of 
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to 224.  The alnount of  capital invested in blast  furnaces- 
including  rented  property-increased  in  the  same  period 
from $89,531,362  to $148,226,113.'  In other words  con- 
siderably  Inore  than  twice  as much  money  was  expended 
in the equipment of  the average blast  furnace in  1900 than 
in  1880.  The number  of  active establishments  produciiig 
steel ingots or castings and rolled  iron and steel numberecl 
in  1880, 358; and  in  1900. 438  The capital  invested  in- 
creased  from $I 16,458,390 to $441,79 j,983.2  TIIUS,  while 
the number of rolling ~nills  ant1 steel works  increased  dur- 
ing these two decades less than twenty per cent, the capital 
invested was augmented by  nearly three  hundred  per  cent. 
This trend  in  the  direction of  concentration  in  the steel 
trade  may  be  illustratecl  by  organizations  in  rail  rnanu- 
facture.  In 1887 the first rail pool was organized; and th~s 
combination  consisted  of  fifteen members.  At  first  it  was 
weak, owing to considerable  outside competition, and  also 
to internal dissatisfaction with the allot~nents  of  trade.  In 
the  allotnient  of  1888, tlie  largest  percentage  granted  to 
any one company was 13.5 ; and this share was given to the 
Carnegie  Company.  In  1897, ten  years  after  the  forma- 
tion of  the first  pool, this  rail  association  consisted  of  but 
six members.  The only considerable manufacturer of  steel 
rails  outside  of  the  pool  was  the  Illinois  Steel  Compan!, 
which  did  not  enter  this  association  on  account  of  the  11- 
linois laws  against pooling.  111 the  allotment  of  1897 the 
Carnegie Company  was  given  53.50 per  cent of  the pool's 
trade, and  the  Lackawanna  Conlpatiy, nearly  two-fifths  oi 
the  remainder.  Thus within  a  single  decade  the  number 
of  companies producing steel rails on any considerable scale 
was  reduced,  and  the  tendency  of  tlie  industry  to  come 
under the control of  a few large corporations became more 
1 Twelfth Census, vol. 10, p. 29.  2 Ibrd. \ol.  10,  p  j4 
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and  more  apparent.  Since  the  spring  of  1901,  nearly 
three-fifths  of the  steel  rails  manufactured  in  the  United 
States have been produced by the constituent companies of 
the  Steel  Corporation; and  the  remainder,  principally  by 
five companies,-the  Lackawanna, the Bethlehem, the Cam- 
bria,  the  Pennsylvania,  and  the  Maryland,  of  which  the 
most important is the Lackawanna. 
Another  indication  of  this  drift  toward  large  corpor- 
ate ownership is  seen  in  the number of  abandoned  estab- 
lishments.  In  1900,  according  to  the  Twelfth  Census, 
there were  123 iron and  steel  establishments with  a  total 
capital  of  $23,831,819  reported  idle.  This was  the larg- 
est  idle  investment  shown  for  any  industry.  Such  an 
abandonment of  industrial establishments is significant both 
of  the  shifting location  of  the  iron  industry  and  of  the 
increasing  concentration  in  large  plants.  In many  states 
there  exist  abandoned  mills  which  were built  to utilize  a 
local  supply  of  ore and  which  have  been  rendered  per- 
ma~lently  unproductive  by  the  cornpertiltion  of  new  mills, 
either  better  equipped,  or in  proximity  to superior  raw 
materials. 
The tendency toward large-scale production has not only 
been  in  the  direction  of  larger  and  better  equipped  blast 
furnaces and mills,  but  also in  the  direction of  consolida- 
tion of plants and companies.  This trend is exemplified in 
two kinds of  combinations: the union of  concerns engaged 
in different stages of the production of  a class or classes of 
commodiiies ;  and the consolidation of companies manufactur- 
ing the same grades or classes of  articles.  An example of 
the  former would  be  the  Federal  Steel  Company,  organ- 
ized in 1898, and now a part of  the Steel Corlmraticvn.  This 
company consisted principally  of  the Minnesota Iron Com- 
pany  owning ore fields  in  the  Lake  Superior  region  and 
manufacturing crude  iron,  the  Elgin,  Joliet  and  Eastern 36  THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION  [as8 
Railroad Cmpany providing certain transportation facilities 
to some of  the coal regions of  Illinois, and the Illinois Steel 
Company  manufacturing  crude  material  like  bars,  slabs, 
etc.,  and  some  finished  products  like  steel  rails.  Such a 
union  is  formed  to secure  a  higher  degree  of  productive 
efficiency by  adjusting more  economically  the  productio~l 
of raw and crude material to the den~and  for finished goods. 
An example  of  a  consolidation  manufacturing  the  same 
grade of articles would be the American Tinplate Company, 
also merged  in the Steel Corporation.  This company con- 
sisted  of  more  than forty rival  concerns.  A  combination 
of  this character generally aims to restrict  or destroy com- 
petition,  although  econonly  of  production  may  also  be 
sought.  An indication of  the extent to which this integra- 
tion of  industries in both  these directions  has gone is seen 
in  the fact  that nearly  all  the great steel  concerns  of  the 
country are producers of  raw, crude, and finished material, 
and that more  than half  the country's  trade  is  now  con- 
trolled by a single corporation. 
B.  The progress  of  this  concentration has been  due  in 
part to the fact that increasing returns have resulted  from 
the application  of  large  capital.  To-day  it  is  practically 
impossible to carry on an extensive manufacturing business 
in the higher and more important grades of  iron and steel 
goods with  a  capital  of  less  than  fifteen  million  dollars. 
This fact may be illustrated by considering the cost of  such 
an item  as  a  modern  blast  furnace.  Such  a  furnace  is 
likely to he froin 500 to 700 tons capacity.  .A  rough esti- 
mate  is,  to the effect  that  a  500  ton  furnace costs  about 
$~OO,OOO,  and takes upward of  a year and a half  to build.' 
In addition to this investment, the labor of  some hundreds 
of  men  and  the transportation  of  1,500 tons  or more  of 
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nlaterial must be provided  for each day.  This of  itself  re- 
qires a capital of half a million.  In other words it would 
take  about  $I,OOO,OOO  capital  to build,  start, and  keep  in 
operation a single 500 toil  furnace.  The cost of  producing 
a ton of  pig iron  in  such  a  furnace  is  from forty to fifty 
per  cent  less  than  in  the  average  furnace  of  the  early 
eighties,  which  represented  an investment  of  $250,000  to 
$300,000. 
Plants with large capital have thus supplanted those with 
small capital because  of  their  superior efficiency  and econ- 
omy.  HOW  far production on an enlarging scale continues 
to be more econon~ical  it is difficult to determine.  The appli- 
cation of repeated "  doses " of capital  does  not  necessarily 
continue indefinitely to be  more economical.  The point on 
this enlarging scale  at which the most  efficient  production 
is reached varies with conditions.  Under similar conditions, 
a  capital  of  forty or fifty  millions  would,  in  the  opinion 
of  one of  the officials of  the Steel  Corporation  whom  the 
writer  interviewed, be  as efficient  in  the iron and steel  in- 
dustry as a capital of ten times that amount.  One of  the 
witnesses  before the Industrial  Commission testified  that a 
capital  of  $?o,ooo,ooo  to  $~O,OOO,OOO would  build  and 
equip  a  steel  plant  for effective  competition.'  It  would 
seem  from these  statements  that  the  principal  economies 
achieved  in the industry by  large investment of  capital  can 
be  attained  with  less  than  $~O,OOO,OOO.  With  capital  of 
this amount or more a steel concern can own and equip the 
most efficient blast  furnaces and nlills and secure control of 
its sources of  raw material. 
C. The  question whether or not a corporation whose capital 
~nany  times this amount  has any competitive  advantage 
lnerely by  virtue of  its size is difficult to answer.  To this 
Report of  Industrial  Comnzission, vol.  13, pp.  504-106. 
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question  certain  steel  officials,  as has  already  been  noted. 
have  given  a  negative  reply.  There  are, however,  some 
considerations  which  seem to favor  a  large consolidation. 
The well known savings in the matter of  advertising and in 
the  employment  of  a  smaller  number  of  traveling  agents 
and salesmen are worthy of  mention,  although these econ- 
omies are not so marked as in the case of  some other indus- 
tries.  The amount of  capital employed for advertising and 
agency  purposes  in  the  iron and steel trade is small com- 
pared with the total investment.  A more important item of 
economy is found in the organization of  the mills consoli- 
dated.  In concentrating departments of  manufacture,  for 
example, instead  of  compelling each establishment to make 
numerous sizes and parts of  the same product  considerable 
saving can be  made.  Stopping a mill to change the rolls 
to suit each size or variety  of  a commodity involves waste 
of  time.  This waste  is  obviated  when  the  different  sizes 
and shapes are distributed among a number of  mills whose 
productive work need  not  be  interrupted.  In many of  the 
more finished varieties of  iron and steel goods the estimated 
saving through  this multiplicity  of  mills  amounts to more 
than one dollar per ton. 
It may  be  said  in  general that the iron and  steel trade 
from its very  nature demands large capital.  To some ex- 
tent  productive  efficiency  seems  to  be  increased  by  con- 
solidation.  Increasing  returns  have  in  large  measure 
followed  increasing  outlays.  It  is  improbable,  however, 
that this law of  increasing returns operates indefinitely.  As 
has already been noted the principal economies attained by 
an iron and steel concern are achieved with a capital of less 
than $~O.MO,OOO.  There are some savings, as has also bee11 
indicated,  in  the  multiplicity  of  mills  in  cases  where  the 
capital may exceed this limit.  It is unlikely, however, that 
any  considerable  economies are gained by  very large con- 
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solidations  by  virtue of mere size.  The fact that the Steel 
corporation,  as will  be  noted  later, has not  increased  its 
proportion of  the  country's  trade during the  six  years of 
its existence is some evidence of the truth of this assumption. 
The necessity of large capital to equip properly a steel con- 
cern limits the number of  such organizations.  This facilitates 
combination  for the  purpose  of  controlling the  industry. 
The motive for organizing the larger consolidations is not, 
therefore, competitive efficiency but the desire for monopoly 
control. 
8 4.  A.  The third great factor in the iron and steel situa- 
tion furnishes a powerful incentive toward combination for 
the purpose of control.  This factor is the varying demand 
for  commodities.  Alternating  periods  of  prosperity  and 
depression  act  with  great  force  upon  this  industry,  and 
make  some  control  over  the  trade  peculiarly  desirable 
from the standpoint  of  producers.  The demand  for iron 
and steel varies, not according to the pressing needs of  con- 
sumers, but according to changes in the development of new 
enterprises.  These changes  are periodic; and this period- 
icity  is  closely associat~cl  with  variations  in  the  spirit  of 
investment.  In so-called good times new enterprises of  all 
sorts are freely  launched.  In  succeeding  periods  of  dull- 
ness  comparatively  few  ventures  are  entered  upon.  But 
investment  and  fresh ventures imply the erection of  plants 
and  the  increased  use  of  tools  and  machines.  These  in 
turn mean iron and steel. 
The heaviest consumers, too, of  iron  and scteel,  like rail- 
road  corporations,  purchase  their  material  in  large  ship- 
ment,  and  this material  is  intended  to  supply  a  need  for 
many  years  ahead.  The demand  is  generally  great with 
the  advent  of  prosperous  times  or  when  confidence  is 
felt in  the  futr~re. It  is  then  that  liberal  outlays can  be 
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new  enterprises.  If  steel  cars  are  to  be  substituted  for 
wooden ones, they are ordered by the scores and hundreds; 
if  a  new  railroad  is  to be  built,  shipments  of  rails  must 
be rnade in  thousands of  tons.  During periods of  depres- 
sion, on the other hand, little iron and steel is ordered be- 
yond  the maintenance of  plants and stocks.  Old material, 
if  servicable at all, is likely to continue in use until the out- 
look points to the return of  more prosperous times. 
Uiitil  very  recently  these  fluctuations  have  been  accen- 
tuated  by  the  influence  of  intermediate  producers.  The 
demand  for finished products  varies considerably  and with 
great uncertainty  from year to year.  From the mining of 
ore to the sale of  finished products there are several stages 
of  manufacture and transportation.  The intermediate pro- 
ducers  must  adjust their  scale  of  production-which,  for 
obvious  reasons,  cannot  be  immediately  enlarged  or can- 
tracted-to  a  changeable and  often  fitful  demand  on the 
part  of consumers of  finished  products.  This adjustment 
is necessarily very imperfectly made where the intermediate 
prod~~cers  are independent  concerns.  This fact  has made 
the combination under one control of  all the stages of  pro- 
duction  from the  mining  of  raw  material  to the  sale  of 
finished goods desirable  and  economical.  This integrated 
system is  becoming  characteristic  of  nearly  all  the  larger 
consolidations  of  the iron and steel trade. 
B.  These  oscillations  of  the  industry  are  reflected  in 
variations of  prices.  In December,  1898, steel  rails  were 
selling as low as $17.00 per ton.  A year later the price had 
risen to $35.00 per ton.  In another year the price had de- 
clined  to $26.00  per  ton.  Steel  billets  on  December  29, 
1898, were  quoted  at  $16.25  per  ton; on  Kovember  29, 
1899, at $39.50 per ton; and on October 3, 1900, at $16.50 
per ton.  The lowest and highest quotations for wire rods 
during the years  1898 to 1900  inclusive, were  respectively 
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$20.00  and  $50.00  per  ton.  After  the  latter  price  had 
been  reached early in  1900, there was a drop to $30.00  per 
to11  before the close of  the year. 
Unstable prices necessarily cause great variations in earn- 
ings.  The income  of  the  Republic  Iron  and  Steel  Com- 
pany during the two prosperous years of  1900 and 1901 is 
fairly typical of what one is likely to find in a trade marked 
by  great and uncertain  changes  in  the demand  for goods. 
This  company  showed  on  its  books  for  the  year  ending 
June  30,  1901, a  total  of $~I,OOO,OOO  assets.  Its capital 
stock was $47,497,000, of which $20,30G,ooo  was preferred. 
In 1900 the company's  net  earnings were $j,684,101,  and 
in  1901, only $1,034,248.  The amounts paid  out in divid- 
ends  for the two years were $3,643,729 and $309,099 re- 
spectively.'  This  falling  off  means  that  in  1901,  which 
was generally  regarded as a good year,  the Republic  Iron 
and Steel Company paid  out in dividends only one-twelfth 
of what  it  had  paid  in  1900,  and  only  a  little  over one- 
fifth of  the  amount  needed  to  cover  the  seven  per  cent 
dividends on its preferred stock, leaving nothing at all  for 
the common stock. 
The vicissitudes  in the demand for railroad supplies are 
strikingly  shown  in  the  experience  of  the  Pressed  Steel 
Car  Company.  This  organization  from  1899  to  1903 
more than earned large dividends on its full stock-its  com- 
mon  stock  securing  twenty-eight  per  cent  in  1902.  In 
1904,  however,  it  had  so  little  business,  less  than  one- 
seventh that of 1902, that it was obliged to draw heavily on 
its surplus to pay  the dividends on its preferred  stock and 
was cotnpelled to pass the dividends on the coinn~on.~ 
l Report  of the British Iron  Trade Commission on Americatr  I~tdrcs- 
trial  Conditions. p. 300. 
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The experience of  the Pressed  Steel Car Company  is il- 
lustrative of  the fact  that the more specialized a  phase  of 
the iron and steel industry  is the more exposed it is to the 
vicissitudes of  the trade.  The larger consolidations,  in ad- 
dition  to  securing  control  of  their  sources  of  raw  ma- 
terial and the stages of  manufacture from  raw  to finished 
product, have embraced under their control several different 
lines  of  manufacture.  By  thus  extending  their  markets 
these combinations have to some extent steadied their pro- 
fits.  The greater the number of  markets the more certain 
the income is likely to be. 
C.  This desire to lessen the fluctuations of  the industry 
has been a leading  incentive to consolidation.  The neces- 
sity of opening  up  and shutting down mills and  furnaces 
with varying periods of  demand causes much  waste.  The 
mechanical  waste involved  is great enough to increase  ap- 
preciably the cost of  production.  But this is not the only 
loss.  Brisk times are periods of  high money wages.  The 
attempt to curtail  expenses  in  times  of  severe  depression 
by  lowering wages meets with  resistance  from workmen- 
especially  labor  tlnions.  The  demand  for  increased  re- 
m~~neration  during  flourishing  periods  and  resistance  to 
any curtailment in  dull  times with consequent  strikes and 
lockouts have been  sources  of  great loss to iron and  steel 
establishn~ents. Another feature of  the situation giving rise 
to waste  is  what  may  be  called  a  tendency  to abnormal 
competition.  During  a  period  of  prosperity-especially 
if  long continued-an  unduly  large number of  competitors 
are induced  to enter  the  field.  With  the  advent  o!  dull 
times there is great "  slashing " of  prices among these rival 
concerns to secure trade.  This competition frequently causes 
prices to sink below the level of  cost, and many  establish- 
ments  are driven out of  business  with  consequent  loss  of 
capital.  This feature of  the industry has not  only  caused 
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waste, but has tended  to accentuate the naturally  great os- 
cillations of  the trade. 
The uncertainties  and  fluctuations of  the  business  have 
I~en  responsible  for another characteristic  of  the industry. 
The prices  at which  the  securities  of  steel  concerns  have 
been  sold  have  been  relatively  low  and  very  fluctuating. 
Men put money  into the iron and steel business,  not  as an 
investment,  but  as  a  means  of  making  a  fortune.  Steel 
stock was thus a  favorite with speculators rather than  in- 
vestors; and the industry as a whole was permeated with a 
speculative  spirit. 
One of the great ends of  consolidation has been to reduce 
the  waste  incident  to  fluctuation  and  to  render  returns 
steadier  and  more  certain.  Such  an  aim  could  not  be 
achieved  without an organization  controlling a  large per- 
centage of the trade of  the country.  If the organization of 
the  Steel  Corporation is to be  attributed to any one cause 
more  than  another, it  is  to  be  assigned  to  the  desire  of 
achieving this end  and  placing  the  industry on  an  invest- 
ment level. 
5.  -4. Another determining influence acting on the iron 
;~ntl  steel  trade of  the country and an important  factor in 
tacilitating combination has been  the protective  tariff.  It 
is  not  the  purpose  of  this  dissertation  to  enter  into  any 
detailed  discussion  of  such  an  intricate  subject  as  the 
relation  of  the  tariff to the  growth  of  the  iron  and  steel 
manufacture, but  simply  to indicate the nature of  that  re- 
lation.'especially  in  its  bearing  upon  the  growth  of  con- 
solidation. 
It has frequently been asserted that one of  the chief causes 
of conlbinatio~~  is  the  protective tariff.  Mr.  Havemeyer's 
dictum that the tariff  is the mother  of  the trusts has many 
supporters.  It may  be  doubted, however,  if this assertion 
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the  largest  and  most  monopolistic  combinations  have  no 
direct  tariff  protection; and in England, where there is no 
protection,  combinations have  been  formed  and  operated 
with  success.  At  the  same  time  many  consolidations  in 
this country would  never have been organized without  the 
tariff.  The restriction which the tariff  places upon foreign 
competition has aeted as an incentive to combination where 
industrial  conditions  were  in  other  respects  favorable. 
Whether or not such a combination secures permanent con- 
trol over the domestic market depends upon circumstances. 
If  a  consolidation  secures  control  of  the  sources  of  raw 
material  within  the protected  area,  and a  tariff  is  levied 
upon  such material  imported  from foreign  countries, it is 
clear that domestic competition has lost  in part at least  its 
power  to  lower  prices.  Without  such  control  or  some 
other monopolistic advantage within the country itself, the 
tariff  will  not  give  a  business  organization  a  permanent 
monopoly.  A  combination  of  all  the manufacturers of  a 
nation  may  secure  a  temporary  control  of  the  market: 
but  new  capital will enter the field  and reduce  prices  to a 
competitive  level. 
It is  true  that  trust  officials  in those  industries  where 
high  tariffs  are levied  are generally  strong  defenders  of 
protection.  Among several  reasons usually  cited by  them 
for the maintenance  of  a  high  tariff  is  one  directly  op- 
posed  to the assertion  that monopoly is  thereby  fostered. 
It is contended that protection should be maintained, as its 
withdrawal would  involve the  ruin  of  competing  organi- 
zations  and  thus  leave  the  domestic  field  in  the  posses- 
sion  of  combinations.  The  validity  of  this  contention, 
which  has  gained  a  certain  popularity,  is  difficult  to see. 
If a consolidation  achieves economies by  which  it  can sell 
goods  more  cheaply  than  its  smaller  competitors,  it  can 
hardly be said that the alleged more expensive methods of 
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those  competitors should be  encouraged by  a  tariff.  The 
is  concerned with securing cheap  products  of  good 
quality whether  produced  by  a  large or a  small  concern. 
If a  large  organization,  by  virtue  of  its  size,  can  manu- 
facture at a  cost sufficiently low  to meet  foreign competi- 
tion, but  its smaller rivals need  tariff  protection,  it  is evi- 
dent that the public derives no benefit  from the economies 
achieved by  the combination  in  safeguarding  its rivals by 
potective measures. 
Upon  the  iron  and steel  industry of  the United  States 
the tariff has exercised  considerable  influence.  Until very 
recently the cost of  manufacturing iron and steel has been, 
in general, higher  in this country than in Europe; and an 
important  part of  this  expense  has been  labor  cost.  The 
contention  of  manufacturers  that  the  abolition  of  the 
tariff  would necessitate the payment  of  lower wages in the 
industry  has  not  been  without  some  basis  of  fact.  The 
tariff  has protected  the American  industry by  neutralizing 
the advantages which  foreign producers had  in the matter 
of  lower costs. 
It may be  said further that protective duties on raw and 
crude material have restricted the area of  competition with- 
in  the United  States.  Hermann Levy has shown that im- 
port  duties on pig-iron  have worked  injury to steel estab- 
lishments east of the Alleghanies,  which  at one time were 
dependent  on  foreign  producers  for  their  raw  and crude 
material.'  The tariff  of  forty cents per ton on iron ore is 
probably sufficient to prevent the establishment of  iron and 
steel plants on the Atlantic sea-board, which could easily se- 
cure cheap  raw  material  from  Nova Scatia,  Spain,  and 
Cuba.  This duty, moreover, would  be  an important safe- 
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guard to any concern which  secured control of  all the best 
ore fields of  the country. 
While  the  tariff  has  thus  restricted  the  area  of  com- 
petition.  no consolidation has, as yet, secured  a permanent 
monopoly  in  any of  the  more  important  branches  of  the 
iron and steel trade.  The ore and coal fields of  the coun- 
try have thus far proved  too extensive for monopolization; 
and no  control has been  secured  over transportation.  In- 
ternal competition has thus been  free to act and has often 
been  sufficient to reduce  prices  to a  point  very  near  the 
European level.  The tariff  has acted as a stimulus to com- 
bina~don,  and has enal~led  organizatials to secure temlmrary 
mollupcllies.  Tn  such cases new capital has entered the field, 
and has soon destroyed the control that had  been  achieved 
over market conditions. 
B.  fair illustration of  the working of  the tariff  in  the 
iron and steel trade is the career of  the tin plate  industry 
from  1890 to the time  of  the organization of  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation.  This  industry  in  this  country 
is generally cited as a product of  protedtion.  The develop- 
ment of  tin plate manufacture in the United  States may be 
said  to  date  from  the  enactment  of  the  McKinley  Bill. 
Previous to  1890  practically  all  the tin plate  used  in this 
country was  imported.  An  industry of  hardly  any signi- 
ficance  underwent  great  developn~ent almost  immediately 
after the enacttnent of  the McKinley  law. 
The method of  manufacturing tin plate is rather simple, 
so far as process is concerned; but considerable skill is re- 
quired  to turn out good  plates.  By  tin  plate  is  meant  a 
thin sheet of  steel or iron coated with tin.  The standard 
size  of  these  plates  is  14  X 20  inches.  These  plates  are 
usually  placed  in boxes  containing 225  sheets  and weigh- 
ing 108  pounds each.  What is called terne plate-an  allied 
product-is  a  similar  sheet  of  steel  or iron  covered  with 
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an  alloy  of lead  and  tin,  generally  two-thirds  lead  and 
one-third  tin. 
Before the enactment of the McKinley  Bill, the tin plate 
industry in the United States had been maintaining a strug- 
gling  existence.  Though protected by  a  duty of  one cent 
per pound on the foreign product, American  tin plate was 
not  in  a  position  to withstand  English  competition.  The 
competitive strength of the industry depended mainly  upon 
three  things:  the  price  of pig  tin,  the price  of  steel, and 
the labor cost.  In regard to the price of  pig tin, the Eng- 
lish manufacturer did not seem to have any special advant- 
age over the American producer.  Block tin was sold about 
as cheaply  in  New  York as in  London.'  The reason  for 
the  high  price  in  London,  notwithstanding  its  proximity 
to Cornwall, is that the Cornish  mines  did  not  supply  the 
entire English  demand, and the price  was governed by  the 
clilo~btipns  of tin from Australia and the Straist Settlements. 
Regarding the price of steel the advantage in 1890 was with 
the  English  manufacturer.  By  the middle  nineties,  how- 
e\-er. Bessemer  steel  bars,  which  were  used  in  both  coyn- 
tries,  sold  about  twenty  per  cent  cheaper  in  the  United 
States than  in  England.  The prices  per ton in these two 
countries  in  April,  1896, were  $15.50  and $18.70 respec- 
tively.  In the matter of  labor cost the American manufac- 
turer  was  handicapped  in  the  early  history  of  the indus- 
try  by  the  high  price  of  labor  and  the  lack  of  technical 
knowledge.  These difficulties were  partially  overcome  by 
the middle nineties, as considerable technical skill had been 
developed, and wages, owing to the depression of  1893, had 
fallen some fifteen per cent.  Nevertheless,  the disparity in 
L On  Mar.  4,  I@$,  the  quotations In  London  and  New  York  were 
$311.10 and $310.44 per  ton  respectively.  Variabions  before  and after 
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labor  cost  was  great.  According  to  Sir  R.  Giffen,  the 
Welsh. laborer in the tin plate industry received on the aver- 
age, in 1897, $5.46  (£  I  2s 5d) per week, while the Penn- 
sylvania workman, whose efficiency was no greater, received 
$10.68  per week.  The advantage, therefore, in  respect to 
labor cost was greatly in favor of  the English producer. 
Taken all  in  all, the  English manufacturer  could  make 
tin plate nearly thirty per cent cheaper than the American, 
and this at a time when the expense of  production  in this 
country was at a very low point.  For the English producer, 
the price per  box  at the  factory  reached  as low  as $2.20; 
and a box could be delivered in New York, freight paid, for 
about $2.50.  The cost of  American tin plate of  first class 
material was not  below  $2.75  per  box.  Without  a  tariff 
duty, therefore,  the English product  could easily  undersell 
the  American  material;  but  in  the  middle  nineties  when 
wages in the United States were very low, a low duty was 
sufficient to enable  the  native  producer  to  compete  with 
the foreign merchant. 
In 1890, owing to the high  price  of  steel bars and the 
high wages of  labor combined with a very imperfect knowl- 
edge of  technical processes American tin plate sold in New 
York  City  for  $5.50  per  box  while  the  English  product 
sold  for $3.88  plus  $1.08  of  tariff  duty.  The price  of 
English  tin  plate  was  considerably  above  cost,  but  the 
American manufacturer being unable to offer any competi- 
tion, a price of nearly $5.00 per box was paid by the Ameri- 
can consumer for the imported product. 
With the enactment  of  the  McICinley  Bill,  the duty on 
foreign tin  and terne plate  was  increasecl to 2.2  cents per 
pound, or about $2.37  per box.  For the first  time in our 
history,  American  tin  plate  was  enabled  to undersell  the 
English product  in  the home market.  The clause relating 
to tin and terne plate in the McKinley law went into effect 
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July  I, 1891.  From that date the imported  material was 
gradually  supplanted by  the native  product.  The imports 
of  tin and terne plates  in  1890 were 737,955,079 pounds; 
in  1891,  734,425,267 pounds.  By  1897 the  importations 
had  declined  to  230,073,683  pounds.'  Contemporaneous 
with this decline, was an increasing production of  tin plate 
in  the United  States.  In 1890, the amount produced was 
negligible.  In  1892,  it  reached  13,646,719  pounds.  In 
the following year, the native product  increased to 99,819,- 
212 pounds; and by  1897 the amount of  tin and terne plate 
produced in the United States was 446,982,063 pounds. 
The tin plate industry in the United States may be  said, 
therefore,  to date from the time when the McKinley tariff 
act went into effect, and seems to have been  intimately re- 
lated  to it.  It is  to be  remembered,  however,  that  this 
tariff  bill  was one of three or four contributing causes of 
the growth of  the  industry.  As has  already been  noted, 
the  price  of  steel  and  labor  cost  declined  greatly  during 
the  first  half  of  the  nineties.  This  decline  enabled  the 
American manufacturer to hold the home market when the 
Wilson Act  of  1894 reduced  the duty on  tin  plate  to  1.2 
cents  per  pound,  or  about  $1.30  per  box.  In  1897  the 
Dingley  Act  raised  the duty to 1.5  cents  per  pound,  thus 
rendering the American manufacturer  somewhat more se- 
cure.  The tariffs,  therefore,  since  1890  have  been  suffi- 
cient to give protection to the industry in the United States, 
and may be said to have stimulated its growth.  At the time 
when the price of  steel and the cost of  labor were very low 
in  this  country, the  English  manufacturer  was  still  able, 
without  the  tariff,  to undersell  his  American  competitor. 
It was the tariff, co-operating  with  the declining price  of 
'For  effect on the  Welsh tin-plate  mills,  see  Consular ReportS for 
May,  1896, pp. 67 and 68; November,  1897,  p. 323 ; and May,  1898. 50  THE UNITED STATES STEEL  CORPORATION  [272 
steel and low labor cost, which enabled the tin plate industry 
to take root on American soil. 
During the early and middle nineties the price of  Ameri- 
can  tin  plate  steadily  declined.  Under  the  protection  of 
the tariff  the number of  plants increased to over forty; and 
competition mmg these, co-operating  with  improvements 
in  processes, low wages, and cheap steel, brought the price 
of  the American product down to $2.70 per box, at mill, in 
1898.'  Toward the end of  this year and the beginning of 
1899, the cost  of  production  was being  raised  on account 
of the increased prices of  steel and pig tin.  About the same 
time, the encouraging prospects  of  the industry incident  to 
the revival of  trade toward the close of  the decade, seemed 
threatened  by  the competition  of  an increasing  number  of 
plants engaged in the business.  Early in 1898 negotiations 
were opened to ascertain if  it were possible to form a com- 
pany that could control all the plants of  the country.  As 
a  result  of  these  negotiations,  the  American  Tin  Plate 
Company was formed in December, 1898, embracing nearly 
all the plants of  the country. 
This industry was now virtually in the hands of  a mon- 
opoly.  The new company endeavored to secure itself  from 
outside competition by agreements with merchants and pro- 
ducers of  raw material and by patents on the latest devices 
in machinery.  In this attempt the company was for a time 
measurably successful.  The Dingley tariff  imposing a duty 
of  1.5 cents per pound on imported tin and terne plate pro- 
tected this monopoly  from foreign competition. 
In January,  1899, the  price  of  tin  plate  was  increased 
from $2.70  per  hundred  pound  box  at the  mill  to $3.00; 
and before summer it had been  raised to $3.50.  Imported 
tin plate could not be sold in this country for less than $4.00 
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per hundred pound box, although English plate was selling 
at Liverpool at $2.30 per box.  The rise in the price of  the 
American  product cannot be  attributed  to any increase  in 
labor cost, as wages and salaries remained  low and in some 
cases were reduced.'  The price  of  tin had  increased, but 
not  more  so than  for  the  English  producer.  While  the 
price of steel was rising during the early months of  1899, 
this rise  did  not  greatly  increase the relative  cost  of  pro- 
duction  for  the  American  manufacturer.  The English 
manufacturer was affected by  the rise, though to a less ex- 
tent.  The principal element,  moreover,  in the expense of 
production  was lahor cost: and this had not yet  increased. 
The increased  price of American tin plate,  therefore, must 
be  attributed  to a  combination which  had  achieved  a tem- 
porary  monopoly,  the power of which  was  in  a  measure 
safe-guarded by a protective tariff. 
The tariff was thus a contributing factor in the develop 
ment  of the American tin plate industry and an important 
aid  to  consolidation.  It has  not  been,  however,  a  com- 
plete protector of  monopoly where the possibilities of  home 
competition  have  not  been  greatly  reduced.  This  was 
shown in the later history of  the American Tin Plate Com- 
pany.  Notwithstanding  the measures taken to control the 
domestic  trade,  by  the  time  the  Steel  Corporation  had 
formed  in  1901,  several  independent  tin  plate  mills  were 
being  built;  and  at  present  these  independent  concerns 
are increasing  their trade at the expense of  the older or- 
ganization,'  which  has  been  merged  with  the  American 
Sheet Steel Company. 
What has been said concerning the  influence of  the tariff 
on the tin plate industry and combination can be said with 
l Tin and  Terne, Jan. 12,  1899. 
Iron  Age. Jam  3, 1907,  p.  65.  1 Tin attd  Terne. Jan.  26,  1898. 52  THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION  [274 
certain n~odifications  concerning other branches of  the iron 
and  steel  trade.  The tariff  by  shutting out foreign com- 
petition enabled the home industry to grow, and by limiting 
the field  of  competition  facilitated  the formation of  com- 
binations whose object, if  not achievement, has been mono- 
poly.  The careers  of  these  combinations,  however,  have 
been  illustrations  of  the  persistence  of  competition.  No 
sooner were  these  organizations  formed  than new  capital 
entered the industry in competition with them. 
5 6.  Such are the  determining  factors  in  the  iron  and 
steel situation in this country.  All  these  factors have  co- 
operated  to  produce  concentration  of  production.  They 
have been potent influences in promoting or facilitating the 
development of  the Steel Corporation, and to-day are help- 
ing to fix  its  character and operations.  Other conditions 
may have  helped  toward  the  same end, but  they  seem to 
have  been  of  minor  consequence.  The  railroad  rebate 
which played such an important r6le in the growth of  cer- 
tain  other  capitalistic  organizations  exercised  relatively 
little influence in developing the Steel Corporation and the 
consolidations  out  of  which  it  was  formed.  These  steel 
corilbinations were not  due to the absorption by  great cor- 
porations of  smaller rivals which had been brought to terms 
by  means  of  railroad  discriminations,  local  underselling, 
and the like.  They were unions of  various establishments 
upon  a  certain  plane  of  business  equality  formed  for  in- 
creasing productive efficiency or for controlling the market 
in their several lines of  manufacture. 
The iron  and steel  situation  in  the  United  States with 
its tendency toward concentration  must be  ascribed  to the 
factors which have already been considered.  The distribu- 
tion of  ore and  coal  fields made the  industry  on a  large 
scale in this country possible and to a  considerable extent 
facilitated  consolidation.  The growth  toward  concentra- 
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tion  was  greatly  influenced  by  the  superior  efficiency  of 
large over small capital, which  tended  to limit the number 
of  producers to large corporations,  and  by  the protective 
tariff which put foreign n~anufacturers  at a disadvantage in 
the  home  market.  The fluctuation  of  the  iron  and  steel 
trade still further accentuated this development  by making 
the desire to control  the industry peculiarly strong. 2771  THE  BEGINNIA'GS  55 
CHAPTER 111 
THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE UNITED STATES  STEEL  COR- 
PORATION 
5  I.  IN  order to explain the nature of  the Steel Corpor- 
ation it will be necessary to devote some space to a discus- 
sion of  the organizations existing  in  the  North and  East 
which became parts of  the corporation at the time of  its 
formation or immediately  thereafter.  At the beginning of 
the last decade of  the nineteenth century the large iron and 
steel establishments of  the country had come to depend upon 
the Lake Superior region  for most  of  their ore and upon 
the coal fields of  Pennsylvania  for their coke.  The intro- 
duction of  the use of  coke and the opening of  the ore fields 
of  Michigan and Minnesota had already changed the center 
of trade activity from the region east of  the Alleghanies to 
that section immediately west.  The growth of  new  mar- 
kets in the West as well  as the relative  proximity to the 
principal  ore and coking-coal  areas had already made the 
region in the vicinity of  the Great Lakes the great iron and 
steel producing  section of  the country.  This pre-eminence 
the district has retained to the present time. 
In the same decade the individual and partnership basis 
of  the industry  had  been  supplanted  in  all  the  more  im- 
portant  concerns  by  the  corporate  form of  organization. 
Thm was due in  the main  to the  growing need  of  large 
capital  in  the  equipment  of  furnaces and mills.  At least 
one organization had  already begun the policy of  insuring 
its supply of  raw material by  securing control of  ore and 
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coal fields.  This policy,  afterwards followed by ather m- 
cerns, necessitated  an increasing amount  of  capital.  As a 
natural result the industry was already tending strongly in 
the direction of  concentration of  production. 
The period  from 1893 to 1897 was one of  extreme de- 
pression  in most branches of manufacture.  It was especi- 
ally so in the iron and steel trade, where a large number of 
establishments went permanently out of  business.  It is sig- 
nificant of  the tendency  toward large-scale  production that 
of  the  123 establishments reported  in  the Twelfth Census 
as abandoned-most  of which  went out of  business  during 
this  critical  period-the  average  capital  invested  per  es- 
tablishment  was  only  one-fifth  that  of  the  organizations 
flourishing in 1900.  It was the large concern well equipped 
and  well  situated  with  respect  to ore and  coal  that  was 
enabled to survive the crisis of  the middle nineties. 
8 2.  In 1897 and 1898 the country was recovering  from 
the severe depression  of  1893; and with this recovery' the 
iron industry awakened  to new  life.  In much  of  the  in- 
dustrial field the new  era of  prosperity was marked by  the 
formation of  great consolidations.  Among the most  pro- 
minent  in the  iron and steel trade were  the Federal  Steel 
Company,  the  American  Steel  and  Wire  Company,  the 
American  Tin  Plate  Company,  the  National  Steel  Com- 
pany,  the  National  Tube  Company,  the  American  Steel 
Hoop Company, the American  Sheet  Steel  Company,  and 
the  American  Bridge Company.  In the  Pittsburg  region 
of Pennsylvania  was the Carnegie Company, which, while 
not  strictly speaking a consolidation, had  for several years 
past  been  absorbing  a  number  of  establishments,  making 
it the largest concern of  its kind in the world.  All these or- 
ganizations became  parts of  the  United  States Steel  Cor- 
poration. 
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concerns were themselves consolidations of  pre-existing cor- 
porations.  In September, 1898, the Illinois Steel Company, 
the  Minnesota  Iron Company,  and  the  Elgin, Joliet,  and 
Eastern Railroad Company were combined to form the Fed- 
eral  Steel  Company  with  an authorized  capital  of  $200,- 
ooo,ooo,  of  which  only  $99,743,900  were  ever  issued.' 
Shortly after the Lorain Steel Company of  Ohio and the 
Lorain Steel Company of  Pennsylvania were added to this 
combination.  On December  14,  1898, the  American  Tin 
Plate  Company  was  organized  with an authorized  capital 
of  $jo,ooo,ooo,  of  which  $46,325,000  were  issued.  This 
consolidation, as has been seen, embraced about forty com- 
panies and some two hundred and sixty-five mills, produc- 
ing about ninety-five per cent of  the total production of  the 
country.'  The American  Steel and Wire Company, incor- 
porated  under the laws of  New  Jersey,  followed  on Janu- 
ary 13, 1899.  This company was successor to the Arneri- 
can Steel and Wire Company of  Illinois, formed in March 
of  the preceding  year.a  At the time of  its  formation,  it 
virtually  controlled  the  production  of  wire  goods  in  this 
country.  Its capital was $go,ooo,ooo,  all of  which was is- 
sued.  The National  Tube and  National  Steel companies 
were both organized  in February,  1899.  The former was 
capitalized  at $80,000,000,  and  the latter  at $5g,ooo,ooo. 
The National  Tube Company included  over a  dozen  com- 
panies,  At the time of  its organization, it was the largest 
concern  of  its kind  in the world, and the third largest en- 
aged in the iron and steel business-the  Carnegie Company 
and the Krupps of  Germany, alone being larger.' 
Commercial  and  Financial  Chronicle,  Sept.  18, IW,  p.  530.  Iron 
Age, Sept. 15, 1898. 
2 Iron  Age, Feb. 16, 1899,  p.  17. 
S Commercial and  Financial  Chronicle, Mar. 12,  1898. 
Ibid., July I, 1899;  July 15,  1899. 
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On April 14, of the same year, the American Steel Hoop 
Company was formed with a capital of  $~~,OOO,OOO.~  In 
March  1900, the American  Sheet Steel Company, embrac- 
ing over a  score of companies,  was  incorporated  with  an 
authorized  capital  of $j2,ooo,ooo,2  of  which  $qg,ooo,ooo 
were issued.  In the following month the American Bridge 
Company was formed with an authorized capital of  $70,- 
ooo,ooo,  of  which  $61,05j,60o  were  outstanding.  This 
consolidation absorbed twenty-six  firms  or companies,  and 
at the time of  its organization  embraced  over  nine-tenths 
of  the bridge building interests of the co~ntry.~ 
These consolidations which have just been described were 
regarded  as industrial  experiments.  Their  capitalizations 
were  based  upon  the  prediction  of  promoters  that  they 
would  be  successful.  As  much  time  would  be  required 
for  a  justification  of  such  predictions,  and  as  serious 
dangers  from  the  competition  of  new  enterprises  threat- 
ened  these  organizations, their  stocks  sold  at low  prices. 
The organizers of  these concerns relied  upon the returning 
prosperity of  the country and the monopoly which most of 
these organizations seemed likely to enjoy, for a consider- 
able period at least, in their several lines of trade. 
The future plans, moreover, of  these corporations were 
generally  far in advance of  any early  realization.  These 
plans,  in at least one instance,  were  reflected in an exces- 
sively  large  authorized  stock.  The Federal  Steel  Com- 
pany  with  an authorized  capital  of  $2oo,ooo,ooo-$100,- 
m,m  preferred,  and  $~oo,ooo,ooo common-had  by 
October,  1899 issued only $53,ooo,ooo  preferred and $46,- 
ooo,ooo common.'  The American  Sheet  Steel  Company, 
too, held a considerable portion of  its stock in re~erve.~ 
1 Iron Age, Oct.  19,  1899.  Ibid., Apr. 5,  1900. 
a Ibid., May 17,  Igoo.  Ibid., Oct. 26, 1899. 
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3. With extensive plam for future growth and appar- 
ently bright prospects for the immediate future, the tendency 
toward  over-capitalization  was  marked.  A  large propor- 
tion of  the issued stock was without any tangible basis.  It 
was determined mainly by  possible future gains.  Accord- 
ing  to  testimony  before  the  Federal  Industrial  Commis- 
sion,  the book  value  of  the  constituent  companies  of  the 
Federal Steel Company was placed by  experts at $45,000,- 
ooo, to which, however, should be added $~o,ooo,ooo  cash 
and the value of  certain ore and coal properties.'  Accord- 
ing to Mr.  Graham, a director of  the American  Tin Plate 
Company, only  $18,ooo,ooo-the  amount of  the preferred 
stock-represented  the  actual  value  of  the  mills  of  the 
compan~.~ 
The  iron  and  steel  consolidations  of  1898-1900  thus 
tended  toward  over-capitalization.  In  this  respect  they 
resembled the early period of  railroad  financiering.  There 
was,  however,  one  important  difference:  a  large  part  of 
the  capital  of  railroads  has  always  been  represented  by 
bonds, while the industrials  which  we have just  been  con- 
sidering  had  but  little  bonded  indebtedness.  Both  had 
eventually to pass their dividends; but the railroads unable 
to pay  interest  on  their  bonds  went  into receivers'  hands. 
The period  embraced  between the last half  of  1898 and 
the first half  of  1900 was an epoch of  great prosperity  in 
the iron and steel industry.  During this prosperous period 
the steel combinations followed  a  policy  which threatened 
their ruin.  In an industry subject to such extreme varia- 
tions in the volume  of  trade it  is wise to build  up a  sub- 
stantial reserve during a  period  of  prosperity.  It is only 
by  such  a policy  that the securities of  new  iron and steel 
Iron Age, Oct. 26, 1899,  p.  35. 
2 Rep.  Industrial  Commission, vol. i  and vol. xiii, p.  517. 
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consolidations  can eventually be  brought  up  to an invest- 
ment  level.  Organized  as these  new  combinations  were, 
the pursuance of such a course would necessitate  the pass- 
ing of dividends.  This policy would temporarily lower the 
market value of their securities and render their sale more 
difficult; but  the corporations  would  unquestionably  have 
been  strengthened. 
l'he  interests  in, control of  these  various  combinations 
failed  to  follow  thcis  conservative  policy; and  all  of  the 
,companies paid  regular dividends on  their preferred  stock 
from the dates of their organization to January, 1901.  The 
Federal  Steel, the American Steel and Wire, and the Na- 
tional  Tube  companies  paid  in  addition  good  returns  on 
their  common stocks.  The total  dividends of  the Federal 
Steel, the American Steel and Wire, the National Tube, the 
National Steel, the American Tin Plate, and the American 
Steel Hoop companies  from their several dates of  organi- 
zation to January  I, 1901 were approximately $30,000,000. 
Their  aggregate  capital  amounted  to over  $408,000,000. 
Their  bonded  debts  were  $31,341,271.  The surplus  re- 
serves at the close of  1900 aggregated $32,687,250, or seven 
per  cent of  the total  capitalization.'  When  it  is remem- 
bered  that  the  preferred  stock  of  these  combinations  re- 
presented about the capitalized  value of  the average earn- 
ing power of  the constituent plants in their separation, and 
that the common stock represented real or supposed mono- 
poly  advantages, economies  due to combination,  and such 
working capital as was provided by underwriters, and that 
fifty-three  per  cent of  the total  stock capitalization  of  the 
six  consolidations  already  named  consisted  of  common 
stock whose value could not yet be demondtrated, it is seen 
that the financial position  of  these steel concerns after two 
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years of  high prices  and  large profits  was  scarcely  better 
than at the outset of  their careers. 
With this exception the business  of  these  organizations 
seems  to have been  ably  and  honestly  conducted.  Many 
improvements  were  made  in  their  several  properties  and 
considerable  economies  effected.  The policy  of  manage- 
ment in almost every direction was a distinct advance over 
former  methods  of  trade.  However,  the  lack  of  ample 
reserves  unfitted  these  consolidations  to  withstand  trade 
depression and serious competition.  Such depression  and 
threatening competition confronted them  in  the latter half 
of  I 900. 
4.  Before  discussing  the  nature  of  this  competition, 
it will be necessary to describe the business of the Carnegie 
Steel Company.  In the Pittsburg district this organization 
had, during a period  of  four decades, grown from a small 
firm managed by the ICloman Brothers into a concern which 
owned the most  complete  and best  managed  steel plant  in 
the world.'  The change from the  use  of  anthracite  coa1 
to that of  coke  in  the manufacture  of  iron  and  steel  had 
given the Pittsburg region peculiar advantages in the mat- 
ter  of  assembling  material.  The  region,  furthermore, 
was not far from the best markets.  The mills of  the Car- 
negie  Company had  also been  well  concentrated; and this 
fact gave them a pronounced advantage over the companies 
we  have  already  considered  whose  mills  were  generally 
quite  widely  scattered.  Nor  did  the  advantage  of  the 
Carnegie Company  stop here.  As a  result  of  a  policy of 
large expenditure upon betterments persistently pursued for 
a number of  years, the average excellence of  its equipment 
was far above that of  any of  its rivals.  "  Every new  pro- 
1  For an interesting, though one-sided,  account of  the  Carnegie Com- 
pany, see Bridge's  Inside History  of the Carnegie Steel  Compar;y. 
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cess and every new  machine  which would  in  any way  in- 
crease the efficiency, reduce the cost,  and improve the pro- 
ducts  of  the  Carnegie  Company  has  been  adopted,  until 
this great concern has raised  the physical  condition  of  its 
mills to a point which is unsurpassed."  l 
The labor force of the company was also strained to the 
utnlost.  Trade unions were banished  in  1892, and work- 
men  were  encouraged  to utmost  exertion  by  high  wages 
and the promise of advancement.  Official rank was strictly 
the reward of merit.  Every head of  a department had an 
interest in the business apart from his salary.=  Every visi- 
tor was  impressed  by  the intensity  of  effort  displayed  by 
the workers in each department.  It has been said that the 
terrific speed made break-downs frequent at thirty-five,  and 
old age common at forty-five. 
In the early  eighties  the Carnegie Company-or  rather 
the  Carnegie,  Phipps and  Company, as it was then  called 
-had  begun the policy which eventually issued in the con- 
trol of all the factors contributing to the production of  steel, 
-from  the ore and coal in the mine to steel billets and steel 
rails.  -4 controlliilg interest in the stock of the H. C. Frick 
Coke Company, the largest owner of  coal land in the Con- 
~ellsville  region  was  secured.  This insured  the  Carnegie 
Company not  only  a  majority share in  the earnings from 
the  sale  of  coke  and  coal,  but  also  a  supply  of  coke  at 
prices very close to the cost of  production.  Notwithstand- 
ing Mr.  Carnegie's  repeated  assertion  that  the  best  way 
to obtain ore is to buy  it in the open market,  ore supplies 
with  accompanying  transportation  facilities were also ob- 
tained.  In 1896 a  five-sixths  interest  in the stock of  the 
U.  S. Investor, Feb. g, 1901. 
See Schwab's  testimony, Report  of Industrial  Cornmissio~t,  vol.  13. 
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Oliver Iron Mining Company was purchased; and this pur- 
chase  secured  for  the  Carnegie  Company  large  ore  de- 
posits  in  the Gogebic and the Mesaba  ranges.  By  a fifty 
year contract with the Rockefeller  iron, mining, and trans- 
portation  companies  1,500,000 tons of  soft ore were  sup- 
plied  and  transported  to  the  lower  lake  ports  annually. 
Thus an abundant supply of  hard and soft ore at stable and 
cheap prices was secured.  Controlling interests  were  also 
obtained  in  the  Pittsburg  Steamship  Company,  which 
owned, in  1900, eleven steamships and two tug boats, with 
six addi'tiond  steamlers under constructioln, and  the Pitts- 
burg,  Bessemer  and  Lake  Erie  Railroad  extending  from 
Conneaut,  Ohio, to the  Carnegie mills  at Duquesne.  By 
the close of  1897, the Carnegie Company was almost self- 
sufficient in all the factors of  production.  The profits which 
other steel companies were then adding to their costs, this 
concern was adding to its earnings. 
The example  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company  was  not 
lost in the consolidations formed in  1898-1900.  The Fed- 
eral Steel (Company, through the Minnesota Iron Company, 
came into control of  large supplies of  m.  The  company 
also acquired a considerable acreage of  coal land, and aimed 
to  secure  adequate  means  of  transportation  for  the  as- 
sembling of  material.  The National Steel Company in like 
manner obtained conrrol  of  the sources of  some of  its ore 
and coal supply.  Indeed,  it may be said that all the con- 
solidations of  the period were organized with a view of  be- 
coming ultimately self-sufficient. 
5 5.  Though organized and largely capitalized  with such 
a'purpose in view, the manufacturing companies which be- 
came  constituent  parts  of  the  United  States  Steel  Cor- 
poration at its beginning were, nevertheless,  largely depen- 
dent upon one another.  The companies may be divided on 
the basis  of  their  principal  products  into two classes,  the 
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Carnegie,  Federal  Steel,  and  National  Steel  companies 
were largely  producers  of steel billets,  ingots, bars,  plates. 
and  slabs,  materials  not  in  their  final  form.  'The  Na- 
tional Tube, American Steel and Wire, American Tin Plate, 
American  Steel  Hoop,  and American  Sheet  Steel  corpor- 
ations  were,  as  their  titles  indicate,  producers  of  fin- 
ished  steel  goods.  These  latter  companies  obtained  most 
of their materials from the primary producers of  steel, and 
converted them into wire, pipes, tin plates, sheets, structural 
material and the like. 
These two groups of  companies  from their location  ant1 
the  nature  of  their  products  had  extensive  dealings  with 
each other.  The western plants of  the American Steel and 
Wire Company  and the Ohio plants of  the National  Tube 
and  -4merican  Bridge companies  were  supplied  with  wire 
rods and steel billets by  the Federal Steel Company, whose 
principal  plants  were  located  at  Chicago.  The  National 
Steel  Company  supplied  a  portion  of  the  demands  of  the 
Tin Plate,  Sheet  Steel, and  Steel  Hoop companies,  whose 
financial control was identical with its own.  The Carnegie 
Steel  Company  furnished  material  for  the  finishing  mills 
of  the  Pittsburg  district  including  representatives  from 
all the companies of  the second group. 
So long  as  the  various  companies  confined  their  trade 
to  certain  fields of  the  iron industry and to certain  terri- 
tories,  the  harmony  of  their  interests  was  not  seriously 
disturbed.  However,  as has been  indicated, all  these  or- 
ganizations  aimed  to be  ultin~ately  self-sufficient.  \\'hen 
the primary producers were about to enter the lines of  fin- 
ished  material  or  the  producers  of  finished  material  at- 
tempted  to become  independent  by  invading  the  fields of 
those who supplied them with pig iron and steel, a serious 
competition  threatened  their  financial  standing.  Being 
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companies of a field hitherto controlled by the others, meant 
serious injury, if  not absolute ruin, to the original occupants. 
5 6.  From the winter of  1898-99 to the spring of  1900 
prosperity reigned  in the steel industry.  By the middle of 
1900  a reaction in the steel market had set in; and it became 
evident that trade must  adjust itself  to a  smaller  margin 
of  profits.  Jf  dividends were to be  continued  during the 
periods  of  reduced  demand, every  effort must  be made to 
reduce  expenses.  In  no  other  way  could  the  companies 
engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  finished  material  accom- 
plish this than by securing the largest measure of  indepen- 
dence in the field of raw material. 
The depression of  1900 hastened  the movement  towards 
ultimate  independence.  The  American  Steel  and  Wire 
Company, a large customer of  the Carnegie concern  in the 
Pittsburg region and of  the Federal Steel Company in the 
IVest,  had  already  acquired  two  thousand  acres  of  Con- 
nellsville coal, and also ore properties with an annual out- 
put of  g16,ooo tons.  A  fleet of  twelve steamers had been 
acquired  from  the  American  Steamship  Company.  A 
large  steel  plant  at  Milwaukee  which  would  supply  raw 
material to the company's  western mills was projected, and 
in thk Pittsburg district there was begun the installation of 
a complete system of production from ore and coke to wire, 
wire nails, and springs.' 
The National  T~ibe  Company  adopted  a  similar  policy. 
In the fall of  1900 it began the construction of  a large open- 
hearth steel plant at Wheeling, West Virginia, designed to 
supply  steel  billets  to all  its  plants  in  the  Central  West. 
The company,  though owning no coal or ore, relied  upori 
its  friendly  relations  with  the Federal  Steel  Company  to 
secure its are and coal on favorable terms. 
1 Iron Age, Dec. 21,  1899. 
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The National  Steel Company which  had  hitherto  relied 
very  largely  upon  outside  corporations  for  its  supply  of 
iron ore and coal now greatly increased  its holdings of  ore 
and coal properties.  It purchased  iron mines  with an an- 
nual  output  of  1,300,000  tons  and  considerable  tracts  of 
coal land in the Connellsville and adjoining districts.  It al- 
so began the installation of a furnace capacity  sufficient to 
supply the total requirements of  the Tin-plate,  Sheet Steel, 
and Steel Hoop companies,  whose financial control, repre- 
sented by  William & J. H.  Moore,  was  identical  with  its 
own.' 
These threatening movements toward industrial  indepen- 
dence  led  to counter  movements  on the  part  of  the  two 
chief  primary  companies.  The  Federal  Steel  Company 
threatened  to build  wire  mills  unless  the  American  Steel 
and Wire Company should abandon the plan  of  producing 
its own raw material and renew  its wire-rod  contract with 
the  Federal  Steel Company.  As there was nothing to be 
gained for the present from such a competition, the Steel and 
Wire Company abandoned  its western  extensions.  In the 
Pittsburg district, the Carnegie Company began to expand in 
a  similar  fashion.  In  January,  1901,  it  was  announced 
that the company would construct a large tube mill at Con- 
neaut, Ohio, sheet mills at Homestead, and mills for other 
finished  products  in  the  Pittsburg  region.  At  the  same 
time the  Carnegie  Company  was  preparing  to secure  an 
independent  railroad to the sea-board. 
These  proposed  movements  caused  serious  anxiety  to 
the leaders of  the consolidations of  the Middle West.  In 
the Pittsburg district,  the  four Moore companies,  the Na- 
tional Tube Company and the eastern trade of  the Ameri- 
can  Steel  and  Wire  Company  were  threatened  by  the 
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Carnegie organization; and in the Chicago region, the Fed- 
eral  Steel  and  American  Steel  and  Wire companies  were 
naturally  uneasy. 
The results  of  this  threatened  competition  would  obvi- 
ously be  ruinous to most of  the concerns  involved.  Heav- 
ily  over-capitalized,  as  most  of  the  companies  were,  and 
fortified  by  very  inadequate  reserves,  such  competition 
would meall decreasing profits and the passing of  dividends. 
,Is  a consequence of  this there would be a heavy fall in the 
value  of  steel  stocks.  Industrial  warfare,  too,  demands 
new  appliances, and these could only be  secured by  issuing 
bonds  or by  increasing  the  floating  debt.  The interests 
in control of the consolidations strove in every way to avert 
the impending calamity.  Coupled with these interests were 
the interests of  underwriters and promoters who still held 
large amounts of  stock which they had  been  unable to sell 
to the public, and thus to reap the large profits upon which 
they had counted.  The decline in the value of  these securi- 
ties,  o.wing  to the  temporary  reaction  in  the  steel  trade, 
made their sale still more difficult in the face of  a competi- 
tion  which  threatened  to overwhelm  the  new  companies. 
The promoters,  underwriters,  and  original  owners of  the 
plants, therefore, were all vitally interested  in preventing  a 
break in the harmony of  the various steel interests. 
8 7.  After the eleution of  1900,  the tide again turned  in 
favor  of  steel.  Everything pointed  to an upward  move- 
ment  in steel stocks '  if  the threatened  competition among 
the new  consolidations  could be  averted.  Failure to come 
to some harmonious arrangement would issue in severe loss. 
and  in  addition,  lock  up  cash  resources  at  a  time  when 
See quotations of  steel stocks  in  Commercial and  Financial  Chron- 
icle  during October, November  and  December, 1900,  and January and 
February, 1901. 
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~rojects  of new consolidations promised large profits.  The 
emergency was, therefore, a financial, as well as an indus- 
trial,  one.  me  controlling  interests  in  the  steel  trusts 
wished to protect their own holdings; while the promoters 
and underwriters  not  only desired  to sell theirs at a good 
margin of profit, but also to retain their prestige with the 
speculative  public.  To do this they  must  prevent  a  gen- 
eral decline  in  stock values and avert the impending steel 
war. 
The course to be adopted  by  the interests involved  was 
necessarily one which must not be construed as a reflection 
upon  their  credit.  The Carnegie  Company  was  unques- 
tionably the most  powerful  of  the organizations which we 
have considered, and the one least likely to be seriously in- 
jured  by  the threatened  rivalry.  The other  corporations 
might  have  surrendered  to  it; but  such  a  course  would 
have  been  a  serious  compromise  of  all  plans  for  indus- 
trial  independence,  upon  the  attainment  of  which  their 
capitalizations had been in part based.  The course adppted 
was  a  plan  by  which  all  the  conflicting  interests  were 
united  into one  corporation  organized  to own  at  least  a 
majority  interest  in  the  various  steel  companies which  it 
was necessary  to control.  In this way  would competition 
be  removed.  This movement  received  the backing of  the 
strongest  financial  houses  in  the  United  States.  Mr. 
Morgan and his friends, who had been instrumental in the 
formation of several of  the trusts of  the West, now did all 
in their power to avert the disaster threatened  by the steel 
war, and to further the  harmony  of  interests  which  was 
achieved  in the formation of  the United  States Steel Cor- 
poration. 
The plan  to combine  embraced  at first  only  four com- 
panies-the  Carnegie, the Federal Steel, the National Tube, 
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these  organizations  that  the  threatened  competition  was 
impending.  A quick survey of  the field, however, showed 
at least  four other concerns  which  might offer  inconven- 
iently  active  competition,  but  which  could  easily  be  per- 
suaded  to  enter  the  confederation.  These  organizations 
were the National Steel, the American Tin Plate, the Ameri- 
can  Steel  Hoop, and the American  Sheet Steel companies. 
An attempt was made to purchase the Jones and Laughlin 
plant  at Pittsburg  for $~O,OOO,OOO,  but  the offer  was  re- 
fused.  The Rockefeller  ore  properties  in  the  Lake  Su- 
perior  region were secured by the payment of  $~O,OOO,OOO 
of  stock-$4o,ooo,ooo  preferred,  and  $~O,OOO,OOO  com- 
mon; and the ore carrying fleet  was  purchased  for  eight 
and one-half millions cash.  This purchase gave to the new 
corporation about two-fifths  of  its ore and nearly one-half 
of  its ore fleet. 
The Steel  Corporation was  organized  on  February  23, 
1901,  under  the  laws  of  New  Jersey  with  a  capital  of 
$3000.  This  nominal  capital  was  shortly  afterwards 
incteased  to $~,~oo,ooo,ooo,  of  which  authorized  capital 
stock, $55o,o00,000  was to be  preferred, and $550,000,000 
common.  The charter gives the corporation the right  to 
increase its preferred and common stock "  in such amounts 
and  proportions  as  shall  be  determined  by  the  Board  of 
Directors, and as may be permitted by  law."  l  The hold- 
ers of  preferred stock  are entitled, "  to receive when,  and 
as declared, from the surplus or net profits  of  the corpor- 
ation yearly  dividends  at the  rate of  seven  per  cent  per 
annum and no more, payable quarterly on dates to be fixed 
by the by-laws."  The cumulative feature of  the preferred 
stock  was  also  guaranteed  to  the  holder  in  the  charter. 
'Charter  of  U. S. Steel Corporation.  See also Iron  Age, Feb. 28. 
1901, P.  25. 
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When all curnulative dividends are paid, dividends may be 
declared on the common stock. 
The  United  States Steel  Corporation  bought  the stock 
of  its  constituent  companies  and  controls  these  organiza- 
tions  by  virtue  of  being  the  single  stockholder  in  each 
case.  As has already been indicated the companies  which 
became  the  first  members  of  this  consolidation  were  the 
Carnegie Steel Company, the Federal  Steel  Company,  the 
American  Steel  and  Wire  Company,  the  National  Tube 
Company,  the National Steel Company, the American  Tin 
Plate  Company, the American  Steel  Hoop Company,  and 
the  American  Sheet  Steel  Company.  Shortly  after  its 
formation  the  American  Bridge  Company  and  the  Lake 
Superior Consolidated  Iron Mines entered the organization. 
The Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines had been in- 
corporated  under  the  laws  of  New  Jersey  in  1893.  Its 
purpose  was  to  acquire  and  operate  iron  mines  in  the 
hlesaba  Range,  Minnesota.  It owned  valuable  ore prop- 
erties in the Lake Superior region, some of  which  it leased 
to the Carnegie and other steel companies.  It owned the 
Duluth,  Mesaba,  and  Northern  Railway,  extending from 
Duluth to Iron Mountain, Minnesota.  Its authorized capi- 
tal was $~O,OOO,OOO,  of which $28,722,000  had been issued 
at the time of the organization of  the Steel Corporation. 
8.  The exchange  of  securities between  the  Steel  Cor- 
poration  and  the  various  constituent  companies  was  af- 
fected in sr~ch  a manner as to afford a bonus to most of  the 
latter.  Leaving out of  account  the  Carnegie  Steel  Com- 
pany,  the  aggregate  capitalization  of  the  original  con- 
cerns entering the new organization was $457,070,200.  On 
becoming  subsidiary  members  of  the  Steel  Corporation, 
this capitalization was  raised  to $531,914,300,  an increase 
of  nearly  $75,ooo,ooo. 
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Carnegie Steel  Company  no  definite official  statement  has 
been  published,  although  reports  have  been  made  which 
are apparently  authentic.  Mr.  Morgan  in  an official  an- 
nouncement  declared  that $304,ooo,ooa  of  first  mortgage 
bonds  were  issued  to  the  holders  of Carnegie bonds  and 
sixty  per  cent  of the  company's  stock.'  The bonds  are 
reported  to have been  exchanged  at par; and it is further 
stated that for each $1,000  of  Carnegie stock $1500 of  first 
mortgage bonds  of  the new  corporation were issued.  As 
the capital stock  of  the Carnegie Steel  Company  in  1901 
was $160,000,000,  and as these exchanges  exactly fit  Mr. 
Morgan's  figures,  these  proportions  are probably  correct. 
The remaining forty per cent of  Carnegie stock-$64,000,- 
ooc--was  exchanged  for  $98,277,120  in  preferred,  and 
$90,279,040  in  common  stock  of  the  Steel  Corp~ration.~ 
The  entire  Carnegie  holdings  were  thus  purchased  for 
$492,556,160  par value of  stocks and bonds. 
# 9.  Mr.  Carnegie's  personal  share in  this amount  was 
paid  entirely  in  bonds.  Concerning  his  holdings,  Mr. 
Bridge says, "At  the time of  the transfer of  the Carnegie 
properties  to  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation,  Mr. 
Carnegie personally held $88,147,000  of  the Carnegie Com- 
pany's  bonds.  These were exchanged  for the Steel Com- 
pany's  bonds at par.  He had also 86,382 shares of  stock, 
for which  he was paid  in bonds at the rate of  $15oo.00  a 
share.  He therefore  acquired  $217,72o,ooo  of  the bonds 
of  the United States Steel Corporation."  a  If Mr. Bridge's 
statement is  correct,  Mr. Carnegie held  only  a  little  over 
half  of the bonds of  his company and received for his stock 
Circular  of  J. P. Morgan, March 2,  1901. 
Bridge, Inside History of Carnegie Steel  Co. 
a Commercial  and  Financial  Chronicle,  Nov. 21,  1903, p.  2039.  See 
also list of  stock  and bond  holders  in  Bridge's  Inside  History of  the 
Carnegie Steel Compa~y,  4th edition, pp. 356-7. 
293  l  THE BEGINNINGS 
$1zg,537,ooo.  Had he owned sixty per cent of  the stock, 
as currently reported, he would have received $144,ooo,ooo. 
4  10. ?\ht (total issues of  stock for the Steel Corporation 
were  put  in  Mr.  Morgan's  circular  of March  2,  1901,  at 
$~Z~,OOO,OOO  of seven  per  cent  cumulative  preferred  and 
$425,ooo,ooo  of  common.  The  new  organization  thus 
started on its career with a stock capital of  $g~o,ooo,ooo, 
which, however, was soon increased to over $r,ooo,ooo,o~~. 
The bonded  indebtedness of  the Steel Corporation included 
the $~o~,~,ooo  l held by the Carnegie interests and some 
tens of  millions of  bonded  obligations incurred by the con- 
stituent companies  and assumed  by  the new  consolidation. 
In addition to these obligations were various mortgage and 
money  liabilities  of  the  constituent  companies.  At  the 
time the first annual report was issued the total capital as 
expressed  in  stocks,  bonds,  and  other  liabilities  was  as 
follows :  = 
Capital  stock- 
fieferred .........................................  $510,281,10o.m 
Common..  ........................................  5&302,500.m 
Total  capital  stock.. ........................ $1,or8,583,600.00 
Capital stocks of  subsidiary  companies not held by the 
.........................  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation..  215,914.38 
Bonded and debenture  debt of the U. S. Steel Corpor: 
ation (U. S. Steel Corporation bonds $303,757,000). .  360,754,326.77 
Mortgage  and  purchase  money obligations  of  subsid- 
lary companies ....................................  9,590.550.60 
Current liabilities.. ..................................  49,826951.78 
Total  capital  and  current  liabilities.. ........  $1,438.970~643.53 
lne  bonded  debt  held by the Carnegie  interests  was   lightly  less 
than thtis amount.  Sixty per cent of the stock of the Carnegie Company 
was acquired but only $159,450,000  of  the bonds.  Some more  Carnegie 
bonds were later exchanged, but not the  full $16o,ooo.ooo. 
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The Steel Corporation, as has already been indicated, con- 
trols  its constituent  companies  by  virtue of  its  ownership 
of their stock.  Immediately on its formation, it proceeded 
with the purchase of  the securities of  the companies to be 
controlled.  By April 2,  1901, the corporation had acquired 
ninety-eight  per  cent of  all the stock of  the original eight 
companies.  A public offer having been made to the share- 
holders of  the American Bridge Company and the Lake Su- 
perior Consolidated Iron Mines to exchange their shares for 
those of  the new organization upon terms contained  in Mr. 
Morgan's  circular  of  April  2, practically  all  the securities 
of  the former company, and eighty-five per cent of  the stock 
of  the latter, were acquired.  Arrangements were also made 
for the acquisition of  all outstanding interests in the Oliver 
Iron Mining Company  and the Pittsburg Steamship Com- 
pany  not  already  owned  by  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company. 
These exchanges were  all  virtually  completed  by  the  end 
of  April, 1901.  In this way the United  States Steel Cor- 
poration  came by  stock ownership  into direct management 
of  ten corporations which  were already  among the largest 
in  the world. 
CHAPTER  IV 
5 I.  In the short space of a single chapter, it is impossible 
to give  in any  detail  a  history  and  description  of  an or- 
ganization, the mere cataloguing of  whose properties would 
itself  fill  a  fair-sized  volume.  The  Steel  Corporation, 
furthermore, has been described by such writers as Wilgus 
and  Moody,'  and  certain  features  of  its  financial  policy 
have been treated by  Meade, Ripley  and others.  Its place 
in the development of the steel industry of the United States 
has been discussed by Hermann Levy,* who though a for- 
eign observer, has shown keen  insight  into the tendencies 
of  the steel  trade in this country  during the last  twenty- 
five years.  It will be  the purpose  of  this chapter to con- 
sider only the more salient features of  the organization and 
history of the corporation and certain aspects of  its financial 
condition and business standing which are of  special inter- 
est from an economic point of  view. 
5 2.  It may be said that the United States Steel Corpora- 
tion is typical of a tendency among industrial consolidations 
to bring  under  one control  all  the  characteristic  lines  of 
work  related  to a general industry.  In the charter under 
l Wilgus,  United States  Steel  Corporation;  Moody, Truth about  the 
Trusts, pp.  133-204.  For a  good, pupu3lar  account,  see  R.  S. Baker, 
"What the United  States Steel  Corporation really is,"  McClure's,  vol. 
18,  pp. 3-13. 
Hermann  Levy,  Die  Stahlindustrie  der  Vereinigten Staatet,  vorr 
Amen'ka. 
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which it was organized, the purposes of  the corporation are 
declared to be "  to manufacture iron, steel, manganese, coke, 
copper, lumber and other materials, and all or any articles 
consisting or partly consisting of  iron, steel, copper, wood, 
or other materials, and all or any products thereof,"  to ac- 
quire or lease lands containing these materials ;  to mine, ex- 
tract, or remove coal, ores, stone, other minerals, and tim- 
ber from any lands occupied or owned by  the company  or 
any other lands; and to buy and sell articles consisting, or 
partly consisting, of  these materials.'  The United  States 
Steel Corporation is thus an organization for the mining, 
manufacture, and buying and selling of  whatever relates to 
the iron and steel industry. 
This development  is an outcome of  the tendency  noted 
in a previous  chapter to integrate the productive forces of 
an iron  and  steel  concern.  The companies  out of  which 
the corporation was formed were in the main producers of 
certain  classes  or  grades  of  commodities.  While  they 
aimed ultimately to be self-sufficient-to  produce their own 
raw, crude, and finished material,-their  immediate purpose 
was to control only special branches of  the industry.  The 
Tinplate  Company,  for  example,  endeavored  to  secure  a 
rnonopoly of  tin plate; and the  Steel  and Wire Company, 
of  wire goods.  The futility of  such attempts and the de- 
sirability from the standpoint of  producers of  controlling a 
trade so exposed to variations of  demand  for commodities 
led  to the  formation  of  the  Steel  Corporation,  combina- 
tion of  all the principal  branches of  iron and steel produc- 
tion under one control.  While all monopolistic intentions 
are disclaimed by  the officials of  this consolidation, it has 
already been seen that the combination was formed to avert 
a threatened competition which would have lessened profits 
1  Cltorter, art. iii.  2 See Fwrth Annual  Report. 
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in  the  prosperous  period  which  was  coming,  and  would 
have  proved  destructive  to several  of  the  companies in a 
time of depression.  The aim, therefore, of  the new organi- 
zation was,  in a measure at least, the control of  the indus- 
try.  How far this object can be said to have been achieved 
will be discussed later.  It is to be noted in this connection 
that the Steel Corporation  is  largely the  result  of  the na- 
tural vicissitudes  of the trade and represents an attempt to 
control those vicissitudes. 
The organization by which the operations of  the corpor- 
ation  are carried  on presents  several  features  of  interest 
and importance.  The Steel Corporation is  not  an operat- 
ing company, but what is known as a security-holding cor- 
poration.  The companies which became parts of  it did not 
lose their  identity.  The Carnegie Steel Company and the 
National  Tube  Company  are  two  distinct  organizations, 
though parts of  the same general combination.  The cen- 
tral or governing corporation controls the subsidiary  com- 
panies  through  ownership of  their  stock.  If  the  officials 
of a subsidiary organization adopt a business policy in con- 
flict with that of  the controlling body, the latter has simply 
a stockholder's  right of  removing the officials of  such com- 
pany  and  electing  others more  amenable  to  its  purposes. 
The subsidiary  companies retain  the management  of  their 
various  manufacturing  plants,  and control  such operations 
and  policies  as are not  of  common  concern.  Each  com- 
pany, for example, pursues its own policy in the matter of 
recognizing labor unions.  Wide latitude is allowed  in fix- 
ing prices of products which vary with the producing com- 
pany.  One company buys of and sells to another; and bar- 
gains are driven as shrewdly as ever.  In the event of  dis- 
pute, the executive committee acted, in the first year or two 
of  the corporation's  existence,  as a sort of  supreme court. 
At the present time conflicting  interests  between  the com- 76  THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION  1298 
panies are harmonized by either the advisory or the finance 
committee. 
While each subsidiary company maintains a sort of local 
or  special  jurisdiction  over  its  own  peculiar  operations, 
those  interests  common  to all  or to several  of  the  com- 
panies are usually  combined  in great general departments. 
The coke  interests,  the  various branches  of  manufacture, 
and the  like  are united  in  such  departments  under  single 
heads.  A single agency distributes iron ore, coal, and coke 
among the various plants.  By this means cross-shipments 
are avoided ;  plants are supplied from the nearest sources of 
supply; and material is sent to those places where it is most 
needed.  In the matkr of  prices where two or more coa- 
panies  are concerned, arrangements are made  at the con- 
ferences of  the managers of  sales of  the subsidiary organi- 
zations.  These price arrangements are much influenced by 
departmental officials and by the business policy of  the cen- 
tral governing body. 
The Steel  Corporation is  under  the control  of  a  board 
of  twenty-four  directors.  The direct management is vested 
in  the chairman  of  the board  of  directors, the president, 
several subordinate officials, the finance committee, and the 
advisory  committee.'  All  these  functionaries  are  ap. 
pointed  by  the board.  The chairman of  the board  of  di- 
rectors presides  at all meetings of  the stockholders and of 
the board, and has general supervision of  matters designated 
to him by  the board  or finance committee.  The president 
is the head of  the manufacturing  side of  the corporation's 
activity, the chairman of  the advisory committee, and an ex- 
oficio member of  the finance committee.  The most import- 
ant executive body  of  the organization is the finance com- 
mittee,  consisting of  seven  members,  who as far as prac- 
1  By-laws of  the U. S. Steel Corporation, arts. iii, iv, v. 
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ticable. must be persons of experience in matters of  finance. 
This body has special charge and control of  all financial af- 
fairs of the company; and during the intervals between the 
meetings of the board  of  directors it may  exercise all the 
powers of the board.  The advisory committee,  consisting 
of  three members  besides the president  of  the corporation, 
is  a body  with powers to consider  such questions  relating 
to manufacturing, transportation,  or operation,  as may  be 
submitted to the committee by the president. 
It is significant  of the general policy of  the  Steel  Cor- 
poration  that  the  ruling power  is  financial.  The leading 
executive  body  is  the  finance  committee;  and  the  presi- 
dent, who is at the head of  the industrial side of the organi- 
zation, is subordinate in managerial power to the chairman 
of  the board  and  the chairman  of  the  finance  ooinmittee. 
The board  of  directors, too,  is composed  mainly  of  finan- 
ciers.  When the corporation was first organized only about 
one-third of  the board  were acquainted  with the language 
of  steel.'  The banking interests were represented by J. P. 
Morgan,  Geo.  C.  Perkins,  and  Robert  Bacon; the  Stand- 
ard  Oil,  by  the  Rockefellers  and  H.  H.  Rogers.  The 
Steel  Corporation, therefore, has been  at least  as much  a 
financial  as a  manufacturing  organization.  Most  of  the 
business and industrial  policy of  the consolidation is deter- 
mined by meetings of the heads of departments and various 
committees.'  Mr.  Bridge,  in  his  Inside History of  the 
'The  directors  in  1901  were  J.  P.  Morgan,  J.  D.  Rocke- 
feller,  H. H. Rogers,  Chas.  M.  Sohwab,  Elbent  H. Gary,  Geo. C.  Per- 
ks,  E.  C.  Converse,  Jas.  Gayley.  Marshall  Field,  D.  G.  Reid,  J. D. 
Rockefeller,  Jr.,  A.  Gifford, Rabt.  Ram,  NathanieZ Thayer,  Abram 
Hewitt,  C.  S.  Griscom,  F.  H.  Peasbody,  Chas.  Steele,  W.  H.  Moore. 
N. B. Ream. P. A. B. Widener, J. H. Reed, H. C. Frick, and Wm. Eden- 
hn.  Cf.  First Annual  Report. 
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Carnegie Steel  Company  graphically  describes  the weekly 
meetings of  the board of  managers,  superintendents,  assis- 
tants, etc., of  that company.  Meetings of a somewhat simi- 
lar nature are periodically held by the officials of the larger 
organization.  Friendly  rivalries  are encouraged.  Inven- 
tions and improved processes  are made the common prop- 
erty of  all  the plants which  can use them; and  all  infor- 
mation concerning trade policy  is discussed  in common by 
representatives of  the plants concerned. 
3.  By the formation of  the Steel Corporation two hun- 
dred and thirteen different manufacturing plants and trans- 
portation companies, forty-one mines, nearly one thousand 
miles of  railroad  connecting ore, coke,  and manufacturing 
properties, and a lake fleet of  one hundred  and twelve ves- 
sels constituting about one-third  of  the total tonnage of  the 
Northern Lakes were united under one controlling interest.' 
Of  the manufacturing plants,  one hundred  were in  Penn- 
sylvania; fifty-one in Ohio; fifteen in Illinois; twelve in In- 
diana; twelve  in  New  York; and the  rest  scattered  from 
Connecticut  to California.  The company  also controlled 
seventy-eight  blast  furi~aces,~  more  than  one-third  of  the 
entire number  in the United States,  Several of  these  fur- 
naces have a daily capacity of  seven hundred tons. 
The coking-coal properties of the Steel Corporation, upon 
whose value Mr. Schwab placed such emphasis in his testi- 
mony  before the  Industrial  Commi~sion,~  comprised  some 
57,000  acres located  in  IVestmoreland  and  Fayette Coun- 
ties, Pennsylvania.  This area constitutes  part of  the fam- 
ous Connellsville region.  In the fall of  1901 considerable 
additions to this area were made in Pennsylvania; and the 
'Report of  Industrial  Commission, vol.  xiii, p. 471. 
2 Commercial and  Financial  Chronicle, Apr.  27, 191,  p. 171. 
a Report, vol. xiii, pp. 464,  467,  472. 
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lease  of  50,000  acres  of the  Pocahontas  district  in  West 
Virginia was effected.  Besides these properties  in coking- 
coal  a  considerable  area of steam and gas coal  in  Illinois 
came into the possession of the corporation. 
The most  important  asset of the  Steel  Corporation  has 
been  its valuable mines of  iron ore in Minnesota, Michigan, 
and  Wisconsin.  This region is generally divided  into five 
ld  ranges ": the  Menominee  and  Marquette,  in  Michigan; 
the  Gogebic,  partly  in  ,Michigan  and  partly  in  Wiscon- 
sin; and  the  Vern~illion  and  Mesaba,  in  Minnesota.'  All 
these ranges are within two hundred miles of  the shores of 
Lake  Superior.  At the  time  of  the  organization  of  the 
United States Steel Corporation, the Vermillion range pro- 
duced approxilnately 1,700,000 tons of  ore annually, nearly 
all  of  which  belonged  to  the  new  corporation;  the 
Gogebic  range,  2,800,ooo  tons,  1,700,000 of  which  came 
rinder the control of  the new organization; the Menominee, 
3,roo,ooo tons, of  which  the  Steel  Corporation  controlled 
2,000,000; the Marquette, 3,300,000 tons of which 1,400,000 
belonged  to the  same organization; and  of  the  7,800,000 
tons proclucetl in  the Mesaba  range, the corporation would 
have  5.700,ooo tons.' 
Just what proportion of the Lake Superior ore fields came 
into the possession  of  the  Steel  Corporation  is difficult to 
state, and has been variously estimated.  At the end of  the 
year  1902.  when the first annual report  of the Steel  Cor- 
poration  came  out,  it  had  shipped  during that  year  over 
sixty per cent of  all the ore production of  the Lake Superior 
region, and controlled about forty-five per cent of  the entire 
l See  Ore Deposits  of U. S. and  Canada, by J. F. Kemp,  Scientific 
Publishing  Co.; also  hfussey, Combination in  the  Mining  Industry, in 
Columbia  University  Series  in  History, Economics  and  Public  Law. 
2 Age of  Steel, Jan..  1901,  p.  115;  April 20, 191. Iron Age, Feb. 21. 
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output of  the country.  Its proportion of  the entire supply 
of  worlcable ore in the ground has been  placed very high. 
Mr.  Schwab  in  his  statement before the  Industrial  Com- 
mission  estimated  this  proportion  at not  less  than  eighty 
per cent of  the total deposits of  the Lake Superior district. 
'The  ore fields of the Carnegie, Federal Steel, National Steel. 
and ,'~merican  Steel and \Vire companies, were estimated to 
contain at least ~OO,OOO,OOO  tons.'  In addition to this the 
Rockefeller holdings were supposed to represent about one- 
half  the  iron  ore of  the  Mesaba  range,  or approximately 
~.~O,OOO,OOO.~  If  these  estimates  were  correct  the  Steel 
Corporation would  have come into possession  of  750,000,- 
ooo tons of  workable ore. 
The estimates may have been exaggerated as any calcula- 
tion of the amount of  available ore in a district can at best 
only  approximate the truth.  What proportion  of  the ore 
fields came under the control  of  the corporation is hard to 
determine.  The Hill holdings in  the Mesaba Range which 
the Steel  Corporation  recently  leased  have been  estimated 
to contain as much  as 500,000,000 tons.  Several indepen- 
dent companies have additional holdings.  In view of  these 
facts  the Steel Corporation  probably  came into possession 
of  not  more  than  half  the  deposits  of  the  Lake  Superior 
district. 
In 1901, however,  much  of  this  region  was imperfectly 
known; and hence the holdings of  the new steel consolida- 
tion were over-estimated.  In view of  the current opinion 
of  the time, we can readily appreciate the feeling voiced by 
the New  York Indepc~tdetzt  : 
It is  quite plain that the corporation will soon own nearly all 
:  Rsport of  Industrial  Commission, vol.  I, p.  1023. 
Uge  of  Steel, hlar. 23,  1901, p.  15.  Review  of Reviews,  May, 1901. 
P.  560 
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the northern ore supply.  Its control is alrady so well  estab- 
lished  that the annual meeting of the ore-producers to  make 
prices for the season has been  postponed  indefinitely, because 
prices will be  determined by  the corpration.  This gathering- 
in of  the iron  mines  by  the new  combination is  a movement 
of  great  importance.  It will  make  the corporation  absolute 
master of the American iron and steel industry.l 
While occupying a commanding position among iron and 
steel  producers, the  Steel  Corporation  did  not  monopolize 
the Lake Superior region.  Nevertheless, it did obtain pos- 
session of  much of  the best ore regions in the world.  But 
as the later history of the Lake Superior region has shown, 
independent  companies  have  pre-empted  large sections  of 
this valuable district.  No sooner was  the  Steel  Corpora- 
tion  organized than several companies, alive to their  own 
interests,  secured possession  or leases of  property  in these 
fields.  Among the most  active was  Mr. J. J. Hill, whose 
ore lands became nearly  as extensive as those of  the Steel 
Corporation  itself,  and  whose  railroad  interests helped  to 
make him one of  its most formidable rivals2 
4.  During the six years of  its existence, the Steel Cor- 
poration  has  maintained  the same general  features  which 
characterized  it at the outset  of  its career.  It has,  how- 
ever, extended its control over some large independent con- 
cerns, and added to its holdings of coal and ore land: it has 
reorganized some of  the constituent companies ; it has trans- 
ferred much  of its preferred stock into a bonded  indebted- 
ness;  it  has  introduced  a  novel  scheme  of  profit-sharing; 
and it has shown some interesting vicissitudes in  its earn- 
ings  and  in  its  relative  share of the  country's  iron  aritl 
steel trade. 
1 New York Independent,  April  11, 1901, p. 862. 
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Among the most notable additions to the Steel Corpora- 
tion since its organization have been the Shelby Steel Tube 
Company in  1901 ; the Union Steel Company  in December, 
1902 ;  the Troy Steel Products Company in January, I903 ; 
the holdings of  the Chemung Iron Company  of  Duluth  in 
August, 1903; the properties of the Clairton Steel Company 
in  May,  1904; and  the  lease  of  the  Hill  holdings  in  the 
Lake Superior region in October, 1906. 
The Shelby Steel  Tube Company,  which  became a  part 
of  the  corporation  about  the  time  that  the  exchange  of 
shares had been  effected  with the American  Bridge  Com- 
pany and the Lake Superior Consolidated  Iron Mines, was 
the largest maker of  seamless tube in the world.'  This or- 
ganization, however, had been greatly overcapitalized.  The 
basis of  exchange of  shares *as  $37.50  of  the corporation's 
preferred  for $~oo.oo  of  Shelby Steel Tube preferred, and 
$25.00  of  the corporation's  common for $100.00  of  Shelby 
Steel Tube common. 
The Union  Steel  and  Troy  Steel  Products  companies 
were  added  in  1902  and  1903.'  The  former  organiza- 
tion had  absorbed  seven other  companies  and had  a  con- 
trolling  interest  in  two others.  Its bonds,  amounting  to 
$45,ooo,ooo,  were  guaranteed  by  the  Steel  Corporation. 
The Troy Steel  Products  Company  was  a  much  smaller 
concern, and the entire issues of capital stock and first mort- 
gage bonds were purchased  for $I,I~,OOO. 
The purchase of the holdings of the Chemung Iron Corn- 
pany of  Duluth added some extensive and valuable fields of 
iron ore.  By  this  purchase  there  was  acquired  what  the 
Iron Age describes as "the last really large and important 
block  of  Mesaba  ore that was for sale."  These holdings 
Age  of  Steel, June 29,  1905  p.  15. 
* First Annual Report. Dec. 31, I*. 
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are said to include "  eleven more or less fully developed and 
as yet entirely unmined  tracts, in all about 70,000,000 tons 
of ore of excellent quality, mulch  of  it  of  high grade Bes- 
semer, much of it cheaply mined and readily reducible.  The 
lands are mostly leased properties  on a basis of  twenty-five 
cents a ton royalty."  l 
The Clairton  Steel properties consisted mainly of  a large 
manufacturing plant  at Clairton, Pennsylvania,  2644 acres 
of coking-coal  land  in  Fayette  County  of  the  same  state, 
20,000  acres in fee of mineral lands on the Marquette range. 
and considerable railroad and limestone property.*  Of  the 
bonded  debt  carried by  the Clairton Steel  Con~pany,  $10,- 
230,000  were guaranteed  by  the  United  States Steel  Cor- 
poration,  the  remainder  being  mortgages  on  property  in 
which  the  corporation  had  a  part  interest.  In consider- 
ation  for the  transfer  of  the  company's  stock,  there  was 
paid  to the  vendors  $r,ooo,ooo  par  value  of  the  United 
States Steel Corporation 10-60 year five per cent bonds. 
The transfer of the Hill holdings  in  October,  1906, has 
excited  much  attention  as indicative  of  the  policy  of  the 
corporation to control  the northern  ore supply.  The con- 
ditions of this transfer are stated in the following announce- 
ment  made by  Judge  E.  H. Gary,  Chairman of  the Boartl 
of  Directors of  the  Steel Corporation: 
After  long  negotiations, a  contract  has  been  signed  for  the 
acquisition on a royalty  basis  of the  Hill  ore properties  (so- 
called)  by  companies  controlled  by  the United  States  Steel 
Corporation.  The quantity of  the ore has not been  accurately 
determined, but  it  is  a (large body.  The price to be  paid  is 
$1.65  per  ton, delivered at the upper lake 'docks, with  an in- 
crease of 3.4 cents per  ton  each  succeeding year.  The mini- 
~  ~ 
Commerctal and  Financial  Chronicle, Aug  22. 1903,  p.  405. 
Third  Annual  Report  Also  Iron  and  Stccl  Directory,  rgaq,  pp. 
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mum  agreed  to be  mined  is  750,000  tons  for the year  1907, 
and increases of  750,000 tons per year until it reaches 8,250,000 
tons, and thereafter it continues on  that basis.  It is  believed 
that  the consummation of  this agreement will  result in  great 
benefit  to both  parties.' 
In  considering  this  notable  addition  to  the  ore  lancls 
owned or controlled by the Steel Corporation two questions 
naturally suggest themselves:  What will be its effect upon 
the  corporation  itself?  What will  be  its  consequences to 
the  iron trade  at large?  In securing the  most  extensive 
deposits of  Lake Superior ore held by a single interest apart 
from itself, it has made an important addition to the num- 
ber  of  years  of  operation  guaranteed to its blast  furnaces 
and mills by  the lake  ores  it  previously  controlled.  It  is 
probably  assured  of  supplies  outlasting by  a  great  many 
years those  of  its principal competitors.  It must  be  said. 
however, that it has paid no small price to the Great North- 
ern for the privilege  of  taking all the ore the latter has to 
offer.  And  furthermore, the transaction by  increasing the 
cost  of  producing  ore  to  the  Steel  Corporation  has  irn- 
proved the position  of  some of  its competitors. 
The effect on the iron and steel trade as a whole is likely 
to show itself  in a general marking up of  ore values.  The 
position  of  the  Southern  producers  of  foundry  and basic 
irons in competition with the merchant furnaces of  the East 
and the Central West will doubtless be  advanced.  Eastern 
producers are likely to have an additional incentive for the 
use  of  foreign ores, and in  some  regions  for the clevelop- 
ment of deposits at home. 
While  the  transfer  of  these  properties  is  significant,  it 
should be clearly stated that the Hill holdings leased to the 
Steel Corporation do not include the developed mines owneti 
1 Iron Age, Oct.  rr, igo6.  p  gj3 
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by  the Great Northern interests.  Such noted mines as the 
Mahoning,  Stevenson, and others, Mr. Hill could not con- 
vey.  With the  exception of  two newly  opened  mines  no 
actual mining operations have been conducted  on the lands 
leased.  A  considerable part of  them has been  thoroughly 
explored.  It is  said  that  ~oo,ooo,ooo  tons  of  ore are in 
sight on the property  leased; but  as much  of  these fields 
have  not  been  tested,  the actual  tonnage  is  probably  very 
much  more,'  the  estimates  ranging  from ~oo,ooo,ooo  to 
~00,000,000  tons. 
The acquisition of the Hill properties  is in line with the 
policy which  the corporation has pursued  since its organi- 
zation.  The Union Steel Company and the Clairton Steel 
Company on entering this consolidation added  large areas 
of ore land.  The purchase of the holdings of  the Chemung 
Iron Company of Duluth and what is known as the Canisteo 
deal late in 1905 took into the Steel Corporation ownership 
more than  200,000,000 tons of  ore.'  All  these  additions 
show  that  the growth of  the  company's  control  over  the 
northern ore land has been marked  and rapid  since its or- 
ganization  in  1901.  What  proportion  of  the  Lake  Su- 
perior  ore region  is now  owned  or held by  the Steel Cor- 
poration  is  difficult to state; but  it  seems probable that  it 
is  not  less  than  three-fourths,  and  may  be  considerably 
more. 
8 5 While the United  States Steel  Corporation was ex- 
tending its control over other companies  and properties,  it 
was  also  making  certain  other  extensions  and  internal 
changes.  During the first  three years of  its existence the 
export trade was  under the supervision of a  departmental 
head.  During the depression of 1903-4 this trade assumed 
l Iron  Age, Oct.  18, I@,  p.  log. 
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an importance greater than in 1901-2.  Early in 1904 there 
was  organized  the  United  States  Steel  Products  Export 
Company with general offices  in  New  York  City.  "This 
Company does not manufacture finished or unfinished pro- 
ducts of  any kind, but has for its object the extension and 
development of  the export trade of  the United  States Steel 
Corporation." '  As the Ullited  States is  to-day  the larg- 
est producer of  iron and steel in the world, the export trade. 
of  its greatest producer  is important to the country.  The 
direct control of  the new company is vested in the Federal 
Steel Company. 
Another development  is the organization of  the Indiana 
Steel Company, also to be directly controlled by the Federal 
Steel  Company.  The formation  of  this  concern  is  due 
to the rapid growth of  the steel trade in the West, and the 
inability  of  the mills  in  Illinois to meet  the  increased  de- 
mand  for their commodities.  We are told by the officials 
that : 
in  consequence of  these conditions, it has been  decided to con- 
struct and put in  operation ,a new  plant, to be  located on the 
south shore of  Lake  Michigan, in  Calumet  Township,  Lake 
County,  Indiana; and a large acreage of  land has been pur- 
chased  for  that purpose.  It is proposed to construct a plant 
of  the most  modern  standard  and  to completely equip it  for 
the manufaoture of pig iron, Bessemer and open-hearth steel, 
and a great variety of  finished steel products.  The total cost 
will he large.* 
It is the purpose  of  the corporation to make this  plant 
the  largest  and  best  equipped  of  its  kind  in  the  world. 
Furnaces and rolling mills will cover a square mile in ex- 
1 Iron and  Steel  Works Directory, 1904, p. 39. 
2 Fourth Annual  Report, Decerr.ber,  1905. 
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tent;  and  in  addition  thousands  of  acres  owned  by  the 
Indiana Company will be used for a town site.  This town, 
the name of which  will be  Gary, will  form a large indus- 
trial  community  dependent  mainly  upon  the  steel  plant. 
The plant, which  is to cost $75,ooo,ooo,  is being built pri- 
marily to serve the Western market, but is so located that its 
product can be marketed advantageously in the East as well 
as in the West.' 
B 6. Coincident with these extensions the constituent com- 
panies  themselves  have  undergone  some  noteworthy 
changes.  In March, 1903, the Carnegie Steel Company of 
New Jersey  came into existence through a combination of 
the original Carnegie Steel Company of  Pennsylvania,  the 
National  Steel  Company,  and  the  American  Steel  Hoop 
Company.  The capital stock was fixed at $63,ow,ooo,  all 
of  which is common.*  A similar merger took place in De- 
cember,  1903,  between  the American  Sheet  Steel  and the 
American Tin Plate companies.  This combination is now 
known  as the  American  Sheet and  Tin  Plate Company.' 
The capital stock is fixed at $4g,ooo,ooo of  which $24,500,- 
ooo is seven per cent cumulative preferred, and $24,500,000; 
common.  This  merger  was  part  of  a  plan  of  enforced 
economy  due  to  the  depression  of  the  latter  months  of 
1903.'  In these months occurred a dismantling of several 
of  the least  productive  mills  and  a  removal  of  the  head- 
quarters of  nearly all the subsidiary companies to Pittsburg. 
After  these  extensions  and  reorganizations,  the  United 
States Steel Corporation may now  (March,  1907)  be  said 
to control  directly the following companies, which  in turn 
control numerous  other  subsidiary  interests: 
l  Iror Age, Apr. 26,  1906,  p.  1417. 
Iron and  Steel  Directory, 1904, P. 3.  B Ibid., p. 53. 
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Carnegie  Steel Company  (of  New  Jersey). 
Federal Steel Company. 
National  Tube Company. 
Shelby Steel Tube Company. 
American Steel and Wire Company (New Jersey). 
American  Sheet and Tin Plate Company. 
American  Bridge  Company  (New Jersey). 
Union Steel Company. 
Clairton Steel  Company. 
Lake Superior  Consolidated  Iron Mines. 
Of  these companies,  the Steel Corporation owns practi- 
cally all the stock.  It also owns one-sixth  of  the stock of 
the  Oliver  Iron  Mining  Company  and  of  the  Pittsburg 
Steamship Company, the remaining five-sixths  of  both  be- 
ing owned by  the Carnegie Steel  Company.  In the Lake 
Superior region through its subsidiary companies,  it owns 
or has a controlling share in sixty-five active mines,'  besides 
extensive fields containing large quantities  of  ore not  yet 
mined.  Its coking-coal area embraces over  I 13,000 acres, 
and  its tracts of  steam coal, over  32,000 acres.'  It owns 
over eleven hundred miles  of  railroad,  including branches 
and  spurs, and  operates  under  trackage  rights,  297 miles 
more.Vts blast furnaces number ninety-three, and its iron 
and steel mills over seven hundred. 
5 7.  On January  I, 1906, there  was  a  capital  stock  of 
$868,583,600  and a bonded  indebtedness  of  $570,472,264- 
93.'  Of  the capital  stock, $508,302,500  is  common,  and 
$360,281,100,  preferred.  At the close of  the first year  of 
the  corporation's  existence  the  preferred  stock  amounted 
to $510,281,100.  Its contraction  is the outcome of  a plan 
by  which  $I~O,OOO,MM  preferred  stock  was  converted 
into a bonded  indebtedness. 
1  Fourth Annual Report.  '  Ibid.  8 Ibid.  4 Ibid. 
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5 8. Of the business policies of  the Steel Corporation none 
has  probably  excited  more  attention  and  received  more 
severe criticism than  has this  conversion  plan  proposed  in 
the spring of 1902.  Under the date of  April  17, the Steel 
Corporation announced a plan  for the exchange of  $200,- 
ooo,ooo of the preferred stock for a like amount of  second 
mortgage collateral trust bonds, and asked the stockliolders 
for authority to create a mortgage on the property,  limited 
to $250,000,000,  of  which  $50,000,0oo  was  to be  sold  for 
cash, the remainder being exchanged  in  the manner above 
indicated.  The announcement  created  great  surprise,  es- 
pecially as the earnings of  the previous nine months showed 
a most surprising surplus.  However, at a special meeting, 
the  proposition  was  voted  on  and  approved  by  the 
stockholders  representing  $374,574,100  par  value  of 
the  preferred  stock  and  $395,855,700  par  value  of  the 
common  stock.  Within  a  few  days  of  the  ratifica- 
tion  of  the  conversion  plan,  suit  was  begun  by  certain 
owners of  stock to prevent  the proposed  issue of  bonds anti 
retirement  of  preferred  stock.  An order was  granted  011 
June g, by a New Jersey court to show cause why the cor- 
poration should not be restrained  from changing stock into 
bonds.  This  temporary  injunction  was  made  permanent 
on June  16; and  the case  was  appealed  to the  Court  of 
Errors and Appeals at Trenton, and awaited its turn on the 
calendar.  On September 26,  1902, the court handed down 
its decree  reversing  and  disolving  the, injunction.  Other 
legal complications arose, but the legality of the conversion 
plan  was  upheld. 
The motives which led to the proposed  plan  have been a 
subject  of  much  controversy.  The alleged  motive  of  the 
corporation was the need  of money  for proposed  improve- 
ments.  It  was  further  urged  that  the  payment  of  five 
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per  cent  dividends  on  preferred  stock  of  $zoo,ooo,ooo 
would result  in an annual saving of  $1,50o,ooo.  In view 
of  the large earnings of  1902 and the early part of  1903, 
these motives were seriously questioned; and the plan with 
its  provisions  for  the  underwriting  syndicate  met  with 
such criticism that the arrangement was closed when $150,- 
000,ooo of  preferred stock  had  been  exchanged  and $20,- 
000,ooo of  bonds sold.' 
3 9.  -4nother plan of  the corporation which excited much 
comment, favorable and unfavorable, at the time of  its first 
publication  was the famous profit-sharing  scheme.  Under 
the  date  of  December  31,  1902,  two  circulars,  one  ad- 
dressed to the stockholders and another to the officers and 
employees, were issued in which a plan was proposed where- 
by the officers and employees might be given an opportunity 
to become stockholders.  Two million  dollars of  preferred 
stock  were to be  set  aside  for purchase  by  employees  of 
the  corporation.  The stock  was  to be  sold  for $82.50  a 
share, and a bonus of five dollars a share for five years was 
to be added  to the regular  seven per  cent  dividend.  The 
workers were  divided  into six classes according  to annual 
salary, beginning with those receiving $20,000  or over, wh~ 
embraced  the  first  class.  The sixth  class  included  those 
receiving $800 or less; the other classes embraced those re- 
ceiving  intermediate  amounts.  The proportion  of  stock 
which  could  be  owned  by  these  several  classes  varied  in- 
versely with their  salary.  The members of  the first class 
could own stock to an amount not  exceeding five per  cent 
of  their  annual income.  The second  class was  limited  to 
eight per cent of  their yearly income; the third class to ten 
l For s  defmfse of  the bond  mnversion, see edihats in Commerciar 
and  Fiunncial  Chronicle in  the  summer of  1902.  For a criticism, see 
Meade  in Quarterly Journal  of Economics, vol. 18, p. 22; also Ripley, 
Quurterly  Journal,  Feb., 1905. 
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per cent; the fourth to twelve per  cent; the fifth to fifteen 
per cent; and the sixth to twenty per  cent.  The object  of 
the provision was 
to interest the large number  of  young and able employees in 
the  work of more  closely  organizing  and  systematizing the 
business  in  all  its branches and  ramifications-as  an  integral 
part of  the Steel Corporation as an harmonious whole; to  in- 
terest these men  in  reducing general expenses as  well  as the 
particular  cost of  manufacture;  to offer to these men  an  in- 
ducement )to remain permanently in  the corporation's service ; 
and to avoid the tendency of  a profit-sharing plan  pertaining 
solely  to a constituent company.= 
To this  proposition  the  Amalgamated  Associatiorl  of 
Iron and Steel Workers made  no opposition,  and a  large 
number of the employees availed  themselves  of  the oppor- 
tunity to buy shares.  During the period of  declining ear~l- 
ings in the latter half of  1903, many of  the workmen  who 
had  invested  in  the shares of  the company complained  of 
the  possibility  of  losing  their  investments.  The corpora- 
tion  then  voluntarily  promised  to buy  back  in  1908  the 
shares of any of  its employees who might then wish to sell 
and who were still in its employ at the price  at which  the 
shares  were  purchased.  By  this  agreement,  the  Steel 
Corporation virtually guaranteed the integrity of the work- 
men's  investments. 
The setting aside of shares  for employees  has been  re- 
peated each year since the introduction of  the plan; and the 
conditions of  the offer, except  in the matter of  price,  have 
been substantially the same.  Under the offer made at the 
end of  1905, "  subscriptions were received from I 2.256 em- 
ployees, for a total of 23,989 shares." ' By the close of  the 
Circular to  Stockholde~q  Dec. 31, 1gxZ. 
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year  1905, there had  been  issued to employees of  the cor- 
poration over  120,000 shares of  stock. 
The differences in the price  paid  for stock due to varia- 
tion in market value  from year to year have been a source 
of some complaint  among workmen.  The employees who 
purchased  stock at the time of  the first  offer  secured their 
shares at $82.50  per  share; at the  end  of  1903, the price 
was fixed at $55.00; a year later, at $87.50;  at the end of 
190.5,  at $~oo.oo;  and  in  December,  1906,  at  $103.00.' 
The workmen, however, in most cases have recognized that 
these variations are due to market conditions, and that in 
each case the stock has been offered them at some discount. 
This profit-sharing  scheme represents  an attempt on the 
part of  the company to interest employees in the success of 
the business by  giving them  an interest  in the profits.  In 
this particular it does not differ essentially  from other pro- 
fit-sharing  schemes.  Making  employees,  however,  a  part 
of  the corporation by  making them  stockholders, is  a  de- 
parture  from  the  usual  forms  which  profit-sharing  plans 
have  assumed  in  the  past.  It is  not,  indeed,  the first  at- 
tempt  of  the kind  ever  made.  The National  Steel  Com- 
pany before becoming  a part of  the Steel Corporation had 
persuaded  many of  its workmen to become investors in  its 
preferred stock, and in the Carnegie Company the policy of 
giving officials and  departmental  heads  an  interest  in  the 
business outside of  their usual  salaries had  long been  pur- 
sued.  The scheme,  however,  is  none  the  less  significant. 
How far it will make employees feel that their interests are 
identical  with  those of  the corporation remains to be  seen, 
ant1  its  outconle  promises  to  be  of  more  than  ordinary 
economic and sociological interest. 
10. The earnings  of  the  cerporation  have  exhibited 
1  New York Evening Sun, Dec. 14  1906. 
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some interesting features both  on account of  their magni- 
tude and variation.  Starting out as the organization  did 
with a capital in round numbers of  $~,qoo,ooo,ooo,  it was 
a  question  whether  the  earnings  would  justify  this  huge 
capitalization.  While it cannot be said that the income has 
come up to the sanguine expectations of  the organizers, the 
returns  have nevertheless  been  large.  It must  be  remem- 
bered,  however,  that the period  since the  organization  of 
the company has on the whole been one of  great prosperity. 
The corporation has not  yet  been  compelled to weather  a 
time of  depression  comparable to that of  the middle nine- 
ties, and until it has experienced such an epoch, its strength 
and stability will remain problematical. 
While the period  since  1901 has been  on the whole  one 
of  prosperity  there  has  been  sufficient  variation  in  trade 
considerably to affect  the income.  The total  sales  of  the 
corporation  for  1902, the  year  for which  the first  annuaI 
report was issued, amounted to $560,510,479.  The magni- 
tude of  this income will be  appreciated  when  it  is  remem- 
bered  that our national revenues  for the fiscal year  ending 
June  30,  1905,  aggregated  $543,423,859,  or $17,086,620 
less than  the gross earnings  of  the corporation  for  1902. 
During the year  1904 the gross receipts  fell to $444,405,- 
430.56  This decline was due to the depression  which  set 
in  in  the latter part  of  the year  1903 and  lasted  through 
most of  1904.  Near the close of  the latter year a  revival 
in the iron and  steel trade began  which  has continued  to 
the  present  time  (March,  1907).  With  this  revival  the 
gross  receipts  of  the  corporation  have  greatly  increased, 
those  for  I905  being  nearly  $~~,OOO,OOO  more  than  the 
gross earnings  for  1902. 
The variation of  the trade was more forcibly reflected in 
the  net  earnings.  Net  earnings  in  the  corporation's  an- 
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above cost  of  manufacture,  operating expenses, interest on 
bonds  of  subsidiary companies,  taxes,  and debts  incurred 
for  ordinary  repairs.  Out  of  the  total  net  earnings  are 
paid the interest  on the corporation's bonds,  dividends, ap 
propriations  for  additional  properties,  extraordinary  re- 
pairs,  and  sinking  funds.  The amount  remaining  after 
these obligations have been met constitute the "balance  of 
surplus " for the year; and these surpluses constitute a  re- 
serve fund  (the undivided  surplus). 
The total  net  earnings of  the Steel Corporation  for the 
vears 1902-1906  l  with  the yearly balances of  surplus have 
been as follows: 
Net Earnings.  Balance  of Swrplw. 
1902.  .  . . . .  .  . . .  . .  .  .  .  .  .$133,308,763.00  $34253,656.75 
193..  . ..  ...  ......... 109,171,152.35  12,304,916.59 
1914 ................. 73,176,521.73  5,047~852.19 
1905  .  .  .  119,787,658.43  17~65,815.15 
1906. ..  ........  ....  .. 156,624,273.18  12,742~859.94 
It will be seen from this table that the banner  year of  the 
corporation  was  1906.  Owing  to  large  approp,~iations 
for improvements and extensions the surplus remaining for 
the  corporation's  reserve  fund  is  less  than  half  that  for 
1902, the year of  the next largest net earnings. 
During the six years of  the Steel  Corporation's  history 
the net earnings have been sufficient for the payment of  the 
annual  dividends of  seven  per  cent on the preferred  stock. 
Down to October, 1903, the annual dividends on the com- 
mon stock had been four per cent.  They were then cut in 
half; and in  April,  1904 they  were passed.  On July  31, 
I+,  it was announced that dividends on the common stock 
would be resumed.  Since then quarterly dividends of  one. 
half  of  one per cent have been paid. 
Annual  Refiorts  of  the  Steel  Corporation,  and Iron  Age, Jan. 31, 
1907. P. 354. 
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The net earnings of the corporation have thus fluctuatetl 
considerably  (luring the six years of  its  existence.  The 
company  tlurit~g  part  of  that time  has  been  cornpelled  to 
forego dividends  on  much  of  its stock,  and  fortify  itself 
against outside competition by making large appropriations 
for improvements ant1 extensions.  This fact indicates that 
the organization  is  as yet  far from controlling the condi- 
tions of iron ant1 steel protluction.  Concerning the depres- 
sion of three years ago, the Iron .4ge  declares: 
It has been truthfully said that in 1904 the United States Steel 
Corporation passed through the worst year in  its history from 
every standpoint; and this being true of  (this great interest, it 
naturally  follows that it is  also true of  all other leading iron 
and  steel concerns.  It is  a matter of congratulation  that  the 
Corporation,  in  spite of  the adverse conditions existing,  wai 
able to maintain and pay  regular dividends upon  its preferred 
stock and at the same time keep up and  improve the physical 
condition of  its plants. 
And  yet  this  depression  lasted  but  little  over  a  year  arltl 
was milt1 compared with such periods as the middle nineties 
and the middle seventies.  When it is remembered that the 
iron and steel tratle is peculiarly  subject to the fluctuations 
of  business  anti that  the company carries a bondetl  debt  oi 
lialf a billion tlollars, it can hardly be paid that the financial 
stability of the Steel Corporation is fully assured. 
I I. Of  allied  interest  and  of  even  more significance is 
the  corporation's  relative  share  of  the  country's  trade 
Perhaps no  inclustrial  combination  excited  such  apprehen- 
sion of  monopoly  power  and  tyranny as did  this company 
at the time of its formation.'  'This  apprehension  is  readily 
accountetl  for  bj  its  great  size-its  im~t~ense  capital  and 
large property holtlings.  \\71~ile  controlling a large share of 
For  a dark  picture of \uch  intluscrinl  tyranny, see  quotation  from 
Lmdon Standard  in Ir(71t  .4~r.  Mar  28. Iw1,  p. 4. 96  THE UNITED STATES  STEEL  CORPORATION  [3~8 
the country's iron and steel trade, the Steel Corporation ex- 
ercises  no such  dominating influence over  the industry  as 
do  the  Standard  Oil  and  American  Sugar  Refining 
companies  in  their  respective  fields.  Nor  has its  relative 
share of  the country's production tended  to increase.  In- 
dependent concerns have maintained a vigorous activity and 
have even gained on their great competitor. 
When the  Steel  Corporation was first  organized  it  was 
estimated that the company's  control of  the country's out- 
put of  Bessemer ore would be about ninety per cent,'  and of 
the iron ore lying in the ground, fully seventy-five per cent." 
Wilgus in his work on the United States Steel Corporation 
stated that it would  make eighty per  cent of  the Bessemer 
steel; fifty to sixty per  cent of  the open-hearth; two-thirds 
of  the steel rails  made  in  the United  States, Canada, and 
Mexico; sixty per  cent  of  the steel  beams;  two-thirds  of 
the wire rods; ninety-four  per  cent of  the wire; ninety-five 
per  cent of  the wire nails;  all  the woven  wire  and barb- 
wire fence; ninety-five per cent of  the steel in tubes; ninety- 
five per cent of  all the tin plate; and nimty per  cent of  all 
the bridge  material.  While  some  of  these  estimates  ap- 
proximate  the  truth,  most  of  them  proved  extravagant. 
However,  very  conservative  calculations gave the  corpor- 
ation  sixty  per  cent  of  the  output  of  pig  iron  and  from 
eighty to eighty-five per cent of  rolled or finished products 
Considering the size of  the  Steel  Corporation, the  pro- 
portion  of  its trade has,  at no period, been  very  startling. 
In 1901, it produced  43.9  per  cent  of  the iron ore of  the 
country, 42.9 per cent of  the pig iron, 66.2 per  cent of the 
total  steel  ingots  and  castings,  and  50.1  per  cent  of  the 
rolled  products.  In addition  to this it  controlled 65.8 per 
1 New York Independent,  Apr.  11,  1901 
2 Review  of Reviews, May, 1901,  p.  560 
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cent of  the output of wire nails.'  It may be said. however. 
that its control of the higher  grades of  ore, pig iron,  and 
rolled  products was  larger than  these figures would  indi- 
cate.  Of the 20,589,237 tons of  ore shipped from the Lake 
Superior region, the Steel  Corporation shipped  12,692,213 
tons,  or 61.6 per  cent.  It produced  58.5  per  cent  of  the 
Bessemer and basic pig iron, and 70.2 per cent of the Bes- 
semer  steel  ingots  and  castings.  Among  rolled  products, 
the  corporation  produced  59.9  per  cent  of  the  Bessemer 
steel rails; 62.2 per cent of  the structural shapes; 64.6 per 
cent  of the  plates  and  sheets;  and  77.6  per  cent  of  the 
wire  rods:  Of certain  wire  goods  like  woven  and  barb 
wire the Steel  Corporation had  practically  a monopoly  by 
virtue of  patent rights. 
Since 1901 the proportion of  the trade controlled by the 
company has not varied to a very marked extent.  In 1902 
the aggregate of that trade was large; but independent con- 
cerns  secured  a  due  share  of  it.  The most  noteworthy 
changes were in regard to steel rails which increased from a 
proportion of 59.9 per cent to 65.4 per cent and wire rods 
which declined from a percentage of 77.6 to one of  71.5. 
The year 1903 marks a relative decline in the proportion 
of  raw  and  crude  material  and  a  slight  advance  in  the 
percentage of finished and rolled goods.  The increase, how- 
ever,  was  followed  by  a  noticeable  decline  in  1904  and 
1905.  The proportion  of  pig  iron  and  open-hearth  steel 
produced by the corporation has held  its own.  With these 
and  a  few  other  exceptions,  the  company's  share  of  the 
total  production  from  1902  to  1905  (inclusive)  shows  a 
small but  appreciable  decline. 
The amounts  of  iron  and  steel  produced  by  the  Steel 
Corporation and independent concerns for I905 and the per- 
centages of  the total  for each year  from 1902 to 1905 are 
shown in the following table : 
1 Iron Age, Jan. 2, 1~03.  Taken from figures in Iron Age. 98  THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION  [320 
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The aggregate trade  of  the  Steel  Corporation  has  in- 
creased  considerably  since 1901  ;  but  in  proportion  to the 
business  of  the whole country it  has hardly  held  its own. 
We  read in one of  the recent reports: 
Notwithstanding the  large sums  which  have been  paid  since 
the organization of  the Corporation for increasing the produc- 
ing  capacity  by  the  subsidiary  companies,  they  have  only 
maintained  their  position  in  the  trade.  In  1901 these  com- 
panies produced 43.2  per cent of  the pig iron manufactured  in 
this country, and in  1905, 44.2 per cent.  In 1901 these com- 
panies produced 66.2 per cent of  the Bessemer and open-hearth 
steel ingots, and in 1905,60.2 per cent.  W,hile these companies 
do not expect or desire to con~trol  the steel industry, they must, 
so far as proper  and  practicable, maintain their  position,  and 
to do this it has been necessary to expend large sums of  money 
from time to time.' 
The fact that the proportion  of  the trade controlled  by 
the company  has shown no tendency  on the whole  to in- 
crease,  notwithstanding  the large outlays made for exten- 
sions and improvements, indicates ,that the Steel Corporation 
is meeting  not  a  little  competition.  The fact, too,  that a 
large proportion  of  the capital of  the company has had to 
forego dividends for more than two years and is now yield- 
ing only two per  cent shows that no very great control is 
exercised over the iron and steel industry.  As has already 
been noted, however, the Steel Corporation has during the 
six years of  its history been  increasing its holdings.of ore 
lands through which it may in time control the industry by 
controlling the sources of  raw material.  This achievement 
will be  difficult; but  the best  situa~ted  and most  productive 
fields are new for the most part held by the corporation.  It is 
principally upon the possession of these lands that the Steel 
Corporation  justifies  its huge capitalization.  In order to 
judge the financial stability of the organization it will there- 
fore be  necessary to examine its capitalization. 
1  Fourth Annual  Report  of U.  S. Steel  Corporation. 3231  CAPITALIZATION OF  STEEL CORPORATION  101 
CHAPTER  V 
5  I. THE  organization of  a great consolidation generally 
takes  place  in  a  period  of  prosperity.  It is  then  that  in- 
creased earnings and encouraging prospects  foster a  spirit 
of  enterprise which endeavors to seize the opportunities for 
increased gains.  In a trade like that of  iron and steel, char- 
acterized by great vicissitudes of  demand, the desire to take 
full advantage of the rising market is peculiarly strong.  In 
order to do this, destructive competition must be prevented ; 
and this necessity  gives birth to combinations co-operating 
to secure the  full  benefit  of  the  increased  demand.  It is 
during a period of  rising prices  that pools are most  easily 
formed and maintained; and it  is  tluring such  a time that 
consolidations  are most  readily  organizecf.  In both  cases 
there is a unity of  interest to secure gains which would be 
much curtailed  as a consequence of  unlin~ited  competition. 
The organization  of  great corporations or trusts during 
periods of  prosperity has an ~mportant  effect upon  capital- 
ization.  In the formation of  one of  these combinations the 
capitalization  is usually based  upon  the total  earning capa- 
city of  the separate plants to be united plus anticipated gains 
due  to good-will,  achievement  of  economies,  and  real  or 
supposed  monopoly  advantages.  A  corporation  entering 
a large combination in a period  of  flourishing trade is likely 
$0 insist upon  a higher valuation  of  its securities than if  it 
entered a consolidation in times of  normal business.  In not 
a  few  cases a  strong corporation  will  remain outside of  a 
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combination unless the exchange of  securities is based upon 
its maximum earnings.  A corporation, therefore, which is 
a  consolidation  of  pre-existing  corporations  or consolida- 
tions,  is  almost  inevitably  more  highly  capitalized  than 
normal  conditions  would  justify. 
5 2.  The United  States  Steel  Corporation  was  formed 
under  conditions  similar to those  which  have  given  birth 
to consolidations in general.  The year  1901 was a year of 
great prosperity in the iron and steel trade; and the three 
preceding  years,  with  the  exception  of  a  temporary  de- 
pression during the second half of  1900, constituted a period 
of  increasing demand  and  rising prices.  As has  already 
been  indicated,  it was the  threat  of  a  severe  competition 
in the face of  a promising market which was the occasion 
of  the corporation's  formation.  The corporations  which 
became  parts  of  the  new  organization  at  its  beginning, 
though suffering from the depression of 1900, had enjoyed 
a  period  of  considerable  prosperity.  In the  exchange  of 
securities most of  these concerns received  a bonus on their 
previous  capitalizations; and  thus  the total  capital  of  the 
Steel  Corporation  was considerably  in excess  of  the com- 
bined capitals of  its constituent companies. 
W 3.  The  capital stock of the eight original companies which 
entered  the  steel  consolidation  aggregated  $617,070,200. 
Of  this  amount  $160,000,000  was  common  stock  of  the 
Carnegie Company.  In addition to this capital  stock was 
a  bonded  debt of  $191,341,271.72,  of  which  $16o,ooo,ooo 
were Carnlegie bonds.  In the transfer of  securities the Car- 
negie  stocks were paid  for in first mortgage bonds  in the 
ratio  of  $1500  bonds  per  $1000  stock.  The  remaining 
stock  of  the  original  eight  con~panies  was  increased  to 
$719,999,395.  The new issues compared  with the old are 
shown by the table on the following page:' 
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From  this  table  it  will  be  seen  that  at  the  formation 
of the United States Steel Corporation the stock of  the ori- 
ginal companies, with the exception of  the American  Steel 
Hoop and American  Sheet Steel companies, was consider- 
ably  augmented  on the  exchange of  securities.  The dif- 
ference between the old and new  issues of  stock was $102,- 
929,19j,  to which  should  be added  $144,000,000  of  first- 
mortgage bonds-making  a total increase in the capital  of 
the  original  eight  companies  of  $246,929,195.  This rep- 
resents  an increase  of  capital  due to transfer  of  stock of 
more than forty per cent. 
The capital  stock of  the American  Bridge Company and 
the Lake Superior Consolidated  Iron Mines-both  of  which 
entered the Steel Corporation soon after its organization- 
was likewise increased  on the exchange of  securities.  The 
old issues of  stock outstanding of these two companies was 
$92,212,049.  On the transfer of  shares, this stock was in- 
creased  to $147,705,632,  the difference being $55,493,583. 
Adding this  difference  to the  increase in  the  stock  of  the 
original  eight  corporations,  we  see  that  the  capitalization 
of  the  United  States Steel  Corporation was  $302,422,778 
more  than  the  total  capitalization  of  the  ten  great  com- 
panies of  which it was first formed. 
The aggregate stock capital issued to the ten companies 
mentioned  amounted  to $867,705,027.  There was  issued 
in addition to this amount $~O,OOO,OOO  stock-$~~,OOO,OOO 
preferred and $~~,OOO,OOO  common-in  payment  for $25,- 
ooo,ooo cash.  The remaining stock of  the authorized issue 
of  $~,~oo,ooo,ooo  was left for the pay of  the syndicate and 
as treasury stock for future use.  The capital stock issued 
at the time of  the first  annual report  was  $1,018,583,600, 
of  which  $508,302,500  was  common  and  $510,281,100 
preferred. 
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industrial concern  in  existence  and  attracted  much  public 
attention.  The question  naturally  arises,  how  far is  this 
huge capitalization  justified?  Regarding the basis  of  the 
capitalization of  companies  and combinations, two general 
opinions are held:  First, that the amount of  capital should 
be  limited by  the actual value  of  the  property  owned,  or 
should  be  strictly  related  to  such  value;  Second,  that  it 
should be dependent upon the earning capacity of  the com- 
pany.  The second  basis  of  capitalization  is  the  one  pre- 
ferred  by  most  business  men.  Under  competitive  condi- 
tions, however, these two bases will tend to correspond.  It 
is only  under  advantages, monopolistic  in  nature, that the 
capitalization of  earnings is likely to exceed in any consid- 
erable degree a capitalization based  upon  the value of the 
properties owned. 
It has already been noted that the Steel Corporation was 
organized  in a period of  prosperity.  Just  previous  to this 
organization, the eight original constituent companies were 
paying full dividends on their preferred stock and managed 
to make payments on the common stock.  During the year 
1900, the latter half  of  which  was a period  of  depression, 
the  different  interests  consolidated  made  the  following 
profits :  l 
......................  Garnegie Steel Company.  $39,000,000 
............................  Moore Companies.  22,000,000 
Federal Steel  Company ........................  15,000,000 
......................  National Tube Gompany.  13,000,000 
............  American  Steel & Wire Company..  7,000,000 
............................  Total  .*,OOO,000 
A capitalization of  a billion dollars on net earnings of $96,- 
ooo,ooo does not  seem excessive.  Notwithstanding a tem- 
porary depression  during the summer and fall months, the 
1  Iron  Age, Feb. 28,  1901. 
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year 1900  was on the whole a prosperous year.  The early 
months constituted a period  of  exceptionally  large demand 
for  irm and  slteel  goods; and  the  high  prices  ,of  th'e 
latter part  of  1899 continued.  The smaller earnings and 
lower prices of the latter half  of  the year, though an im- 
portant  factor in  the  formation of  the  Steel  Corporation, 
did not serve to make the gains of  1900 typify a season of 
depression  or even of  normal  earnings.  The net earnings 
of the Steel Corporation during one of  its most prosperous 
years  (1902), which  was also one of  the most  prosperous 
in the iron and steel trade of  the country, were $133,308,- 
763.72;'  and at ,that time the Lake Superior Consolidated 
Iron Mines and the American  Bridge  Company had been 
addmed  .ta the corporation.  When $he incomes qf  these two 
years are compared, and  allowance  is  made  for the earn- 
ings of  the companies added to the Steel combination since 
its  formation, we  readily  see  that  the  net  income  of  the 
eight companies  in  1900 typify a year of  great prosperity. 
S 5.  In sa far as the capitalization of  ,the Steel Corpora- 
tion was based  upon earnings, it was so based  in a period 
of  good  times.  What  the  several  constituent  companies 
could earn during normal times, or during an epoch of  de- 
pression,  was a matter of  uncertainty.  In 1896 and  1897 
the Carnegie Steel Company is said to have earned between 
one-sixth  and  one-seventh  of  its  net  inconle  in  1900;' 
while  during the same period  the  Illinois  Steel  Company 
passed all dividends and was reported  to be  falling behind 
in meeting current expenses.'  As (these  !two  companies were 
among the most  powerful then existing,  they may be  said 
to typify conditions which must be taken into consideration 
in capitalizing  an iron  and  steel  combination.  Mr.  Car- 
First  Annual  Report,  1902. 
a Moody's  Truth About  the  Trusts, p. 200.  a Iron Age. 106  THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION  E328 
negie,  when  referring to the great vicissitudes in the iron 
and steel trade, declared that steel is either prince or pauper. 
It seems clear from what has been said that in the formation 
of the United States Steel Corporation steel was capitalized 
while it was a prince,  and that its periodical  descent  to the 
status of  pauper  was ignored. 
The capitalization  of  the  constituent  companies  them- 
selves was also much in excess of $heir tangible assets.  The 
consolidations of  the Middle  West which  became  parts of 
the  Steel  Corporation  were,  like  that  corporation,  formed 
during a  period  of  rising  prices  and  prosperous  outlook. 
The firms entering these combinations exchanged their se- 
curities in accordance with  the outlook  for increased  earn- 
ings.'  As in other cases, in the division of stocks into com- 
mon  and preferred,  the former came to represent  what  is 
vaguely called "  good-will " and " future gains due to com- 
bination,"  while the preferred stock alone stood for tangible 
assets.  This division was by  no means definitely made in 
all cases.  Nevertheless, the common stock of  these corpor- 
ations represented, in whole or in part, intangible property. 
In at least one case, good will was included in the preferred 
stock-the  common stock representing only anticipations of 
future profits and pay' of  the promoter. 
One of  the clearest cases of  this tendency toward inflated 
capitalization  is that of  the American Tin Plate Company. 
Mr.  Reid, the  president  of  that  company,  testified  before 
the Industrial  Commission that $28,o~,ooo  common stock 
and $18,ooo,ooo preferred stock entered into the capitaliza- 
tion of  that corporation; that the $18,ooo,ooo preferred was 
supposed to represent the cash value of  the plants as going 
concerns,  including  ordinary  good-will,  and  that  all  the 
common represented hope of  future success and pay  of  the 
1 Report Industrial  Conrmission, vol. i, pp. 857,  863, 864, 883,  885. 
3293  CAPITALIZATION OF STEEL CORPORATION  107 
promoter.'  He ,stated further,  that  as th,e estarblishrnenlts 
were bought as going concerns at a time when business was 
prosperous, and when the vendors felt themselves  in a posi- 
tion  to make  good  terms,  the prices  for which  they  sold 
were high, so that all the stock taken together would prob- 
ably represent  from three to five times the cost value of the 
plants themselves  under ordinary conditions.  It was testi- 
fied by  Mr. Graham, one of  the vice-presidents of  the same 
company, that ih the transfer of  securities, when the com- 
pany was formed, the vendors had  the option of  receiving 
$100  cash for each share of  stock, or accepting $100  each, 
in preferred and common stock.  As a result of.this option 
two hundred dollars of stock was preferred to one hundred 
dollars cash. 
The National  Tube Company seems  to have been  capi- 
talized  in  a  manner  very  similar to that of  the Tin Plate 
Company.  In the capitalization  of  the National  Steel, the 
American  Steel Hoop, and the American Sheet Steel com- 
panies  the preferred  stoclts alone represented  tangible as- 
sets, and the common stock, good will, expectation of  future 
profits, and pay of promoters.  As more than half  the stock 
of  these companies was common  it will  be  seen that their 
capitalization represented very largely intangible assets. 
The American Steel and Wire Company was capitalized 
at  $8o,ooo,ooo.  Mr.  Gates,  in  his  testimony  before  the 
Industrial Conlmission, stated that probably $SO,OOQ,OOO  to 
$6o,ooo,ooo  might  be  considered  the  actual  value  of  the 
planka  This estimalte, however,  was  probably  too large, 
as the value placed upon some seventy per cent of the plants 
in  1897 and 1898 by  Mr.  Morgan was $28,oo0,000.  It is 
1 Report  of  the Industrial Commission, vol. i, pp. 866, 884. 
Ibid., vol. i, pp.  944, 957, 958, 959, 962, 963, 967. 
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more  probable  that the  actual  value  of  the  plants  of  the 
company  was  represented  by  about  half  the  full  capitali- 
zation. 
The Federal Steel Company was in like manner capital- 
ized  beyond  the value  of  its  plant  and property  holdings. 
Before the close of  1899 some $gg,ooo,ooo  of  stock  had 
been issued by this corporation.  The book value of  all the 
property  of  this  organization  was  placed  by  experts  at 
$45,000,000,~  although  some allowance  must be  made  for 
an appreciation  in the value  of  its ore and coal properties 
and for its cash assets.'  The constituent companies of  this 
corporation  with  their  issues  of  stock  at the  time of  the 
formation of  the Federal  Steel Company were  as follows: 
......................  Ill~inois  Steel  Gompany..  .$18,650,000 
.....................  Minnesota: Iron Company.  16,500,000 
.................  Elgin, Joliet, & Eastern  R. R..  6,000,000 
.............  brain Steel Company  (of  Ohio).  g,ooo,o00 
Lorain  Steel  Company  (of  Pennt.) ............  3,000,000 
............................  Total  .$53,150,000 
011  this combined  capitalization  some $~~,OOO,OOO  of  pre- 
ferred and $46,ooo,ooo of  common stock were iss~ed.~ 
5 6.  From what has ,been ,said concerning the seven corn- 
panies  mentioned, it will  be  seen that at the time of  their 
formation practically all the common stock represented such 
intangible  things  as good  will  and expectations  of  future 
success.  Some $~~o,ooo,o~~  of  the  stock  of  these  com- 
panies  thus stood  for  intangible  assets.  On entering  the 
United  States Steel Corporation, the capitalization of  these 
Iron Age, Oct. 26, 1899,  Q. 35, and Report  of the Industrial  Commis- 
sion, vol. i, pp. 986, 987. 
2 Report  of  the Industrial  Commission, vol. i, pp. 986, 987. 
a See terms of  exchange for each share fin Comntercial and Financiof 
Chronicle, Sept. 10, 1898,  p.  530. 
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consolidations was still further increased  over $74,ooo,ooo. 
If there  had  been  no  material  improvements  and  exten- 
sions in the plants of  these combinations and no increase in 
the value of their ore and coal properties,  it could be said 
that of the $531,000,000 of stock issued to these companies, 
more  than  $~oo,ooo,ooo  represented  no  visible  form  of 
property. 
The Carnegie  Steel Corporation and the Lake Superior 
Consolidated  Iron  Mines  had  no  preferred  stock.  Their 
capitalizations were not  so disproportionate to the value of 
their  plants  and  property  holdings.  Indeed,  considering 
the growing value of  the ore property in the Lake Superior 
region,  it  may  be  questioned  if  the second  of  these  com- 
panies  was  not  under-capitalized.  The securities  of  both 
these organizations, as has  already been  noted,  were pur- 
chased at a heavy  premium; and thus was added to an al- 
ready  inflated  capitalization  an  increased  issue  of  stock 
which  stood for something other than visible assets. 
7.  Viewed, however,  in the light of  conditions existing 
in  the years from  1898 to  1901, this enormous capitaliza- 
tion  was  the  outcome  of  certain  influences  which  forced 
matters to take  the turn they  did.  It has been  popularly 
pointed  out that Mr. Morgan of  his own volition brought 
the  various  steel  consolidations  of  the  Middle  West  and 
East  together  in  a  larger  combination,  then  overloaded 
the whole  aggregation  with half a billion  dollars or more 
of  watered capitalization, then ordered dividends to be paid 
on this capitalization, and that as a result of this wild finan- 
ciering  there  followed  inevitably  the  crash  of  I903  and 
1904.  The public forgets that this financiering was closely 
related to the conditions under which the Steel Corporation 
and  its  constituent  companies  were organized.  After the 
depression  of the middle  nineties  there  was  ushered  in  a 
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steel  trade.  The prosperous  outlook  gave  an impetus  to 
the formation of  combinations, and at the same time enabled 
companies entering these combinations to exact a good price 
for their securities or properties.  This was especially true 
of  the larger and more flourishing of  these firms or com- 
panies.  The capitalization  of  both  the  Steel  Corporation 
and the combinations of which it is composed was influenced 
by  the relatively  high earning capacity  consequent  upon  an 
epoch of  great demand and high prices. 
The conditions in the steel trade situation in the opening 
months of  1901 which operated to produce an exaggerated 
capitalization were briefly as follows:  The stability of  the 
leading steel interests of  the country was threatened by what 
promised  to be  a  disastrous competition.  To prevent  this 
competition and  secure the  full benefits  of  the  promising 
outlook for large gains in the immediate future, a union of 
some sort had  to be  formed.  The device resorted  to was 
that of  a  holding  company.'  In order that the new  con- 
solidation should fulfil1 its purpose, all the larger corpora- 
tions  must  be  controlled,  and  particularly  the  Carnegie 
Company.  The  prosperous  times  and  consequent  large 
profits enabled these interests to exact a good price for their 
securities.  The Carnegie Steel  Company, the purchase  of 
whose securities has been a theme of  much  comment, may 
serve as an example.  In the year  1900 this company's  net 
earnings  were  $39,0oo,ooo.~  Such earnings  enabled  Mr. 
Carnegie to exact a price which  he could not have secured 
a  few  years before  when the profits  of  the company were 
only six or seven million dollars.  It was absolutely neces- 
sary that the Carnegie interests should be controlled.  "  TO 
control  the  Carnegie  interests  meant  to  purchase  them; 
and to purchase them meant to pay Mr. Andrew Carnegie's 
1  See chapters iii and iv.  Iron Age, Feb.  28,  1901. 
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price for them,"'  and Mr. Carnegie's price was nearly half 
a billion dollars. 
An era of prosperity  in giving a stimulus to the forma- 
tion of  great consolidations therefore acts in a way to pro- 
mote  undue  capitalization.  In  an  industry  characterized 
by great variations of trade the earning capacity  in  such a 
period  is likely to be  greatly in excess of  the income under 
normal conditions.  It was the high earnings of  a prosper- 
ous period  that  were  in  a  sense  capitalized  in  the  larger 
organization of  the iron and steel trade.  It is thus seen that 
the vicissitudes of  the industry were an important factor in 
the  high  capitalization  of  the  Steel  Corporation  and  the 
consolidations of  which  it is composed. 
8 8. What has been  said concerning the large capitaliza- 
tion of the Steel Corporation and the consolidations of  which 
it  is composed  refers to the periods of  their organization. 
Since that time there have been  material  additions to their 
plants and cash on hand.  The value of  their ore and coal 
lands has also very  greatly augmented.  This increase  in 
property holdings has unquestionably  brought  the tangible 
assets of  the corporation  nearer  to its  nominal  capitaliza- 
tion.  How IIIUC~  is to be credited to this increase is a mat- 
ter of  individual  judgment.  Between  the years  1899 and 
1901 ithe values added to the property controllecl would, ac- 
cording to officers  of the  corporation,  amount  to no  less 
than  $175,000,000.  This,  of  course,  includes  mainly  an 
increase  in  the value  of  real  property  and, to a much  less 
extent, additions to plants and cash on hand.  Thus in the 
case of  the  Federal  Steel  Company  the book  value  of  the 
properties  of  the  corporation,  estimated  at  $~~,OO~,OOO, 
did not  include $IO,OOO,OOO  cash on hand, nor increases in 
the  value  of  real  property.  Some  coal  land  which  was 
1 Moody's  Truth About  the Trrrsts, p. 200. I 12  THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION  E334 
put in at $500  an acre was later sold for twice that amount, 
and for a  mine costing the company  $75,000  as much  as 
$60o,ooo  was subsequently  offered. 
Since  the  Steel  Corporation  was  organized  there  have 
been large appropriations for the acquisition of  new mineral 
properties and additions to the existing plants.  Besides the 
ordinary  expenditures  for  maintenance  of  plant,  this  or- 
ganization  during the first four years and a quarter of  its 
history  paid  out  in  such  improvements  and  acquisitions 
$184,50o,ooo  l or between five and six millions more than 
had  been  paid  out  in  dividends.  Some  seventy-five  mil- 
lion dollars are to be appropriated  for the equipment of  the 
steel plants  at Gary, Indiana. 
$ 9.  What the present  value of  the properties of  the Steel 
Corporation is, is  a question on which  considerable diver- 
gence of  opinion  exists.  What is held  to be  its most  im- 
portant  asset  consists  of  ore and  coal  property  of  rather 
indeterminate,  though  great,  value.  It  is  this  property 
which is the doubtful factor in ascertaining the extent of  the 
visible assets of  the corporatim.  In  Mr.  Schwab's  opin- 
ion the question  whether  or not  the company  is  over-capi- 
talized depends upon the value that is to be placed upon its 
unmined ore and coking coal.  The value of  ore and coal, 
in his judgment  should be considered greater from the fact 
that  the  Lake  Superior ores and  the  Connellsville  coking 
coal  are apparently  limited, and  so  far as one can  judge 
from the present  outlook, iron in  this country will be ex- 
hausted  within a  comparatively short time.2  It should be 
said,  however,  that  the  addition  of  a  large capitalization 
representing values of  unmined ore is not usual, although it 
may  have a certain  basis  of  justification. 
1 Iron  Age, Oct. 5,  1905, p. 884.  See reports of  Steel  Corporatim 
1902-05. 
1 Report  of  the Industrial  Commission, vol. 13, pp. 464 467, 472. 
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In I902 when  the plan  for converting  $zoo,ooo,ooo  of 
preferred stock into bonds was announced, the question of 
capitalization became one of  the determining points in suits 
brought to prevent the proposed conversion.  In one of the 
suits an affidavit was made to the effect that the plants and 
properties of the corporation c'ould be  duplicated  for about 
$3oo,ooo,ooo  and that the total properties  including good 
will and organization were not  worth $5oo,ooo,ooo.  An- 
other affidavit stated that the plants of  the Carnegie Com- 
pany,  representing  44 per  cent  of  the productive  capacity 
of  the  Steel  Corporation, had  been  valued  on March  12, 
1900, by  the partners of the  Carnegie Company  at  $75,- 
ooo,ooo.  Th,is  statement  was  rnade  in  answer  ta  Mr. 
Prick's  bill of  complaint, and said it was a "  full, fair, and 
accurate valuation  of  these  assets."  The value  of  all the 
properties  of the corporation was  declared  to be  not  more 
than $zoo,ooo,ooo. 
In behalf  of the  corporation,  Mr.  Schwa'b made a de- 
tailed  statement of  the value of  its properties.  In valuing 
these assets he employed  two leading principles,-the  cost 
of duplication, and the profits derived from their possession. 
No  allowance  was  made  for  good-will,  patents,  trade- 
marks, and the like.  The items, grouped under eight gen- 
eral divisions, are as follows : 
I.  Iron-ore  properties.. ................  .$7m,m,m 
2.  Planmts,  mills,  fixtures,  equipment.. .... 3ow3@3,000 
3.  'Coal and coke fields  (87,589 acres). ... ~m,cm,m 
........... 
after deducting 
4 Transportation pqenties.. 
bonded debt. 
......................  5.  Blast furnaces..  48,000,000 
...................  6. Natural  gas fields..  ~,~,ooo 
7. Limestone properties.. ...............  4,000,000 
8.  Cash  and c&  assets.. ...............  214,278,000 
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The valuation placed upon the properties  in Mr. Schwab's 
statement exceeded the capitalization by over $~oo,ooo,ooo. 
Regarding the statements sworn to in connection  with the 
Carnegie-Frick  litigation  of  1900,  that  $75,000,000  rep- 
resented  a "  full, fair and accurate valuation"  of  the Car- 
negie Steel Company's assets, it was shown by Mr. James J 
Campbell, auditor  and  assistant  secretary of  the  Carnegie 
Company, that the properties of  that organization had been 
carried on the books for many years at original costs; and 
that no allowance had ever been made for money expended 
for improvements, some of  which  far exceeded the original 
outlay.  The real  property of  the company  had  also with 
the increased demand for iron and steel goods risen in value. 
In the above statement, the figures given for the value of 
plants, mills, equipment, transportation properties, and blast 
furnaces are probably conservative.  The item of  cash and 
cash assets is, at least, doubtful; and the items of  coal and 
ore properties, are not much more than guesses.  It is to be 
noted  that  more  than  half  the  assets,  as  given  by  Mr. 
Schwab,  is  ore and coal  land,-the  ore land  alone being 
figured  at  $700,000,000.  In  this  latter  estimate,  Mr. 
Schwab capitalizes unmined  ore, of  which he believes there 
is  a  rather limited  quantity which  will  at no very remote 
day be exhausted.  In not  a few instances,  he has insisted 
upon  the importance of  this property as the greatest asset 
of the Steel Corporation. 
I o.  The capitalization of  natural mineral resources  is  a 
subject  on which  financiers,  captains  of  industry, and  in- 
vestors  hold  widely  divergent  views.  It is  one thing  to 
mortgage the future and quite another to value property at 
its present  earning capacity.  If  the possession  of  a  min- 
eral deposit or a group of  deposits confers a monopoly,  its 
valuation will be determined by considerations radically dif- 
ferent from those governing the appraisal  of  raw material 
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in the ground whose possessor must compete with the own- 
ers of other  deposits.  Even  where  a  supposed  monopoly 
exists,  the condition  may  suddenly  change by  the  rise  of 
competition  in  some distant  part  of  the globe.  It is  not 
very long ago since'the  Lake Superior mines of  copper were 
deeply  affected  by  the  outpouring  of  great  quantities  of 
rich  ore from Butte.  The flood  of  cheap  iron ores  from 
the Mesaba range affected not only the Eastern iron work- 
ers, but iron producers all over the world.  The risk of  new 
discoveries is one which established owners of  mineral prop- 
erty  always  run; and  this  risk  should  be  reckoned  with. 
Furthermore, the acquisition of  a monopoly  in the case of 
iron ore is  rather  remote,  and  out of  the  question  in  the 
case of  coal.  The control of  the  most  favorably located 
deposits from an economic point of  view is another matter. 
It may be figured that the ownership of  Lake Superior iron 
ore mines is equivalent to so much a ton on steel under the 
cost of  producers drawing their supply of raw material from 
other sources.  Even such figuring has its element of  dan- 
ger.  Technical  progress  may  render  natural  advantages 
less  important.  The monopoly  of  Bessemer  ore,  for  ex- 
ample, was deeply affected by  the introduction of  the basic 
process. 
Risks  like  these should  find  an expression  in  some dis- 
count of the capitalization of  mineral deposits.  A cardinal 
question, however, is whether or not it is wise to capitalize 
future earnings at all, assuming that they are secure.  Capi- 
tal  implies interest or dividend obligations; and charges on 
a  future output  of  metal  may  necessitate  a  forced  utiliza- 
tion to meet such obligations.  This may become a serious 
menace to the industry itself and the collateral branches of 
manufacture depending upon it.  It has been computed, too, 
that it would require about five dollars per ton of  steel out- 
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talization at the rate of  seven per cent, whereas other com- 
petitive concerns can get off  with about a dollar and a half 
per ton of  steel produced '-the  latter's  capacity  of  output 
in relation  to nominal capital being much  greater.  If  the 
Steel -corporation  has  stores  of  raw  material  relatively 
greater and better  than others, this fact  justifies  a  larger 
capitalization per unit of  manufactured product.  The capi- 
talization,  however, should  not  be  disproportionate to this 
differential advantage. 
Nevertheless,  it must be  said that ore properties all over 
the world are rapidly growing in value.  The ore question 
is assuming a dominant place; and the high estimate placed 
by  Mr. Schwab upon the value of  the holdings of  the Steel 
Corporation in the Lake Superior region will probably  ap- 
pear modest within a very few years.  The importance at- 
tached to rich deposits of  ore is indicated  not  only by  the 
action of  domestic producers securing their sources of  raw 
material, even at considerable expense, but by the action of 
foreign governments in their attempts to conserve the home 
supply.  It is only last year that Germany, after some an- 
xiety over a proposal by  Spain to impose a tax on exports 
of  Spanish ore to Germany, concluded an arrangement by 
which  the threat was  withdrawn  in  return  for some reci- 
procal  benefits.  The governments  of  both  Norway  and 
Sweden have proposed  steps for the limitation  of  iron ore 
exports; and it is very possible that the latter government 
will  take under  its control the north  Swedish ore proper- 
ties.  Owing  to  the  increasing  difficulty  in  obtaining 
Scandinavian  ores,  prominent  Rhenish  Westphalian  pro- 
ducers of iron and steel have asked the German Ministry of 
Public  Works for special rates  for transport of  ore from 
1 Report  of  the  British Iron  Trude Commission on American Condi- 
tions, by J. S. Jeans,  p.  191. 
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the French  district  of Briey.'  These measures are all  in- 
dicative of a  fear of future scarcity  of iron ore; and this 
fear is giving rise to serious concern in political as well as 
industrial circles. 
Upon  the world's  apparently  limited  supply  of  ore the 
demand for steel is pressing with increasing urgency.  Go- 
ing back twenty-five years we find that the steel rail was not 
only  the back-bone of  the steel  industry  but  its body  and 
bulk.  In 1881 production of steel rails in the United States 
was  1,210,285 gross tons, while in  the same year the Bes- 
semer steel  ingot  production  amounted  to 1,374,247 gross 
tons,  or only  163,962 tons more, and  the output of  open 
hearth  ingots  was  131,202 tons.  To-day,  not  only  is  the 
steel  rail  production  nearly  three  times  that of  1881, but 
even  this production  is  only  a  fraction of  the entire steel 
trade.  The increased  use  of  wire  nails  and  barb wire  is 
making the manufacture of  wire rods  nearly  as important 
as that of  steel rails.  The production of  structural shapes 
amounted  to 360,005  tons  in  1894.  In  1902  it  had  in- 
creased to 1,300,326 tons.  The tonnage of  vessels built of 
steel in the ten years beginning with  1880 averaged  35,000 
tons of new capacity a year.  In the next ten years the aver- 
age was  86,000  tons a year.  In the five years beginning 
with  1900 the average was 248,000  tons a year.  The use 
of the steel car is adding some eight or nine hundred thous- 
and tons to the steel consumption of the country.  The im- 
portance of  the steel tie as a feeder to the industry, once its 
use is established,  can  hardly be  overestimated.  The pro- 
duction  and  consumption of  iron and  steel  are increasing 
faster than population.  In terms of pig iron, the per capita 
increase  of  production  in  this  country  may  be  shown  as 
follows : 
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.............................  1880.  171 pounds. 
............................  1890..  329  " 
Igoo  ..............................  399  " 
1905  ..............................  619  " 
............................  1906..  662  "  (estimated). 
Barring the possibility of  the discovery of  very extensive 
and cheaply worked  ore fields  in  other  regions,  the ever- 
widening  stream  of  iron  and  steel  consumption  will  add 
greatly  to  the  value  of  the  holdings  of  the  Steel  Cor- 
poration in the Lake Superior region.  Even the high price 
to be  paid for the Great Northern properties recently trans- 
ferred to the corporation is probably  small in proportion to 
the future value of  those properties.  Nevertheless the con- 
tingency of  radical changes in the industry due to new  dis- 
coveries or invention remains.  While time may justify  the 
sagacity  of  the  men  who  attached  a  high  value  to  the 
sources of  ore supply, there nevertheless remains a consider- 
able  element  of  danger  in  the  capitalization  of  a  future 
asset. 
S  I I. 'I'hat fihe United  States Steel Corporation  has been 
enabled to face not a little competition, and during a year at 
feast of  considerable  depression  to meet its interest obliga- 
tions on some $~oo,ooo,ooo  of  bonded  indebtedness  and to 
pay  in  addition  seven per  cent  dividends on $36o,om,ooo 
of  preferred  stock argues in  favor of  the high value  of  its 
plants and properties.  We may dismiss  without comment 
the contention of  one of  the witnesses  in  the Hodge suit 
brought to test the legality of  the bond conversion that the 
tangible  assets  04  the  company  should  not  be  valued  at 
more  than  $200,000,000.  The  earning  capacity  of  the 
corporation  during the six years of  its existence is at least 
some index to the value of  its assets.  If  the amount paid 
out in  interest on bonds and in dividends on stock during 
1904, the most trying year of  its existence, is capitalized at 
3411  CAPITALIZATION  OF  STEEL CORPORATION  119 
five per cent the capitalization would amount in round num- 
bers to $974,759,000.  me  dividends of  the Standard Oil 
Company in 1905 capitalized in the same way would amount 
to nearly  $~OO,OOO,OOO.'  A  conservative  estimate  of  the 
value of Standard Oil property,  exclusive of  monopoly ad- 
vantages places it at about $3oo,ooo,om.  The Steel Cor- 
poration  is not  the monopoly  that the Standard Oil Com- 
pany is, and yet its dividends and interest payments during 
the darkest year  of its history  capitalized  at five per  cent 
amounts to $974,759,000. 
It must be said, however, that during more than two years 
no dividends were paid on $508,3m,om of  common stock, 
and  only  two per  cent  is  being  paid  at the  present  time. 
How much of this stock represents tangible property is diffi- 
cult  to  determine.  From what  has  been  said  concerning 
the  consolidations  which  became  parts  of  the  Steel  Cor- 
poration, the common  stock  must  be  looked  upon  as rep- 
resenting in large measure good will and future gains.  It 
is essentially capitalization of  future returns.  It should be 
remembered,  however,  that the  Steel  Corporation, as was 
shown  in  the preceding  chapter,  has been  steadily  adding 
to its previous holdings of  ore and coal lands.  ,4s the de- 
mand  for iron  and  steel  has  greatly  increased  in  recent 
years and gives promise of  further increase  in  the future, 
these lands are likely to be  a very considerable  addition to 
the assets of  the company. 
The market  value  of  the  outstanding  securities  of  the 
Steel  Corporation, if  taken through a long series of  years, 
would  tend to give a  fairly accurate measure of  the value 
of  its  properties.  But  the  corporation  has  been  in  exis- 
tence  only  six  years;  and  more  than  two-thirds  of  that 
period  has been exceptionally prosperous.  Although it ex- 
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perienced an epoch of  depression  in the latter part of  1903 
and during the year  1904, it has not yet been compelled to 
withstand  hard  times  comparable  to those  of  the  middle 
nineties.  Nevertheless,  it  is  of  some  interest  to compare 
the par and market values of  the corporation's securities. 
The par value of the securities of  the United States Steel 
Corporation at the close of  the year,  1906, was in round 
numbers $1,34o,ooo,ooo.  In the first year of its existence, 
it was slightly less.  In April,  1901, the approximate mar- 
ket  value  of  a11  the  outstanding  securities  was  $1,265,- 
ooo,ooo.  By  December,  1903,  this  value  had  shrunk to 
about $~6o,ooo,ooo.'  During the closing months of  1904 
there was some revival  in the iron and steel trade with a 
consequent  rise  in  value  of  the  corporation's  sec~lrities. 
During 1905 and  1906 the earnings steadily increased, and 
the latter of  these years  showed the largest net  income of 
any year in the corporation's history.  This period of  pros- 
perity has continued to the present time.  As a consequence 
of  this prosperity the stocks and bonds of  the company have 
been quoted at high figures.  During the month of  Febru- 
ary, 1907, the market value of  the outstanding securities of 
the S  tee1 Corporation approximated  $I, I 70,ooo,ooo.~ The 
quotations of  these securities,  it must be  remembered,  rep- 
resent their value during a period  of  "  good times." 
5  12. The future stability of  the Steel Corporation will de- 
pend not a little upon the character of  this huge capitaliza- 
tion.  Reference has already been made to the conversion 
of preferred stock into bonds.  In the spring of  1902, when 
the conversion  of  preferred  stock into bonds was first pro- 
posed, the bonded  debt of  the corporation and its constitu- 
3 Based  upon quotations in  the Commercial  and  Financial  Chronicle. 
See also  Moody's Truth about  the  Trusts, p.  201. 
2 Based  upon  stock and bond quotations in  New York  Sun. 
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ent companies  was,  in  round  numbers, $35o,ooo,ooo.  As 
indicated in a previous chapters1 the plan  was to exchange 
$zoo,ooo,ooo  of preferred stock for a  like amount of  five 
per cent second mortgage bonds,  and to  issue $5o,ooo,ooo 
additional bonds for the same amount of  cash.  The osten- 
sible motive which prompted this proposal  was the need of 
money for additions and improvements in the plants of  the 
corporation.  It was  further urged that such a  conversion 
would  result  in an annual saving of  a  million  and a  half 
dollars.  In view of the large surplus remaining to the com- 
pany after paying all charges and dividends at the end of  the 
first year, the need  of  saddling .the corporation  with  such 
an increase  in  its  debt  has  seemed  questionable  to many. 
The argument, too,  that  by  the conversion,  $r,goo,ooo  a 
year would  be  saved  has seemed almost ludicrous to some 
for an organization  whose  net  income  for  the  same year 
was over $133,ooo,ooo. 
It was  contended by  the  executive committee,  however, 
that the expenditure of  about $25,0oo,ooo  for improvements 
would  add from $~o,ooo,ooo  to $~g,ooo,ooo  to the  yearly 
profits.  The committee  further  stated: "  That  these  ex- 
penditures could be met gradually from surplus earnings the 
management does not doubt; but this would  necessitate ex- 
tending them over a  period  of  years,  and correspondingly 
would  postpone the realization  of  the profits which, by  the 
immediate use of  money, could be obtained promptly." 
The proposal  as originally  announced  was  never  fully 
carried  into  effect.  Of the  proposed  $2oo,ooo,ooo.  onlv 
I,  $x~o,ooo,ooo  of  the  preferred  stock  was  exchanged  for 
bonds.  The bonded  debt, however, of the corporation and 
its  subsidiary companies  was  increased  to over $500,000,- 
Cf.  ch. iv. 
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000, and has thus becme ca~siderably  more than meuthird 
of  the tatal capital*ization. 
Whether or not the financial stability of  the corporation 
has  been  affected  by  the  bond  conversion  depends  partly 
upon the value of  the company's properties and partly upon 
the steadiness of  its  income.  That the  assets  of  the  cor- 
poration are great and that all  indications point  to an in- 
crease in  the value  of  its  ore properties,  we  have  already 
seen.  When it is remembered, however, that the iron and 
slt'eel trade is peculiarly subject to fluctuations, this exchange 
of  securities must seem a rather doubtful expedient of  cor- 
porate financiering.  That the management  of  the organi- 
zation  is  confident of  its  ability  to secure a  large volume 
of  trade, even in dull times, is shown in the contract trans- 
ferring the Hill holdings which  pledges the corporation to 
a minimum output of  8,250,000 tons of  ore from these prop- 
erties  in  1917 at a  royalty  of  $16,417,500.  This royalty 
must be paid,  if  the properties are retained, 'irrespective of 
trade conditions.  Here, however,  the corporation is  safe- 
guarded  in  a  measure  by  the  reservation  to  itself  of  the 
optio?  of  terminating  the lease  on January  I, 1915.'  In 
the case of  the bonded  indebtedness  incurred  by  the  con- 
version  of  preferred  stock  the corporation is  to some ex- 
tent protected by the provision  which allows a lapse of  two 
years after failure to pay  interest, before  foreclosure pro- 
ceedings  can  be  commenced.  This  provision,  however, 
while by no means an unimportant safeguard, would hardly 
preserve the integrity of  the corporation in a period of  pro- 
longed  depression,  like  the  middle  nineties.  While  the 
Steel Corporation may be said to have had a steadying ef- 
fect  upon  the  industry,  the  vicissitudes  of  the  trade  are 
nevertheless  so great  that  a  liberal  margin  should  be  al- 
l See  Fifth Annual  Report. 
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lowed between normal earnings on the one hand and fixed 
charges and operating expenses on the other. 
As is well known it is a fixed policy of  good railroad fin- 
anciering  that  earnings  should  never  fall  below  fixed 
charges and operating expenses.  As far as possible, it has 
been  the  policy  07  successful  railroads  to  reduce  fixed 
charges and replace bonds by preferred stock.  The Chicago, 
Milwaukee and Saint Paul Railroad, for example,  has up- 
wards of $4o,cmo,ooo of seven  per  cent  preferred  shares. 
The conversion  of this respectable sum of  capital into five 
per  cent  bonds  would  save that  company $800,000  annu- 
ally and enable  it to pay  nearly  two per  cent  extra on its 
common stock.  Instead of embarking upon such a policy, 
the  company  made  some  old  mortgages  convertible  into 
stock,  and  has  converted  $3o,ooo,o00  of  its  funded  debt 
during the last twenty or thirty years.  The opposite policy 
on  the part  of  the  Steel  Corporation,  engaged  in  a  busi- 
ness  far more specialized and more exposed  to changes in 
trade conditions than  railroad  traffic has excited much  at- 
tention and not a little criticism.  It is a business principle 
that it is never wise to substitute fixed charges which must 
be  met  for  dividend  payments  which  can  be  postponed. 
Such an axiom, it would seem, even so powerful a corpor- 
ation cannot afford to disregard. 
Whether  or not  the bond  conversion  has  seriously  en- 
dangered  the  future integrity  of the  Steel  Corporation  is 
a  question  which  is  difficult  to  answer.  In  1903  Mr. 
James  H. Bridge said that the revenues  of  the corporation 
could  be  reduced  by  one-third  without  necessitating  a  re- 
duction in the present rate of  dividend on preferred stock.' 
It should be noted, however, that Mr. Bridge spoke in view 
of the prosperous conditions existing in the year  1902 and 
l Commercial  and  Fimcial Chronicle, 1903, pp. 2039-2109. 124  THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION  [346 
the early  part of  1903.  The net  earnings for  1902 were 
$133,308,000,  and  for  1903,  $109,177,000.  In the  year 
1904, these earnings had declined to $73,176,000, making a 
decrease of  over $6o,ooo,ooo  from the net income of  1902. 
Whe~  it is  remembered  that the annual  dividends  on the 
preferred stock amount to only $25,219,677, and that in the 
year  1904, after the payment  of  this dividend, the interest 
on the bonded indebtedness and the various charges for de- 
preciation, replacement, and sinking funds, only $5,047,800 
remained as a surplus, it can be  seen how  near to the dan- 
ger limit a year of  severe depression may bring the corpor- 
ation. 
13.  In summary of  this chapter it may be said that the 
tendency toward  consolidation is most marked  in times of 
prosperity.  Such periods are periods of  more than normal 
earnings, and this is especially the case with the iron and 
steel industry.  The capitalization of  a combination formed 
in  such  a  period  is  largely  based  upon  the  extraordinary 
earnings of  the time, and thus tends to be  in excess of  the 
tangible assets of  the organization.  The Steel Corporation 
and the consolidations of  which it is composed were formed 
in  years  of  exceptional  prosperity  and  were  thus  largely 
overcapitalized.  In a  rough  way  it may  be  said  that the 
preferred  stock  represented  the  value  of  plants  and  prop- 
erties; and  the  common  stock  stood  for  supposed  future 
values.  The capitalization  of  the  Steel  Corporation  was 
much in excess of  the total for all its constituent companies, 
most of  which were already over-capitalized.  All these or- 
ganizations expended  large sums in  the  improvement  and 
extension of  their plants and thus added to their real capi- 
tal.  This capital was still  further  increased  by  the grow- 
ing demand for iron and steel goods, which gave additional 
value to ore and coal properties.  These properties are now 
considered the most valuable asset of  the Steel Corporation, 
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and  in  Mr.  Schwab's  estimate  are  worth  $800,000,000. 
This  imputed  value,  however,  is  based  upon  a  supposed 
scarcity of ore and coal in the not-far-off  future.  The pos- 
sibility of the discovery of new ore fields, as well as changes 
in the technical requirements of  the iron and steel industry 
renders  such imputed valuation  rather uncertain.  The in- 
creasing  use  of steel  for building  purposes,  etc.,  makes  it 
probable,  however,  that  these  lands will  continue  to be  a 
great asset to the corporation.  It is difficult to determine 
the value of  the plants and properties of  the Steel Corpora- 
tion; but  it is undoubtedly greater than many of  the esti- 
mates made by those contesting the validity of the bond con- 
version.  While the value of  the properties of  the company 
is  unquestionably  high  and its  resources  great,  its bonded 
debt,  increased  by  the conversion of $15o,ooo,ooo  of  pre- 
ferred  stock,  is  a  possible  menace  to  its  future financial 
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CHAPTER V1 
5  I. THE  most important, ecrmmically speaking, as well 
as the most interesting question  concerning a cons~lidakion 
or trust is  its influence on prices.  The nature of  this in- 
fluence depends in large measure on the control which the 
organization exercises  over the industry in which  it is en- 
gaged.  Like  the  pool,  the  consolidation  owes  its  origin 
to attempts to restrict  competition; and  its  success in  this 
endeavor is indicated by its influence on market conditions. 
Whether  or not  a  business  organization  exercises  such  a 
control, and what is the extent of  this control, assuming it 
to exist,  are questions difficult to answer and  involving  a 
multitude  of  considerations.  Changes  in  the  demand  for 
goods, variations  in  technical  processes,  vicissitudes  in  la- 
bor  cost,  the limitation  or opening  up  of  sources of  raw 
material, and legislation limiting the field of  competition by 
imposition  of  tariff  duties, are all  factors in  increasing or 
diminishing prices independent of  any direct influence from 
monopolistic control. 
In the attempt, moreover, to estimate this influence, price 
quotations,  which  furnish  the  most  important  data,  must 
be  accepted  with  considerable  reserve.  Real  and  quoted 
prices are not  invariably the same, nor in all cases are the 
prices to large and small customers.  Quoted prices,  often 
inexact,  have been  notoriously  so on a  declining market; 
and at all times the temptation to favor the large customer 
has been great.  In a period, too, of rising demand not only 
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will the quoted prices be paid, but also premiums for prompt 
delivery.  These considerations make any attempt to gauge 
the influence of a  large combination  on market conditions 
rather hazardous.  This is especially so when the object is 
to determine how far a consolidation has been influential in 
raising or lowering prices.  In any very exact estimate of 
this influence, allowance  for these discounts and premiums 
should be  made; and yet  it is difficult to measure even ap- 
proximately  these  variations  from quoted  values.  In the 
iron  and  steel  industry  this  difficulty  is  enhanced  by  the 
fact that discouilts  and premiums seem to have been  illore 
frequent before than since the  formation of  the Steel Cor- 
poration. 
a. It inay be said, however, that price quotations taken 
through a series of years do indicate with some approach to 
accuracy real  variations.  In so far as they  are given  for 
purposes of  trade they do, in general, tell what  the ordinary 
constlmer has to pay  for his goods.  In the iron and steel 
trade they give an adequate idea of  the fluctuations to which 
prices  are subject.  Notwithstanding  numerous  deviations 
froin  quoted  schedules  in  a  declining  market,  there  is  a 
strong disposition  to  adhere to quoted  figures  in  times  of 
rising  prices,  and  to  give  fairly  accurate  quotations  in 
periods of  long and extreme depression.  They form, there- 
fore, a fairly reliable index of  the fluctuations  characteris- 
tic of  the trade. 
In order to form some estimate of  the  influence of  the 
Steel Corporation on prices, it will be necessary to give some 
attention to iron and steel prices  in  general.  During the 
last thirty years, in which the industry in the United States 
has grown to  its present  predominant  position  in the mar- 
kets of the world, the prices of iron and steel have greatly 
declined.  From 1870 to 1900 this decline on the average, 
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than fifty  per  cent.'  The course of  prices  is well typified 
by those of  steel rails, which until recently formed the bulk 
of  the country's steel trade.  The price per ton of  this com- 
modity averaged $92.91 in  1870; $67.50 in 1880; $31.75  in 
1890; and $32.29 in 1900.~ Late in  1900 the price sank to 
$26.00  During the depression of  the llliddle nineties prices 
were lower than ever before or since-steel  rails selling as 
low as $17.00  per  ton in June,  1898.'  Since April,  1901, 
steel rails have been  quoted at $28.00. 
As has already been  noted, the prices  of  iron and  steel 
goods are subject to great fluctuations; and quotations for 
single years may lead to mistaken conclusions.  It may be 
said, however, that the three decennial years chosen to il- 
lustrate price changes were all years of  prosperity; and 1900 
was  especially so,  notwithstanding the mild  depression of 
the fall months.  During thirty years, therefore, prices can 
be  said  to have  undergone  a  remarkable  reduction.  The 
consumer in the first decade of  the twentieth century gives 
less than half  the price paid by the buyer of  1869 and 1870 
for most of  his iron and steel. 
3. This price reduction was due in part to the opening up 
of new sources of raw material, and in pa~  to improvements 
in technical processes.  In 1870 the eoulltry relied for most of 
its ore on Pennsylvania and other eastern states.  It is true 
that during the ten  preceding years upwards of  3,000,000 
tons of  iron ore had been  shipped  from the Lake Superior 
region; but  this amount formed  a small percentage of  the 
total product  of  the country.  The eastern ore while more 
expensive  to  mine  and  more  limited  in  quantity  hid  the 
advantage of  being located near the coal region of  the coun: 
try and within easy distance of  the principal markets. 
1 Twelfth United States  Census, vol. X,  p. 8. 
Report  of  the Industrial Commis;ion, vol. xiii, p. 625. 
a Iron Age, June 30, 1898. 
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The change  from the  use  of  eastern to Lake  Superior 
ore is associated with the introduction of  the Bessemer pro- 
cess.  As was  indicated  in  a  previous  chapter,'  the Lake 
Superior material is largely suited to this process.  During 
the eighth and ninth decades of  the last century the demand 
for steel in the place of  iron folr  railroads, bridge construc- 
tion, etc., mqas growing; and this demand had to be satisfied. 
Steel had been manufactured east of the Alleghanies largely 
out of imported  pig iron, but  at an expense  too great  for 
general use.  With the introduction of coke as a fuel and the 
cheapening  of  rates  for transportation  of  ores  over  the 
Great Lakes, the cost  of  manufacture  was  much  reduced 
for  the  producers  west  of  the  Alleghanies,  who  were  in 
close  proximity  to  the  coking-coal  areas  of  the  country. 
The decline in  freight rates to eastern markets still further 
enabled these producers  to undersell  their competitors east 
of  the Alleghanies.'  While  all  these  influences conspired 
to lower prices, not a little of  this reduction is to be attrib- 
uted  to the presence  of  competition  from  the new  ore re- 
gion, leading to the final displacement of the eastern product 
by  the more cheaply mined  ores of  Lake  Superior.  Tak- 
ing the  country as a  whole,  the  average cost  per  ton  of 
iron ore at blast furnaces was approximately $4.60 in 1880. 
$3.70 in  1890, and less than $3.00 in  1900. 
Contemporaneous  with  the  opening  up  of  new  ore  re- 
gions was the development  of new  processes  of  manufac- 
ture.  Allusion  has  just  been  made  to  the  cheapening  of 
costs by the use of  coke.  The installation at modern plants 
of the latest labor-saving machinery and the employment of 
l Cf.  supra, ch. ii. 
For an  excellent  account of the  effect of the  declining  freight  rate 
and the protective tariff upon the  steel indushy of eastern Pennsylvania, 
see  Levy.  Die  Stahlindustrie  der  Vereinigten Staaten  von  Ameriko, 
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skilled managers and workmen  have  also helped  to lower 
prices.  This  cheapening  of  manufactures  may  be  illus- 
trated in the case of  pig iron.  Between the years 1890 and 
1899 the average daily product of  pig iron at a typical blast 
furnace plant  in  Pennsylvania had  increased 63.3 per  cent. 
The yield of  iron per ton of  ore diminisl~ed  about three per 
cent.  The amount of  fuel needed to manufacture a ton of 
iron declined  three per  cent; and the  requirement of  lime- 
stone, 25.5 per cent.  The cost of  ore per ton of  iron dimin- 
ished some 25 per cent; labor cost, 38.9 per cent, and office 
and incidental expenses, 29.4 per  cent.  The total cost per 
ton of  iron  declined 34.2  per  cent.'  When it  is  remetn- 
bered  that the costs  and  conditions of  producing  pig  iron 
are important factors of  price determination  in the iron in- 
dustry, the significance of  such an instance, which  is fairly 
typical of  the country, can readily  be  understood. 
In steel manufacture there has been a similar cheapening 
of  costs.  According  to the  records  of  the  United  States 
Census,  the  average cost  of  materials  per  ton  of  finished 
product was $37.00 in 1880 and $26.00 in 1890.  The aver- 
age output per employee in the same years were respectively 
37 and 60 tons; and the average wages per ton of  product 
were $12.10 and $9.40.  These figures show that the steeI 
industry made considerable progress during the decade end- 
ing with  1890.  Great strides were also made  in the clos- 
ing decade of  the century.  Mr. Kirchhoff,  in  an address 
to the  American  Institute  of  Mining  Engineers,  in  Feb- 
ruary,  1899, stated  that  the  cost  of  producing  Bessemer 
steel ingots had diminished by about one-half between  1887 
and  1898.  The total cost of  producing  Bessemer steel in- 
gots declined in the proportion of  IOO to 64.39 between the 
years 1891 and 1898. 
1  Report  of  the British Iron Trade Commission, p. 116. 
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5 4.  Enough has been said to indicate a great cheapening 
in the cost of iron and steel goods resulting from the use of 
cheaper ores and improved  technical  processes.  It would 
not be  correct, however,  to attribute all this change to in- 
vention  and discovery.  Cost varies to a  considerable ex- 
tent with the oscillations of  trade.  A period of  depression, 
for example, is a  period  of  low  money  wages.  The low 
costs of  the middle nineties were  due in  part to the  rela- 
tively low wages incident  to the hard times of  that period. 
Labor cost, while playing a smaller part in the determina- 
tion of price in an industry like that of  iron and steel than 
in a trade where little or no machinery is used, is neverthe- 
less a material element. 
How far this price tendency was affected by the growth 
of  consolidations in the closing years of  the nineteenth cen- 
tury and by  the organization of  the  Steel  Corporation at 
the opening of  the twentieth is difficult to estimate with any 
degree of  accuracy.  These organizations were formed in a 
period of extraordinary prosperity.  There was a great de- 
mand not only for old standard products, but also for mate- 
rial to be put to new uses.  New  forms of  structural mate- 
rial,  steel  cars, new  varieties  of  wire  goods,  and  the  like 
came into vogue.  Demand for all these commodities tended 
to raise  prices  far above the  level  of  the  middle  nineties 
notwithstanding  the low  cost  of  production.  In any esti- 
mate of  the influence of  con~binations,  therefore, allowance 
must be made for the prosperity of  the period. 
That the consolidations of the time were a  factor influ- 
encing prices can be seen in the cases of  the American Tin 
Plate and the -4merican Steel and Wire companies.  These 
companies had  so~nething  of a monopoly  of  the market in 
their  respective  lines; and  this nlonopoly  was  reflected  in 
the prices of the period.  Shortly after the organization of 
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price of  coke tin plate  (14x20)  was raised  from $2.70  per 
hundred  pound  box  to $3.00  at  mill.  Quotations in the 
leading cenlters of trade in the northeastern  part  of  the 
country  were  upwards  of  $3.20  per  hundred  pound  box. 
During February,  1899, the average price  was $3.55.  By 
the end of  the year  it was $4.84,  and  it  remained  at this 
figure during a large part of  the following year.'  In like 
manner  after the organization of  the American Steel  and 
Wire Company there was a great rise in prices.  Wire rods 
which  sold  for  $20.00  to  $22.50  per  ton  in  1898 were 
quoted at steadily increasing prices during 1899.  By  Jan- 
uary,  1900,  the price had  reached  $50.00  per  ton.  Wire 
nails,  which  had  been  quoted  at $1.40  to $1.50  per  100- 
pound  keg  in  1898, were  steadily  raised  in  price  during 
1899 until they were quoted at $3.20  in  the early  months 
of  1900 2-a  higher  figure  than  that  reached  under  the 
regime of  the notorious wire-nail  association of  1895 and 
1896. 
It is true that the period  under consideration was one of 
increasing demand for iron and steel goods and that rising 
prices were general.  The rise,  however,  in  each  case was 
most  marked  immediately  after  the  organization  of  the 
manufacturing consolidation.  The difference, too, between 
English and American  prices  was  increased  notwithutand- 
ing the fact that the English as well  as the American  in- 
dustry was enjoying a period of  great prosperity and rising 
prices.  In the case of  coke tin plate the price per hundred 
pound box at New York City during the last seven months 
of 1898 ranged from twenty to thirty-five cents above that of 
the  English  product--excluding  tariff  duty-at  the  same 
place.  While prices in both England and the United States 
1  Iron  Age, 1898-99, op. cit., passim. 
2 Report  of  the Industrial  Commission, vol. xiii, p. 558 
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were rising, immediately  after the formation of  the Amer- 
ican Tin Plate Company the difference between the figures 
for the  two  countries  became  very  pronounced.  At the 
organization of the trust  this  difference  was  increased  to 
sixty cents, and two months later to $1.30.  From the time 
the  Tin  Plate  Company  was  organized  to the  time  the 
Steel  Corporation was  formed, the difference  in  price per 
hucdred  pound  box  between  English  and  American  coke 
tin plate was more than one dollar.  While the conditions 
of  the time favored high prices,  these figures indicate that 
consolidation influenced the situation very appreciably. 
Previous to this era of  consolidation prices had  been  in- 
iluenced  by  pooling  con~binations;  but  this  influence  was 
not  so general.  One of  the most  extraordinary cases  of 
price manipulation in any industry was that of  the wire nail 
association alluded to above.  In the spring of  1895 a wire 
nail pool  or association raised  the price of  wire nails from 
$1.45  a keg to $1.80.  A month later the price was raised 
to $2.15.  In another month it rose to $2.65, then to $2.85, 
where it remained  to the end of  February, 1896.  Another 
rise brought the price up to $3.00, where it stayed for two 
months.  From the first of  May to the end of  October the 
quoted  price of  wire nails per keg was $3.15.  During all 
this period  the producers  of  cut nails co-operated  with the 
association  in  raising  the prices  of  cut  nails  in  the same 
proportion as those of  wire nails, so that the consumer was 
unable to save himself  from this extortion by  substituting 
one commodity for the other.  In November the pool broke 
and the price soon fell to $1.50.  Just before the pool was 
formed the difference  in price between  wire nails and No. 
11 wire, out of which the nails are made, was about twenty- 
five cents  per  one  hundred  pounds.  After  the  pool  was 
organized  this difference increased  to $1.90,  although  the 
price  of  No.  11 wire  varied  but  little  during the  whole 
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The wire nail  association  was one of  the most  flagrant 
instances of  price manipulation in the history  of  combina- 
tions.  It was especially so in view  of  the low cost  of  the 
material out of  which wire nails  are manufactured.  Con- 
cerning this pool the Iron Age says : 
The managers of  the Nail Association can take to themselves 
the  credit of  having  developed a  stronger  sentiment against 
combinations lthan (any other single agency.  They have aroused 
an intensely bitter  feeling among all classes and  conditions of 
people,  which  could  only  have been  awakened by  making ex- 
orbitant prices on an article of  such universal consumption as 
nails.' 
Froni what has been said concerning the course of  prices 
in  general  it  is  seen  that improved  processes  of  manufac- 
ture and !the opening-up of  new  sources  of  raw  material 
have  reduced  the cost  of  iron and steel to the consumer. 
This general trend in  the direction  of  lower prices  has at 
times been  interfered  with  by  the formation of  pools  and 
combinations-especially  during the later nineties.  As has 
already been  indicated,  some of  the consolidations  formed 
during the period from 1898 to 1900 virtually controlled for 
a time the output of  their special commodities.  When the 
United  States Steel Corporation was organized, embracing 
as it did these combinations, the new  organization seemed 
like a consolidation of  monopolies.  The force of  competi- 
tion which had given consumers the benefit of  new  inven- 
tions  and  discoveries seemed,  for the time  at least,  com- 
pletely  destroyed.  The London Engiwer voiced  a  feeling 
very widespread on both sides of  the Atlantic when it said: 
Mr. Morgan  and  his  immediate partners can fix  the price of 
iron and steel.  They are for the  moment,  at all events, be- 
1  Iron  Age, Dec. 3d,  1896,  p.  1086. 
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yond  the sphere of competition.  They can  have  no  competi- 
tors in  their own  country.  The American consumer is  abso- 
lutely in  the hands of the trust.  They can have no European 
competitor because the tariff defends them. 
In attempting to gauge the influence  of  the  Steel  Cor- 
poration on prices, it may be well to form some estimate of 
the validity of  this gloon~y  prediction.  As was noted  in a 
previous  chapter,  the  corporation  was  organized  to avoid 
a threatened  con~petition  between concerns engaged largely 
in different lines of manufacture and to a considerable ex- 
tent  mutually  dependent  upon  one another.  These com- 
panies  were  at least  quasi-n~onopolies  at the time of  their 
organization.  Sonle of  these concerns,  like the American 
Steel  and  Wire Con~pany,  the  American  Tin  Plate  Com- 
pany,  and the American Bridge Company,  were estimated 
to control about ninety per cent of  the country's output of 
their principal comlnodities at the time of  their formation. 
However, during the prosperous  period  of  1899 and  1900 
competing establishinents were  being  organized, and some 
of  these  were  of  forillidable  proportions.  Except  where 
patents  had  been  secured, these  independent plants,  by  the 
opening of  1901, were  making  their  influence  felt in  the 
industrial field.  The Steel Corporation ditl not, therefore, 
result  in a combination of  n~onopolies. 
Nor  did  the  Steel  Corporation  achieve  monopoly  by 
securing control over the country's output of  iron ore.  As 
was indicated in a previous chapter, its present holdings in 
the Lake Superior district, although several large additions 
had  been made since its formation, are still in all probabil- 
ity not greatly in excess of  two-thirds of  the visible supply. 
As there are large deposits  in  other parts of  the country, 
complete  control  over  the  ore supply  is  far  from having 
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5.  The fear that the formation of  the Steel Corporation 
would result in a general mlarking-up of prices due to mmap 
dy  contrd proved unfounded.  Prices in general were rising 
in the early months of  1901 ;  but no very marked advances 
seem to have taken place as a result of  the organization of 
the  new  consolidation.  A  consideration  of  the  general 
trend of  prices immediately before and after the formation 
of  the Steel Corporation will show this. 
Bessemer pig iron, which  sold for $24.90  per  ton in the 
latter part of  1899 and the early months of  1900, dropped 
to $13.00  per  ton in  October of  the latter year.  It then 
gradually rose again to $15.50  in March, 1901.  In Novem- 
ber,  1899, steel billets were quoted at $39.50  per ton, from 
which abnormal figure they gradually declined to  $16.50 in 
October,  1900,  rising  again  to  $21.50  in  March,  1901. 
The price of  steel rails,  which had risen to $35.00 per ton 
in  1899 and remained at or near that figure during the first 
seven months of  1900,  fell to $26.0  in  November,  where 
it stayed until after the organization of  the Steel Corpora- 
tion.  Wire  rods  which  had  reached  the  high  figure  of 
$50.00  per ton in January,  1900, were selling at $30.00  in 
July,  and  at $33.00  to $35.00  in  the  opening  months  of 
1901. 
The low prices of  the latter half  of  1900 were due to a 
mild depression which had set in just  previous to the presi- 
dential election of  that year.  The opening months of  IYI 
were characterized by a revival  in trade and rising prices. 
It was in this period of  rising prices that the Steel Corpora- 
tion was organized.  Soon after its formation the price of 
Bessemer  pig  iron  advanced  to $16.75  per  ton; that  of 
steel  billets  to $24.00;  that  of  steel  rails  to $28.00;  and 
that of  wire rods to $38.00.  With the exception of  steel 
rails,  the  prices  of  none  of  these  commodities  remained 
permanent  through the year.  Bessemer  pig  iron declined 
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to $15.75  per ton and rose agair.  to $16.50.  Steel billets 
dropped to $23.50  per ton and then rose to $27.00.  Wire 
rods were quoted at $39.00  in May and June, but declined 
to $34.25  in  December.  In these quotations it is worthy 
of  note that the most conspicuous advance in price was that 
of  steel  billets,  of  which  the  Steel  Corporation  sells  but 
little;  and  that  there  was  an appreciable  advance  in  pig 
iron  which  was  not  sold  by  the  corporation  at all.  The 
year  1901 was a year of  great prosperity,  and the advance 
in  prices  was  a  natural outcome of  the increased  demand 
for goods.  In no case were the quotations marked  higher 
for the commodities  which  the  Steel  Corporation  sold  in 
large quantities than for those which  it did  not  sell at a11 
or only in small quantities. 
The year  1902 was  one of  the most  prosperous  in  the 
history of  the iron and steel trade.  Until 1906 it was the 
banner year of  the Steel Corporation.  Notwithstanding its 
great prosperity, prices by no means reached the high level 
they had  attained in  1899 and  1900.  The brisk  trade of 
1902 was  followed  by  the  depression  of  1903  and  1904. 
During these years prices  declined to relatively  low levels, 
though  not  so  low  as  during the  middle  nineties.  Near 
the end of  1904 there was a  revival  in the  iron and steel 
,trade, followed  by  (the prosperous  years  1905  and  19oG. 
Prices rose to higher figures than at any time since  1902, 
and  those  of  crude  materials  to figures  higher  than  any 
since  the  Steel  Corporation  was  organized.  Quotations 
taken  from the Iron Age, showing the highest  and lowest 
prices of  standard materials in the six years preceding and 
the six  years succeeding the  formation  of  the  Steel  Cor- 
poration, are given in the following table: 138  THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION  C360 
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From the preceding table  it  will  be  seen that the high- 
est prices quoted in the period  succeeding the organization 
of  the  Steel  Corporation  did  not  reach  the  high  level  of 
1899 and  1900,  except  in  the  case  of  foundry  pig  iron, 
which  the corporation does  not  sell.  Nor  are the lowest 
quotations as low  as those of  1897 and  1898.  The Steel 
Corporation has followed  what business  men  would  call a 
conservative policy.  This policy has doubtless been due to 
a  recognition  that control of  the productive  forces of  the 
industry  has not  been  achieved,  and  that  any  attempt  to 
raise  prices  much  above  what  market  conditions  will  jus- 
tify would  increase  the number  of  competitors  already  in 
the field. 
The Steel  Corporation,  however,  does  produce  a  large 
percentage of the wire goods of  the country.  Almost  sev- 
enty per  cent  of  the  wire  rods  are manufactured  by  this 
organization, and from sixty-five to seventy per cent of  the 
wire nails.  The prices  of  these commodities  do not  seem 
to have been  greatly influenced in any way detrimental to 
the interests  of  the consumer.  Immediately  after the or- 
ganization of  the Steel Corporation wire rods were raised 
in price to $38.00  per ton and then to $39.00,  after which 
they gradually declined to $34.25 in December,  1901.  Dur- 
ing the year  1899 the average -price of wire  rods accord- 
ing to the quotations in the Iron Age was $36.50  per ton. 
During  the  prosperms  year  1902  the  price  averaged 
$35.80.  During the same years the average prices of  wire 
nails were respectively $2.45  and $2.00.  Other wire prod- 
ucts show similar differences in price which are more favor- 
able  to the  period  succeeding  the  formation  of  the  Steel 
Corporation than to the one preceding  it.  As in the case 
of iron and steel ~roducts  in general a conservative policy 
has been  followed. 
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by the case of  steel plate.  In February, 1899, the price of 
steel plate at Pittsburg was $1.30 per one hundred pounds. 
In view  of  the  growing demand  for this commodity  the 
steel-plate pool  raised the price to $3.00  in August of  that 
year.  This price  attracted several competitors.  With the 
lessened demand of  1900 the rolling mills fought to secure 
business; and in July, 1900, the ruinous price of  $1.05  was 
reached.  Several mills were compelled to go out of  busi- 
ness.  With the revival  of  trade  in  1901  and  1902  there 
was  another  great  demand  for  steel  plate,  due largely  to 
the  steel-car  and  steel-ship  industries.  This  price  was 
raised  by  the  Steel Corporation to $1.60,  and  maintained 
at or near  that figure  in  face  of  a  greatly  increasing  de- 
mand.  New  rivals  were  thus  kept  out  of  the  industry. 
Throughout  most  of  the  depression  of  the  latter  half  of 
1903 and  1904 this price  continued  in  force.  The main- 
tenance of  a  profitable  price  during a  period  of  slackened 
trade was thus made  easier by  the policy of  a  reasonable 
price in good times. 
5 6.  In line with this general policy is the attitude of  the 
Steel Corporation toward the prices of  raw materials.  The 
Steel Corporatiot~  is engaged primarily  in the manufacture 
and sale of  rolled or finished products.  Owning, however, a 
large percentage  of  the best  ore fields in  the country,  its 
influence on the price of  ore is important.  In 1901 it fixed 
the price of iron ore at $1.25  less per  ton than was  paid 
during the season of  1900.  The reason  for this action  is 
not  clear.  Mr.  Schwab vaguely  intimated  that  this  act 
showed that there was  no attempt at securing excessively 
high  prices.'  It may  be  said  in  this connection  that the 
Steel Corporation at this time purchased much of  its crude 
iron; and in thus lowering the price of  ore there may have 
1  Report of  the Industrial  Commission, vol. xiii, pp. 471,  472. 
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been an element of reciprocity.  It has been, however, the 
purpose of the corporation and other steel concerns owning 
their  own ore fields to keep  the price  of  ore high.  This 
policy  is  due to the desire to raise  the cost  of  production 
for rival steel mills not owning, or owning very little, ore 
property.  In  1903  the  price  of  Bessemer  ore was  $4.50 
per ton.'  The Merchant's Ore Association wished to make 
the price for 1904 between $3.25 and $3.80,  while the Steel 
Corporation demanded that $4.00 be made the price, threat- 
ening to sell ore itself.  In wishing to make the lower price 
the  Ore Association  was  actuated  by  a  desire  to sell  the 
largest  possible amount  of  product.  The price  was  ulti- 
mately fixed at $3.50,  although several of  the members of 
the  Association  made  long-term  contracts  to  deliver  at a 
sliding scale price  fluctuating  with  the price  of  pig iron.' 
In this instance the influence of  the  Steel  Corporation did 
not  prevail; but  its attempt to hold  up the price  of  ore is 
typical  of  its  general  attitude  toward  the  prices  of  raw 
products. 
A somewhat similar attitude seems to be  maintained  to- 
ward  the  prices  of  crude  and  unfinished  material.  The 
quotations, for example,  of  pig iron show greater fluctua- 
tions than those of  finished products.  During the closing 
months of  1906 the prices of  crude iron soared higher than 
they  had  ever  done since  1899, whereas  those  of  finished 
material did not in general reach  the level of  1902.  Steel 
billets,  out of  which  a variety  of  finished commodities  are 
manufactured, and among them steel rails, were quoted at 
$32.00  per  ton  in  June,  1902,  and  at $29.50  during the 
closing months  of  1906 and  the opening months of  1907. 
During both  these prosperous  periods,  however,  the price 
of steel rails remained  fixed at $28.00. 
1  Journal of  Commerce, New York,  Apr.  22,  1%. 
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These  instances,  and  others  which  might  be  cited,  in- 
dicate  a  conservative  policy  with  regard  to the  sales  of 
finished  material  and  a  disposition  not  to discourage  any 
"  leveling  up " of  the  prices  of  raw  and  crude products. 
By  pursuing  this  business  policy,  steel  makers  discourage 
competition from the outside; and the steel industry tends to 
be confined to those already  in the field  and owning their 
own sources of  raw material.  Prosperity, therefore, brings 
little inducement to outsiders to enter the steel trade.  This 
policy has given  rise  to much  criticism on the part of  in- 
dependent producers; '  but it has saved the consumer from 
paying very high prices for goods during those times when 
he needed them most. 
5 7.  A conlparison of  the prices during the present boom 
and those of  1901 and 1902 further illustrates the tendency 
toward  moderation  in  the  case  of  finished  commodities. 
The fall  and  winter  months of  1906 and  I907 mark  the 
most prosperous period  in the history of  the iron and steel 
trade and the  highest  levels reached  by  prices  since  1902. 
The highest  quotations during these two periods  for cer- 
tain standard products  are as follows: 
190I-I903. 
Foundry  pig  iron, No.  2,  Pbiladel- 
~hia,  per  ton. ... ................  $23.00 
Bessemer pig iron. Pittsburg, per ton.  21.75 
Steel billets,  Pibts,burg, per  ton.. .  .  32.50 
Wire rods.  Pittsburg, per  ton.. . . . .  39.00 
Bar iron, Pittsburg, per  IOO  lbs.. .  .  .  1.80 
Tank plate,  Pittsburg, per  loo  lbs.  1.85 
Wire nails,  Pittsburg,  per  IOO kbs.  2.30 
Sept. 1906  to Fcb. 1907. 
With the exception of  foundry and Bessemer pig iron, the 
prices  oi these  materials were  either lower  or not  higher 
during the later boom  than  during the earlier one.  This 
lEvening Post, New York,  Dec.  31,  1906. 
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is  worthy of note  as the  volume  of  trade  for  1906 was 
greater throughout the world than in any previous yeay. 
8.  Ijt  is seen therefore that one marked effect which the 
Steel Corporation has had on prices has been to render them 
more steady.  It has been  compelled to meet  considerable 
competition; and it has been  driven to a policy of  modera- 
tion'during times of  prosperity in order to save itself  from 
the results of  a cutthroat rivalry in  periods of  depression. 
More than any other steel company the United States Steel 
Corporation must maintain a large volume of  business with- 
out interruption in order to meet heavy charges.  Control- 
ling as it does over half the steel trade of  the country, it has 
been  able  during periods  of  prosperity  to check  the num- 
ber  of  rivals  entering  the  trade by  keeping  prices. from 
rising  abnorn~ally  high.  By  this  policy  competition  is 
rendered less severe in times of  depression. 
A  further consideration  in  this purpose  of  the corpora- 
tion  is  the  steadying  of  trade.  While  it  is  true  that 
fluctuations in prices are due to fluctuations in demand,  it 
is also true that prices react on demand.  It is well known, 
for example,  that on a  declining market  the  consumer  is 
tempted to wait for prices to get lower.  He is furthermore 
inspired with  fear concerning the future; and delayed  de- 
mand results in a depression more or less prolonged.  Oscil- 
lations  in prices  therefore have  their  psychological  effect 
which is, shown to some extent in the vicissitudes of  trade. 
No  explanation  of  such  a  phenomenon  as a  commerciaI 
panic is adequate without due consideration of  this psycho- 
logical element.  In reducing the fluctuations of  prices  we 
may thus look  forward to an appreciable steadying of  the 
volume  of  trade.  Not  that  variations  in  demand  will  be 
done away with, but that the more extreme phases of  these 
oscillations  will be  considerably  reduced. 
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tion  has been  indicated  in a previous  chapter.'  With the 
same amount of  trade more is wasted  in meeting a fluctuat- 
ing  demand  than  in  satisfying  a  steady  and  moderately 
strong demand.  The shutting  down  and  opening  up  of 
mills and furnaces involves a consumption of  energy which 
in a technical  sense  is  unproductive.  The attempt,  more- 
over, to curtail expenses  in  times  of  depression  by  Iower- 
ing  wages  generally  meets  with  more  or less  opposition 
from  workmen,  which  not  unfrequently  results  in  strikes 
and  lockouts.  To reduce  these  and other wastes  is  itself 
a powerful motive in the effort to steady trade. 
5 9.  A subject which has received considerable public atten- 
tion in recent years is the prices charged by  the Steel Cor- 
poration and other companies in the foreign market.  This 
question has arisen in  connection  with  investigations  con- 
cerning the influence of  the tariff  on home prices and cer- 
tain allegations that foreign consumers are favored at the 
expense  of  domestic purchasers.  In  1901, after the  Steel 
Corporation had been organized, steel rails were quoted at 
$28.00 per ton for the domestic consumer and delivered to 
the European buyer at $23.00.~ Plain wire during the same 
period was quoted to the Canadian dealer at $11.00  per ton 
less  than  to the  home  dealer.  It is  reported  that  Mr. 
Schwab  informed  Mr.  Joseph  Lawrence,  M.  P.,  that  the 
Steel  Corporation could  deliver  steel billets  in England  at 
$16.50  per  ton.'  The price of  steel billets  in  the United 
States at the same time was  $24.00.  Such discriminating 
charges have nqturally aroused public curiosity in regard to 
the reason why the domestic consumer should be compelled 
to pay more than the foreigner far the same goods. 
1  Cf.  supra, ch. ii. 
2 Report  of  the Industrial  Commission, vol. xiii, pp.  454, & 
Report  of the British Iron  Trade Commission, p.  123. 
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That these differences have existed at times is  admitted 
by  the  officials  of  the  Steel  Corporation  and  other  steel 
companies, but are defended on the ground that these lower 
prices brought no prdt and  represented  only  attempts to 
capture the foreign market.  It has been further urged that 
it is desirable to keep plants running at their full capacity; 
and when the home demand is not sufficient to do this, it is 
necessary  to  dispose  of  surplus product  at relatively  low 
prices abroad.  If the plants are not kept  running to their 
full  capacity,  it  is  contended  that  the  cost  of  production 
would be so much increased that the price to the home con- 
sumer  would  on  the  whole  be  higher  than  if  the  export 
gods were  sold  at  the  lower  rate.'  Whatever  may  be 
thought of  the validity of  these contentions, it is true that 
goods are often sold  in  foreign or distant markets  at, or 
even below, cost  in order to capture trade.  The price  of 
$16.50  per  ton  for steel  billets  delivered  in  England, re- 
ported  to have been named  by  Mr.  Schwab, was probably 
not above the cost of manufacture to the Steel Corporation. 
In 1894 the Bethlehem  Steel Company entered into a con- 
tract with  the Russian government  for the sale of  armor 
plate which was much below the price charged to this gov- 
ernment.  The action was defended on the ground that the 
price was below cost and entered into solely to secure trade. 
Recent investigations by a board appointed by the Secretary 
of  the Navy  have shown the justice  of  the defense;  and 
later contracts with Russia by this and the Carnegie Com- 
pany  at prices  of  one hundred  to one  hundred  and  fifty 
dollars more per ton of  armor plate than the previous price 
charged have justified the policy as a matter of  business. 
During prosperous periods when the demand at home is 
1  Report  of  the Industrial  Commissiotc, vol. xiii, pp. qgq,  455,  464. 
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strong, it  is  usually  affirmed  by  steel  producers  that the 
prices which they charge in the United States are no higher 
than those which they charge abroad.  That the Steel Cor- 
poration to-day is selling at lower prices in Europe, Canada, 
and  Mexico  than at home  is  emphatically  denied.  This 
denial  seems to be  confirmed  in  the case of  steel  rails  in 
Europe by the export prices fixed by the International Rail 
Syndicate.  This organization was formed  in  1904 of  the 
leading steel rail producers  of  Germany, England,  France 
and Belgium.  When the syndicate was first formed it put 
the export price of  rails at £4-5s to £4-10s per ton at port 
of  shipment.  Lately, however,  the price has been  fixed  at 
£5-15s to £6.  From thesle figures it is seen that steel rails 
are selling as high in Europe to-day as in the United States, 
while the cost of  production is probably lower than here. 
5  10.  Connected with the subject of  domestic and export 
prices  is the much  discussed  case concerning the charges 
made to  the home and fareign governments for the sale of 
armor plate.  Allusion. 'has already kn  made to  the contract 
entered incto in 1904 by the Bethlehem Steel Company for the 
sale of  1500 tons of  armor plate to the Russian government 
at a  price  much  below  that .charged  to this government. 
Last spring a special board appointed pursuant to an act of 
Congress made  an investigation  of  the  prices charged  to 
this and other governments for armor plate and  its actual 
cost  of  production.  The following  table  as given  in  the 
report of  the board  shows the prices  paid  by  the  leading 
countries  of  the  world  for  all  types  of  armor  and  the 
maximum price  paid  for Krupp armor :  l 
l  Iron  Age, Dec. 13, 1906, p.  1604. 
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Average Price  of all armor.  Price of Krupp armor. 
Japan.. . .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  per ton $400.00 
"  '6  per  ton $400.00  Austria. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . 
449.00 
"  4' 
I'  6'  .'  I'  557.00  Italy .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  52  I .oo 
II  ‘C  '6  c'  550.00  Germany .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
I'  'I  450.00 
'6  'I  450.00  France . . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
6'  6'  569.03  6'  G‘  572.00  England. .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  626.00 
'6  L'  681.00  United States.. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  345.00 
'C  " 
346.00 
From the board's  investigations it appears that the manu- 
facturers of this country are practically alone in demanding 
of  the home government no greater and even lower prices 
for armor than those charged to foreign customers.  Very 
generally abroad home prices rule higher than those to for- 
eign purchasers. 
There are three armor-plate mills in the United  States- 
the  Carnegie,  the  Bethlehem,  and  the  Midvale.  Of  these 
the Carnegie mill Is  the largest.  The board made a careful 
investigation  of the  cost  of  producing  armor plate  at all 
three places  and then  divided its estimated  costs  into two 
kinds:  production  cost,  and  full  cost.  The  former  in- 
cl~des  the price  of  all  raw material,  cost of  labor, cost of 
up-keep  of  plant,  the current repairs,  salaries  of  superin- 
tendents, and interest on capital.  Full cost includes in ad- 
dition taxes, insurance, and a host of other expenses whicll 
cannot be  readily  itemized.  The board estimated that the 
cost of armor plate of  grade A  (armor five inches or more 
in  thickness)  would  be  $244.27  per  ton,  production  cost, 
and  $296.89  per  ton, full cost.  Armor plate  of  grade B 
(armor  less  than five  inches  in  thickness)  costs  $221.76, 
production  cost,  and  $273.78,  full cost.  The board  em- 
phasizes  the  fact  that  cost  depends  largely  on  output. 
Working to the full capacity is the most  economical. 
In general it may be  said  concerning  domestic  and  ex- 
port prices that producers  in  all countries have endeavored 
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foreign consumer to attain this end.  In dull years so-called 
surplus product  has been disposed of in foreign markets in 
order to keep prices relatively high at home.  A high pro- 
tective tariff, by shutting out foreign products, has enabled 
the producers of  such  countries as the United  States and 
Germany to keep prices high in the home country while sell- 
ing to foreigners at very low rates.  For reasons which will 
be  indicated  in  the  following  chapter  this  practice  seems 
likely to disappear in the future. 
In reference to the attitude of  steel companies to the gov- 
ernment, particularly  in  the matter  of  armor plate,  there 
seems to be no reason to believe that the American producers 
have  made  a  practice  of  favoring  the  foreign  purchaser. 
Certain  indications,  however,  point  to  the  Carnegie  and 
Bethlehem companies having combined to raise the charges 
made  to  the  United  States  government.  In  December, 
1903, when a contract was made with the Midvale company 
for 6080 tons of  armor of  class A  for the American navy 
at $398.00 per ton, the Carnegie and Bethlehem companies 
both put in a bid at $420.00.  Again in April, 1905, when 
a second proposal for armor plate was made, the bids of  the 
Carnegie  and  Bethlehem  companies were the same-$400 
to $420  per ton, while those of  the Midvale company were 
from $385  to $398.  A  recent  contract  has  awarded  the 
making  of  armor  plate  to all  three  cmpanie notwith- 
standing the higher  bids  of  the  Carnegie  and  Bethlehem 
companies.  This rather  strange award was  made  on the 
threat that the mills of  the latter companies would be dis- 
mantled, leaving the Midvale establishment the only one in 
the United  States manufacturing armor plate.  Whatever 
in general may be said of the relations existing between these 
organizations  and  the  United  States  Government,  their 
charges  seem to compare very  favorably with those made 
by  foreign manufacturers to their own home governments. 
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The practice  of demanding more of  the home government 
than of foreign purchasers  hzs  prohbly been  greatest  in 
those nations where it has been least denounced. 
5  I I.  The influence which the Steel Corporation is likely to 
exert upon  the general  level of  prices  will  depend  in part 
upon  the  preservation  of  competitive  conditions.  Aside 
from the increasing control which it is securing in the Lake 
Superior region,  there is no evidence of  any drift toward 
monopoly conditions.  There is very little reason to believe 
that it is able by virtue of  mere size to manufacture more 
cheaply  than its best  equipped  competitors.  It has,  how- 
ever,  certain  advantages  in  the location  of  mines  and  in 
transportation facilities, which  in the lower  stages of  pro- 
duction greatly cheapen cost.  The Steel Corporation owns 
its  own  means  of  transportation  from  the  ore  mines  of 
Minnesota  and  Michigan  to the furnaces of  Pennsylvania 
and  Ohio.  On its  leased  properties  it  has  paid  royalties 
of fifteen to thirty-five cents pei- ton for some of  its best ores. 
These rates are cheaper than those charged for most of the 
ore mined by  its competitors.  By  its superior transporta- 
tion facilities and low royalties on ore the cost of  this ma- 
terial to the Steel Corporation at its blast furnaces in Penn- 
sylvania and Ohio has been  on the average from seventy- 
five cents to a  dollar and a half  cheaper per  ton than for 
independent companies. 
These advantages, however,  are likely to be  neutralized 
in part by  the higher royalties  which the corporation vlrill 
be obliged to pay for recent additions to its ore properties. 
As has been seen in a former chapter, the acquisition of  the 
Hill  holdings  will  cost the corporation  $1.65  per  ton for 
ore mined  during the year  I907 with  an increase of  3.4 
cents  per  ton  for each  succeeding  year.'  The minimum 
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agreed to be mined is 750,000  tons for 1907 and thereafter 
750,000  tons additional  for each succeeding  year  until the 
output reaches 8,250,000 tons.  What the cost to the Steel 
Corporation will be  if  the minimum tonnage is mined  each 
year until 1917 is seen in the following table: 
Year.  Minimum tonnage. 
1907 .................  750,000 
.................  1go8  I,I;oo,000 
1909  ................. 2,250,000 
1910  .................  3,000,000 
1911.. ...............  3,750,000 
1912  ................. 4,500,000 
1913 .................  5,250,000 
1914  ................. 6,000,000 
.................  1915  6,750,000 
1916  .................  7,500,000 
................  1917.  8,250,000 
Price 












Cost to the 












The price of  the ore given in the above table is that for the 
standard based  on 59  per cent iron contents.  The royalty 
is reduced as the quality falls below the standard in propor- 
tion to iron contents.  Below  48  per  cent the royalty  will 
be  a matter for future negotiation,  with  recourse to arbi- 
tration. 
The  Steel  Corporation,  therefore,  will  pay  the  Great 
Northern a high price for taking all the ore it has to offer. 
While this transaction has greatly increased the holdings of 
the corporation,  it will  add much  as years  go on  to the 
previous cost of  supplying raw material.  The marking-up 
of ore values will doubtless improve the position of  indepen- 
dent  producers  already  owning their  sources of  raw  ma- 
terial.  The increasing  value  of  mining  properties,  how- 
ever,  and  the  policy  of  the  Steel  Corporation  in  keeping 
down the prices  of  finished  products  in  prosperous  times 
will make it harder for the outsider  to enter the field and 
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for the companies  not  controling  their  supplies of  ore to 
maintain their position. 
Ej  12. In general, it may be said that the most obvious influ- 
ence of the Steel Corporation on market conditions has been 
in the direction of steadying, rather than raising prices.  One 
of  its objects has been to lessen the fluctuations of  the iron 
and steel trade; and this purpose  it  has striven  to accom- 
plish  by  making  prices  relatively  uniform.  It  has  been 
enabled to exercise this influence through its large share of 
the country's  trade.  The Steel Corporation in  attempting 
to steady  prices  has  recognized  the wastefulness  of  inter- 
mittent  production.  Its  general  policy  from  a  business 
man's  standpoint has been  a  conservative  one.  Its stand 
for reasonable prices in times of great demand helps to check 
the number of  competitors who would  otherwise enter the 
field;  and  this  policy  operates  to prevent  cutthroat  com- 
petition  in  a  period  of  depression.  Since  its  organization 
the general level of  prices do not  seem to have been  above 
what  market  conditions  would  justify.  In  attempting  to 
influence prices its power  has been limited by  the fact that 
it  does  not  control  the productive  forces of  the  iron  and 
steel  industry.  The means  by  which  this  control  may  be 
secured will be considered  in the following chapter. 375]  MONOPOLY  AND IRON  ASSOCIATIONS  153 
CHAPTER V11 
I.  IN  the formation of the United States Steel Corpor- 
ation, industrial centralization reached a climax.  The cap- 
ital of this company  far exceeded that of  any other indus- 
trial organization in the world.  Notwithstanding its com- 
manding position  among  combinations, it has  not,  as we 
have seen, secured  control of  the country's  output of  iron 
and  steel.  It exercises  no such  influence over the manu- 
facture of  iron and  steel goods as does the  Standard Oil 
Con~pany,  for example, over the refining and distribution of 
oil.  During the six years of  its existence it has produced 
less than forty-five  per  cent  of  the  country's  ore and  pig 
iron, and has manufactured less than sixty-five per  cent of 
its  steel  ingots.  Of  rolled  and finished  material-exclud- 
ing wire nails and tin  plate,-it  has controlled the output 
of  less  than  half.  Of  wire  nails  and  tin  plate  the  cor- 
poration  has manufactured between sixty-five and seventy- 
five per cent. 
The corporation's  share  of  the  country's  trade  cannot, 
therefore, be  said  to constitute  it  a  monopoly.  In every 
consolidation, however, there inheres some element of  mon- 
opoly.  A great combination  is organized  primarily  to re- 
gulate or restrict competition; and this, as has been shown 
in an earlier chapter, was the immediate cause which  gave 
birth to the Steel Corporation.  The object of  such a con- 
solidation is not so much a better adaptation to market con- 
ditions,  as control  of  those  conditions.  In so far as this 
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latter end has been  attained, a combination may be said to 
have reached  the position  of  a monopoly. 
5 2.  Monopoly  results  from one or more of  the follow- 
ing conditions : creation by law ;  ownership or possession of 
the sources of  raw material; control of  transportation; or 
ownership of  trademarks or brands  which  have  secured 
great popular favor.  To  these may be added certain means 
by which competition is restricted or throttled by concerns 
which  have already secured  a large share of  the country's 
trade.  These means have been carefully discussed by  Pro- 
fessor Clark in  his Problem  of  Monopoly.  They are fac- 
tors'  agreements,  local  underselling,  and  the  underselling 
of  one or a  few lines  of  goods by  a  company engaged  in 
trading in a large number of products.  A combination of 
all the firms or companies of a country engaged  in an in- 
dustry will  also,  of  course, produce  a  monopoly; but  the 
control of trade established by such a combination is likely 
to be  of  short duration unless  supported  by  one or more 
of  the conditions which  have  just  been given. 
The 'old  form of legal  monopoly  by  which  a  particular 
trade was guaranteed to a  certain concern  in  return for a 
stipulated  tax  has  virtually  disappeared.  At  the  present 
time the chief  monopolies  created  by  law  are in the form 
of patent rights and local franchises.  The former and gen- 
erally the latter are limited  as to time; and their creation 
is due to reaI or supposed public benefits to be  derived from 
such grants.  A  local  franchise  is  not  always intended  to 
give a concern complete control of local trade or traffic; but 
in such cases as gas,   telephone, and street-car conlpanies, it 
often does this. 
The possession of  the sources of  raw material enables a 
concern  to control  in  large  measure  the  production,  and 
therefore the prices, of goods dependent upon those sources. 
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to secure.  hlonopolies  due  to  this  condition  are  rare in 
this country,  and  confined  almost  entirely  to mining  pro- 
ducts. 
The control of  transportation has been an effective means 
of building up  and maintaining organizations monopolistic 
in  nature.  By  the  phrase,  control  of  transportation,  is 
here meant  not  only the possession of  a means  of convey- 
ance not enjoyed by others, as in the case of  the Standard 
Oil  Company  and  its  pipe  line  system,  but  also  railroad 
favoritism,  by  which  a  large  corporation  secures  certain 
transportation  rates  and  facilities  not  granted  to smaller 
rivals.  This  control  in  the  United  States  has  generally 
taken the form of  railroad discriminations in favor of  cer- 
tain  large shippers.  In putting  small  or competing  con- 
cerns  at a  disadvantage,  this  condition  has been  a  potent 
influence in the development of  monopoly. 
The influence of  favorite brands and trade-marks is psy- 
chological in its nature.  Clever advertising induces people 
to demand certain brands or trade-marks; and the exclusive 
possession of  these gives the holder a great advantage over 
rivals producing commodities equally good, and enables him 
to exact inonopoly prices.  Such an advantage is due to the 
mental  attitude  of  the  buyer.  Take  away  his prejudices 
and  the monopoly  is  gone. 
The other  means  by  which  monopoly  power  is  secured 
and competition  is restricted or repressed  are means which 
can  generally  be  resorted  to only  by  organizations which 
have already built  up a very  large trade.  Factors'  agree- 
ments are used  to secure and conserve  for a consolidation 
or trust the exclusive trade of  a wholesale or retail  estab- 
lishment.  Such contracts help to confine trade to the arti- 
cles manufactured by  the trust.  The agreements  between 
the American Sugar Refining Company and the Wholesale 
Grocers' Association,  the American Tobacco Company  and 
the concerns selling its products, seem to be  of  this nature. 
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Local  underselling  and  the  underselling  of  a  particular 
line of  goods have  been  used  by  large producers to crush 
local competition or competition  in  a particular  branch  of 
manufacture.  Where a  large producer  meets  competition 
in a certain locality the goods of the large concern are sold 
within that area at a price below the cost of  production and 
ruinous to the rival firm.  Losses which the larger organi- 
zation suffers are made good by high prices in other places. 
In  like  manner  competition  in  a  single  line  or grade  of 
goods is crushed by lowering prices below cost in that par- 
ticular line or grade, and recouping,losses by high prices on 
other goods. 
5 3.  Comparing  these  conditions  of  monopoly  growth 
and conservation with the conditions obtaining in the iron 
and steel  industry, it may be  observed  that thessteel  Cor- 
poration from the nature of  its trade is not  likely to resort 
to certain of these  means  in  order to secure  a  monopoly 
control.  The purchasers  of  steel  rails  and steel  plate,  for 
example,  are not  as a  rule  affected  by  those  prejudices 
which  enable  the  manufacturers of other  commodities  to 
create an artificial demand for particular brands and trade- 
marks.  These devices, so potent in many industries, would 
have  little  influence  in  enlarging  the control  exercised  by 
the  corporation  over  the  iron  and  steel  trade.  Nor  are 
factors'  agreements  likely  to  play  any  important  r6le  in 
promoting  monopoly,  as a  large  proportion  of  the goods 
manufactured by  the steel consolidation is  sold  directly to 
customers.  Local  underselling  cannot  be  employed  as  a 
means for crushing competition because the strongest inde- 
pendent companies sell their commodities to more than local 
areas.  The selling below cost of  a single line of  @S  in 
order to ruin a rival concern is not likely to be  extensively 
resorted  to in  view of  the  fact that the strongest compet- 
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manufacture.  This practice  has been  indulged  in by  iron 
and steel concerns in the past, and rumors are not wanting 
that it has been employed in recent times.  When the Car- 
negie and Bethlehem companies were underbid by the Mid- 
vale Steel Company in the sale of  armor plate to the United 
States  government,  it  was  rumored  that  these  concerns 
threatened "  to slash  prices " and destroy the armor plate 
trade of  the Midvale  Company.'  The threat, however,  if 
made, was nat  carried  oult.  For the reason  already given 
this practice is not  likely to be employed by the Steel Cor- 
poration to destroy  competition. 
The Steel Corporation has enjoyed a monopoly in certain 
lines  of  wire  goods  by  virtue  of  patent  rights.'  This 
monopoly,  however, has covered but a small proportion of 
the con~pany's  trade, and could  contribute but  little  to its 
dominance in the iron and steel industry. 
The possible control of  transportation by  the Steel Cor- 
poration  demands some  attention.  The corporation  owns 
most  of  the  railroad  and  steamship  lines  over  which  its 
ores are carried  from the mines  of  Minnesota  and  Michi- 
gan to the furnaces of  Ohio and Pennsylvania.  No inde- 
pendent  company has as complete  facilities for assemblitlg 
its  raw  material  as has  this  organization.  By  means  of 
this control the cost  of  ore to the corporation  at its blast 
furnaces  in  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  is  from  seventy-five 
cents to one dollar and a half  cheaper per ton than for its 
con~petitors.  This control, however,  is limited to facilities 
for the assembling of  ore and coal. 
In regard to the shipment of  commodities from plant to 
market  or to consumer, the corporation  enjoys  no special 
advantage over  independent  companies.  Whether  or not 
1 The Times, New York,  Dec.  27,  1904. 
2 See First Annual  Report. 
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it has to any appreciable extent received  favors  from rail- 
roads is difficult to determine.  In December,  1go5, an in- 
dictment  was  returned by  tlie  Federal  Grand Jury  in  Chi- 
cago against the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, 
the first vice-l)resider,t of  the road, and  its foreign freight 
agelit for having granted rebates to the United States Steel 
Products  Export  Company  of  New  York,  the  company 
under  whose  management  the  export  trade  of  the  Steel 
Corporation  is  carried  on.  In this  indictinent  twenty-six 
offences were charged.  It was alleged in the indictment that 
the rebates amounted to about thirty per cent of  the sched- 
uled  tariff.  Under this charge the defendants were found 
guilty and fined.  It is  worthy of  note, however,  notwith- 
standing this rather flagrant case, that early in the corpora- 
tion's  history  independent  organizations  seem  to have  felt 
little  concern  about their ability  to compete  with  the  new 
company; ' and  at the  present  time  the  fear  of  railroad 
discrimination does  not  prevail  to any considerable  extent 
anlong the corporation's competitors.  The attitude, more- 
over, of some of  the leading officials of  the corporation has 
been friendly toward those measures  of  Federal  regulation 
which are calculated to do away with railroad  favoritism.' 
The increasing  stringency  of  legislation  against  railroad 
discrimination  will make the rebate  a  less potent  factor in 
promoting the growth of monopoly in the future than it has 
been in the past. 
S 4.  If the Steel Corporation obtains control of  the coun- 
try's output of  iron and steel, it is likely to do so by securing 
possession  of  the  principal  deposits  of  ore  in  the  United 
l Report  of the  Industrial  Commission, vol. xiii; see  testimonies  of 
King et al. 
2 See remarks of  Judge Gary on Federal regulation,  New York  World, 
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States.  The control of  the nation's  ore supply will not be 
easy  to  secure  owing  to  the  great  extent  of  deposits. 
Nevertheless,  the corporation has been increasing its hold- 
ings in the Lake Superior region to such an extent that it 
may now be said to control the output of  that district.  Just 
what proportion  of  the ore of  this region  is  now  held  by 
the  Steel  Corporation cannot be  stated very  definite1y;but 
it is probably  not  much  less  than  eighty per  cent.  When 
it is  remembered  that this northern field  probably  contains 
over half  the visible supply of  workable ore in the country, 
the significance of  the large holdings of  the corporation, can 
be readily appreciated.  As a result of  recent additions to  its 
properties the company's share of  the country's output of  ore 
will  probably  increase,  and  it  is  not  unlikely  that  further 
efforts will be made to secure ore lands in oither parts of  the 
country.  The annual report  for 1906, just  recently  issued, 
after speaking of  the large additions made to its properties 
by the transfer of  ithe Hill holdings, says very significantly: 
"  It is, however,  doubtful if  the quantity of new ore so ob- 
tained will prove sufficient to meet the constantly-increasing 
demands upon the ore reserves made by the country's grow- 
ing requirements for steel products." 
It has already been observed  that for much  of  the pro- 
duction of  this district a high royalty must be paid.  In the 
case  of  the  Great  Northern  properties  recently  trans- 
ferred to the corporation this royalty  for standard ore (59 
per  cent iron contents)  delivered at shipping port on Lake 
Superior will be,  as we have  seen, $1.65  per  ton in  1907 
(85 cents royalty plus 80 cents haulage), with an increase 
each year of  $.034, which royalty is to apply to a minimum 
tonnage increasing each  year  until  1917, when  the annual 
production is to be at least 8,250,000 tons.  The price paid 
by the Carnegie  Company  for its ore holdings  before  the 
Steel  Corporation  was  organized  ranged  from  fifteen  to 
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thirty-five  cents per  ton for standard grade.  It will  thus 
be seen that high-grade ore is commanding a much higher 
royalty now than in the closing years of the last century. 
The whole  transaction seems to have been  based  on the 
belief that the bulk of  the iron ore in the United States that 
can be  carried at reasonable  freight rates to advantageous 
assembling points  for fuel and  ore is  known  to-day,  and 
that  if other ore deposits are found  they  will  be  at such 
distances from the chief  steel-making and  steel-consuming 
sections  of the country as not  to compete  on  equal  terms 
with the Lake ores.  It seems to be based also on the con- 
viction that the demand for iron and steel will continue to 
increase, and consequently that the high price  paid  for the 
late additions to the  corporation's  holdings  is  reasonable, 
if  not low, in comparison with future values. 
That the demand for iron and steel is pressing hard upon 
the ore supply of  the country seems to be  indicated  by the 
general trend of  prices  during the last six or eight years. 
In the spring of  1900  Old Range Bessemer ore sold as low 
as $2.75  per  ton  at furnace.  This price  was  lower  than 
for  1899, when all iron and steel goods sold  at unusually 
high  figures.  It was  not,  however,  considered  very  low. 
Four years later the price of  Old Range Bessemer ore was 
$3.25  per  ton,  which  was considered  almost  ruinous.  In 
the fall of  1906 it was $5.15.'  Non-Bessemer  Mesaba ore, 
which sold for $2.75 per ton at furnace in 1901, sold at the 
latter date for $4.10.~  These prices indicate that there has 
been a marking up of ore values during recent years.  The 
high price paid by the Steel Corporation for the Hill hold- 
ings is but a recognition of the general trend of  values. 
The Steel Corporation is thus in possession of  large areas 
of  ore land  which  are steadily increasing  in  value.  It is 
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furthermore in control of  the district from which nearly all 
the  Bessemer  ore of  the  United  States  comes,  and  may 
therefore  be  said  virtually  to control  the  output  of  this 
material.  It is  well  known  that  Bessemer  ore is getting 
scarcer the world over.  The Bilbao district of  Spain, which 
has supplied Europe with a large proportion  of  this mate- 
rial,  will,  according  to  all  accounts,  soon  be  exhausted. 
The large ore fields of  Asturias,  which  are not  yet  fully 
opened up, will not produce ores suitable for the acid  Bes- 
semer process.  The Bessemer ore of  Lake Superior is not 
likely,  therefore,  to experience  much  foreign  competition. 
In this country Bessemer ore still commands a higher price 
than  the  non-Bessemer  product.  As long  as this  is  the 
case the control of  the Lake Superior region  will give the 
Steel Corporation a marked advantage over its competitors. 
It has been pointed out, however, in a former chapter that 
the open-hearth process is gaining favor with manufacturers 
and seems to be  displacing the Bessemer mode  of  produc- 
tion.  This fact has been  recognized by the Steel Corpora- 
tion  itself; and most of  its new  plants have been equipped 
for the open-hearth process of  steel manufacture.  The new 
rail  mills  to be  built  at Gary,  Indiana,  will  manufacture 
rails from open-hearth steel.  The introduction of  the basic 
mode of producing steel, both in the form used in Germany 
and England, and in the form used  in this country in con- 
nection with the open-hearth process, has already destroyed 
the monopoly  once enjoyed  by  Bessemer  steel.  Notwith- 
standing the  fact that this latter product  is still preferred 
to other kinds of steel, the growing demand for the open- 
hearth material seems calculated to neutralize whatever ad- 
vantage Bessemer steel may now possess. 
While the Steel Corporation now holds the most valuable 
ore fields in the United  States and has certain advantages 
in its control of  the output of  Bessemer  ore, it is meeting 
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increasing  competition.  Its advance to virtual  control  of 
the Lake Superior region, especially as marked in the Great 
Northern deal, has been signalized  by  increased  activity in 
the South.  Northern capital in increasing amounts is being 
invested  in  the iron  industry of  the  South; and the Ten- 
nessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company and the Southern 
Steel  Company  are increasing  their  holdings  in  the  Ala- 
bama  region.  An extensive program of new  construction 
has  been  laid  out  by  the  former company  involving  the 
expenditure of  at least $~,OOO,OOO.  "The Hill deal,"  says 
the Iron Age, "  suggested to men of  large capital that thc 
psychological  moment  had  arrived  for investment  in  Ala- 
bama  ore and coal,  and  in  the plants already  existing to 
turn them  into steel."  l 
Competition  from  the  South  is  thus  likely  to becomc 
more  aggressive  in  the  future.  Up to the  present  time 
there has been little competition from this region, notwith- 
standing  its  great  natural  advantages.  Its  comparative 
remoteness  from  the great steel-consuming  centers  of thc 
North and East has held back its development, atid its pro- 
duction  has been  confined largely  to iron materials.  The 
general marking up of  ore values  shown in  the Hill deal 
has given  an impetus  to the industry  in this  region; and 
present  indications point  to more  intense rivalry  with the 
steel producers of  the North.  It is in the interests of  this 
region that the Steel Corporation is likely to meet its most 
formicfable competitors in the future. 
The Steel Corporation has an advantage over independ- 
ent con~panies  in possessing deposits of ore which will prob- 
ably dong outlast  theirs.  It dominates  the  Northern  ore 
region; but  its  large possessions  here  do not  enable  it to 
control  the country's  output.  In order  to secure  sucb a 
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control  the corporation  would,  in  addition  ta  its Fresent 
holdings in the Lake Superior district, have to gain posses- 
sion of  the Alabama  region. 
Rumors are not  wanting that appraisals  of  the value of 
important iron and steel companies have been made with a 
view  to an ultimate  merger  with  the  Steel  Corporation.' 
Companies  in  possession  of  important ore fields would be 
the natural subjects of  such appraisal.  Were such organi- 
zations as the Republic Iron and Steel Company, the Ten- 
nessee  Coal,  Iron  and  Railroad  Company,  the  Colorado 
Fuel and Iron Company, the Southern Steel Company, and 
the Sloss-Sheffield Company to be  merged  with  the Steel 
Corporation  on  the  basis  of  their  present  capitalization, 
something like $2oo,ooo,ooo  would be  added to the stocks 
and  bonds  of  the  Corporation.  A  merger  of  this  kind 
would by  no means be  so great as that which  took  placc 
when  the  Steel  Corporation  itself  was  organized,  and  it 
would  give  the  organization  practically  a  control  of  the 
iron and steel trade of  the country.  Under such a combi- 
nation  the  output  of  ore from Lake  Superior,  Alabama, 
Colorado and Utah would be regulated by one organization. 
8 5.  The strength of a monopoly based upon control over 
the sources of  raw material within the country would  de- 
bend  upon the protection given it by the tariff.  Prices of 
iron and steel have until recently been lower in Europe than 
in  the United  States.  The prices  of  finished  material  in 
bond at New York City are generally a few dollars per ton 
lower than those of  the corresponding goods in this coun- 
try.  Ore and pig iron can also be imported at prices below 
those usually charged for the domestic product.  The tariff 
would  thus be  an  important  factor  in  safeguarding any 
monopoly dependent upon control acquired over the sources 
1  The Times, Kew York,  Mar.  6, I&. 
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of  raw  material.  In the present  state of  public  opinicm 
with  its intense feeling against  anything savoring of mo- 
nopoly  the tariff  protecting such  a  combination  would be 
the first object of  attack. 
8 6. The United  States Steel  Corporation is not  a  mo- 
nopoly.  Whatever may be its developments in the direction 
of ultimate control of the country's sources of  ore supply, it 
at present meets considerable domestic competition, and may 
be compelled to meet not a little foreign rivalry.  To say, 
however,  that no  one consolidation  controls  the  iron  and 
steel industry of  the country is not to say that the situation 
is not influenced by combinations of another character, and 
that the Steel Corporation is not an influential force in such 
combinations.  As has already been  indicated, prices  have 
often been  agreed  upon  by  pools  or associations.  Owing 
to the hostile attitude of public opinion toward price agree- 
ments, and to the mare rigid enforcement of  the anti-trust 
act, many of the old pls  and associations have been form- 
ally  discontinued.  Understandings  in  regard  to  prices, 
however, persist, and the influence of  former associations is 
still a living force, and seems likely to coxtinue so. 
The full  details  of  some  of  the  best  known  pools  are 
difficult to ascertain.  Most of  these associations have come 
to life  and  have  died  without  attiacting public  attention. 
Pooling agreements long preceded the era of  great consoli- 
dations.  The trust, or big corporation, which was' intended 
to do more effectually  what the pool  attempted  to do,  can 
hardly be said  to have supplanted  that  form of  organiza- 
tion.  In fact, pools or understandings in regard to prices 
seemed  to have  been  strengthened  and  extended  simulta- 
neously with the growth in size of our manufacturing conl- 
panies.  The growth of  large consolidations by  rendering 
the number of  producing organizations fewer has tended to 
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involved  in  attempting  to control  the  trade  situation  by 
means of  a single corporate organization has also led to a 
revived  interest  in pools. 
In the  iron and  steel  industry  there  are certain  funda- 
mental  features  common  to  nearly  all  forms  of  pooling. 
An unincorporated  organization is formed by all manufac- 
turers of  a  certain  class  of  commodities;  and  these agree 
to maintain  a  schedule  of  prices  fixed  by  the  association. 
In order  to  maintain  these  prices,  production  is  limited 
according to the conditions of  the market.  Each manufac- 
turer is allowed to produce or sell only a specified percent- 
age of  the total output-a  percentage which  is determincd 
by the capacity and advantage of  his plant.  The agreement 
is often  fortified  by  a  inoney  deposit, which  is  forfeitable 
to the association in case of  violation.  Where production 
is greater than the alloted percentage a fine is imposed; and 
a corresponding  bonus given to plants producing less than 
their  share in the allotment.  Owing to the nature of  the 
industry,  territorial  division  of  the  market,  which  was  a 
feature of  railroad  pools,  has not  been  adopted.  Prices, 
however,  are made  uniform  by  adopting  a  common  base 
point, as Pittsburg for example, where the price would.be 
the factory price, and adding to this figure the freight rate 
to obtain the price at other points.  In this case shipments 
from  Pittsburg  would  increase  in  price,  and  toward  it. 
would suffer loss. 
The success of  certain pools in the iron and steel industry 
has been  mainly  owing to the large capital  now  required 
to produce cheaply  some of  the most  important commodi- 
ties,  and  the  consequent  small  number  of  corporations 
which can engage in the industry on any considerable scale. 
It was noted  in a previous chapter that the number of  iron 
and steel establishments had  declined during the last thirty 
years,  notwithstanding  the  enormous  increase  of  capital 
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invested.  The possession of  sources of  raw material which 
is now necessary to any organization expecting to compete 
with the largest steel corporations has also tended to limit 
the  number  of  producers.  In  1906 the  number  of  steel 
companies  capitalized  at more than  twenty million  dollars 
was only about a dozen.  The consolidations which entered 
the  Steel  Corporation had  united  into single  corporations 
a  great  number  of  competing  concerns.  These  concerns 
were then absorbed  into a still larger combination.  These 
conditions  by  limiting  the  number  of  independent  plants 
have  facilitated  the  formation of  pools  or associations of 
considerable strength.  Those associations have been  most 
powerful  which  have  regulated  the  price  of  colnmodities 
produced  by the fewest plants.  Bessemer steel rails in the 
United  States are produced by less than  a  dozen  different 
plants, and the steel rail association is the strongest in the 
trade. 
7.  The price of  iron is regulated  as soon as the ore is 
dug.  The independent  producers  and  sellers  of  ore havc 
organized  the  Merchants'  Ore  Association  of  Cleveland. 
The United States Steel Corporation is not a seller of  ore; 
but as it  is a  producer  of  this commodity, its  influence is 
felt in the regulation of  price.  With the Steel Corporation 
the price  is  largely  a  matter of  book-keeping.  Neverthe- 
less, its endeavor is to keep it high in order to raise the cost 
of  production  for  rival  mills  not  owning  mines.  As the 
Ore Association desires to sell the largest possible amount 
of  product  it has contended for low  prices.  This conten- 
tion has led to compromises  between the Steel Corporation 
and the Association, not very satisfactory to either party.' 
This attitude of  the  Steel Corporation toward  the price 
of  ore is characteristic of  its policy  with  regard to prices 
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of m~t  crude material.  This organization is, as we have 
seen, more disposed to favor high prices in prosperous times 
in the cases of  ore, pig iron, steel billets, and the like, than in 
those of  steel rails, steel beams, or steel plate.  The object 
of  this policy, as was indicated  in the preceding chapter, is 
to limit  the number  of  manufacturers  of  finished  product 
by keeping  up the cost of  crude material. 
5 8.  Pig iron and steel  ingots have been  the subject of 
price agreements.  The attempt to pool steel-ingot  produc- 
tion  has been  on  the  whole  unsuccessful.  The Bessemer 
Pig Iron Association is an organization of  furnace men by 
which the price  and production  of  pig  iron are regulated. 
As in the cases of  pools generally, allotments are made to 
different  producers  in  percentages.  The Association  has 
had  appreciable influence on prices; but  the  relatively in- 
creasing use of  pig iron, not of  Bessemer grade, has helped 
to limit this influence. 
5 9.  The first steel billet pool was tormed in April, 1896, 
as an attempt to reduce the great fluctuations in price which 
marked  the  year  1895.'  Tlhe  Bessemer  Steel  Associa- 
tion, as this pool was called, alloted the percentages in the 
usual manner, and imposed a fine of  two dollars per ton for 
any excess produced.  The selling price was fixed at $21.50 
per ton.  As this price was higher than was justified by the 
demand  at this time,  outside firms took  orders at @9.50. 
Within the -4ssociation there was much selling contrary to 
the  agreement, and  the larger  concerns,  also,  evaded  the 
agreement by  converting billets  into finished shapes.  The 
pool  was  therefore  weak  from  the  beginning  and  soon 
failed.  Re-organization  was attempted without much  suc- 
cess.=  In 1901, a  sliding scale device was  resorted  to by 
which the price of  steel billets was kept $6.50 above that of 
l Iron Age, vol. i, p. 895; vol. ii, pp. 223, 967.  2 Ibid.,  Jan. 3,  1901. 
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pig iron.  This scale was adopted by  the larger manufac- 
turers; and the attempt to raise the price directly  was  not 
made  very  seriously.  In July,  1903,  an agreement  was 
entered  into by  certain companies  by  which  the  Pittsburg 
price was fixed at $27.00  per  ton.  Some of  the prices  at 
other places were, $28.75 in New York, $28.00 in Chicago, 
$40.25  in Pueblo, Colorado, and $39.25  in  San Francisco. 
The members  of  this pool  were  the  United  States  Steel 
Corporation, the Jones and Laughlin Company, the Wheel- 
ing Steel and Iron Company, the Cambria Steel Company, 
the  Pennsylvania  Steel  Company,  the  Lackawanna  Steel 
Company,  and the Maryland  Steel Company.'  This price 
agreement, however, did not last.  In the depression of  the 
la$ter months of  1903 and of  1904 prices were cut.  In the 
spring of  1904  the  Pittsburg  price  had  been  reduced  to 
$23.00  per ton, and the prices at other places lowered cor- 
respondingly.  The Billet Association has not been able to 
control  prices  to  any  considerable  degree.  The outside 
supply has always been elastic, rendering billet manufacture 
essentially competitive. 
8 10. The strongest and best known pool in the iron in- 
dustry is that  of  steel  rails.  Organized  in  1887,~  it  has 
named prices, with a  few interruptions in the nineties,  for 
nearly twenty years.  The original pool consisted of  fifteen 
members.  To each  of  these  members  was  alloted  a  per- 
centage of the total yield.  A penalty of $1.50  to $2.50  per 
ton was imposed for all excesses beyond this allotment; and 
thus the firms were kept  from cutting prices  in order to 
secure  more  business.  The pool  disbanded  in  February, 
1897,  and  was  not  re-organized  until  1899,  from which 
time dates the present pool.  At the time of  the dissolution 
of the old pool, in 1897, the members with their alloted per- 
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centages were as follows: The Carnegie Company, 53.50; 
the Lackawanna,  19.00;  the Cambria, 8.25  ; the Bethlehem, 
8.25  ;  the Pennsylvania, 8.25  ;  and the Maryland, 2.75.' 
Since the organization of  the Steel Corporation, the Steel 
Rail Association has been able to maintain a uniform price 
for six years.  This pool has probably had more permanent 
influence  in  naming prices  than any other combination  in 
the iron  and steel trade.  The most  important  men11)er  of 
this Association is, of  course, the Steel Corporation, which 
is the main influence in shaping its policy.  The attempt to 
fix the prices  of  rolled  or finished  products  at moderately 
high figures and hold them there irrespective of  the fluctu- 
ations of the trade, is an avowed purpose of  the Steel Cor- 
poration; and this endeavor seems to have been most clearly 
realized in the case of  steel rails.  It must be said, however, 
that the price,  $28.00  per  ton,  has  not  been  much  above 
what market  conditions  would  seem  to justify.  In 1902, 
when the price of  steel billets  rose  to $32.00 per  ton, the 
Association kept the price of  steel rails at $28.03,  and there- 
fore below what would  then have probably  been  the price 
had conditions been strictly  competitive.  This lnoderatioil 
in times of  prosperity  enabled  the Association  to keep  the 
price up during the depression of  1904. The fact that the 
Association  has  been  obliged  to exercise  its  power  with 
moderation  in  order  to prevent  the  rise  of  possible  com- 
petitors shows that it is monopolistic in a very lililited sense. 
S  11. The Steel  Rail  Association  has  excited  consider- 
able  interest  on account  of  its relations  with  the Interna- 
tional Steel Rail Pool.  In the fall of  1904 a meeting of  the 
representatives of  the leading rail-making concerns of Great 
Britain,  Germany, Belgium  and  France was held  in Lon- 
doil.'  The object of  the meeting was to arrive at an under- 
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standing as to export orders, and prevent  the ruinous cut- 
ting of  prices that had hitherto taken place in this industry. 
A  provisional  arrangement was entered into by  which the 
four  countries  ilained  were  to export  r,goo,ooo  tons  per 
annum for three years in the following proportions:' 
British  works.. ....................................  53.50 
German works.. ...................................  28.83 
Belgium  works. ...................................  17.67 
100.00 
.  French works.. .First year..  .48 parts out of  104.8 parts. 
Second year. 4.8  parts out of  Ioj  8 parts. 
Third year.. .6.4 parts out of  105.4 parts. 
It will he seen that the allotn~ents  are 11ase:l  upon  propor- 
tions of 104.8,  105.8  and  106.4  parts  for the three years, 
and that the share of  France increases  slightly  from year 
to year.  This agreement  was  subject to the  approval  of 
the works of the countries interested. 
In the summer of  Igoj it  was  "known  in  trade circles 
that  the  leading  steel  rail  manufacturers  in  this  country 
and  Europe  have  been  working  together  quite  closely."" 
Details  of an arrangement were  published  whereby  it  was 
stated  that the American  manufacturers  were  to be  given 
the  steel  rail  trade  of  the  American  continent,  and  that 
European  manufacturers were  to be  free from American 
competition  in all  parts of  the world  except  South Africa. 
The English and French works were to have the prior right 
of  furnishing rails  to their colonies,  while  German  works 
were to have the prior right in  Norway,  Sweden and Den- 
mark.  Other international trade was divided  anlong Eng- 
lish, German, Belgium and Frencli establishn~ents. 
How far these arrangements are being seriously carried 
l Iron Age, Nov. 3,  1904, p. 45.  *Ibid., July 6, 1905, p. a. 
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out it is difficult at present to say.  Assuming the announce- 
ments  to be  true,  some  interesting  points  suggest  them- 
selves.  If  European  competition  for  steel  rail  orders  in 
this country is removed  by  such an international  pool, the 
reduction  or even  complete abolition of  the tariff  on steel 
rails would not serve to lower prices.  Assuming that the 
agreement is adhered to, such a pool would be  even more 
effective  in  limiting the area of  competition than a  high 
tariff  itself.  This assumption  is,  of  course,  extravagant, 
as pools are notoriously weak  in dull times; and an inter- 
national  association would  probably  be  less  effective than 
a national one. 
Another  result  likely to follow  the formation of  such a 
pool is that countries producing no rails would have to pay 
higher prices than they now do.  Under existing conditiovs 
it is the producing countries which are generally protected 
by  tariff  regulations,  and  within  which  high  prices  are 
charged.  Countries not producing steel rails are generally 
open to the widest competition; and prices are often at cost, 
and  not  infrequently  below  cost.  An  international  pool 
guaranteeing certain territories to the manufacturing  inter- 
ests of  particular  nations would  enable  national  pools  so 
to operate as to reduce  the necessity  of  cutting the prices 
of  exported commodities  in order to secure foreign trade. 
Such an outcome cannot be  said to be  undesirable.  It is 
indeed  an anomaly  that  a  country  producing  steel  rails 
should  have  to  pay  several  dollars  per  ton  more  than  a 
country not  manufacturing  such a  product  situated thous- 
ands of  miles away.  Such a  condition  is a  contravention 
of  the natural  laws of  trade.  If  the  rail  buyer  in  South 
America,  South Africa or Arabia  should be  compelled to 
pay the going price  in the United States, England or Ger- 
many, plus freight to destination, he  would not  be  treated 
unfairly.  Nor will the home consumer be making extreme 
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demands in expecting some of  the consideration which pro- 
ducing concerns have  shown themselves  able to accord  to 
foreign consumers. 
It is  yet  too  early  to measure the  probable  outcome of 
the  movement  in  the  direction  of  international  pooling. 
The great area covered and the number of  establishnlents 
included would  tend to make an international pool  exceed- 
ingly  difficult  to maintain.  The complexity  of  the  legal 
and political situation under which  the pool  would have to 
operate would  certainly  enhance this difficulty.  Industrial 
combinations,  however,  have  shown  a  disposition  in  late 
years to overstep national boundaries; and it is not unlllcely 
that this disposition  will show itself  in several of  the*more 
important lines of  the iron and steel trade. 
5  12.  The Rail  Association is the strongest combination 
of  its  kind  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry.  While  it  has 
been compelled to act with moderation,  it has been able to 
hold prices at a fairly high level.  This strength and mod- 
eration have also been shown by the beam pool, which, next 
to the Rail Association, seems to be the n~ost  firmly estab- 
lished  pool  in  the  trade.  It was  organized  late  in  the 
eighties; and like other organizations of  a similar character 
at first set prices  far above what market conditions would 
justify.  After  some breaks,  the present  pool  was  formed 
in 1898 by six leading firms.  These firms were the Carnegie 
Steel Company, Jones and La~rghlin  Company, the Cambria 
Steel Company, the Pennsylvania  Steel Company, the Pas- 
saic Iron Works, and the Pencoyd  Iron 1Vorks.l  In 1899, 
when  billet  prices  rose, the beam  manufacturers  advanced 
prices by leaps and bounds.  With the depression  of 1900 
prices  fell.  After  the  organization  of  the  Steel  Corpora- 
tion the price  of  beams  was  fixed  at $1.60  per  hundred 
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pounds,  Pittsburg, and kept there.  During the prosperous 
year of  1902  the steadiness of the price of steel beams was 
in  marked  contrast  with  the  fluctuations  of  1899.  This 
change of  policy on the part of  the pool  was certainly due 
to the influence of  the Steel Corporation. 
$ 13.  Some other associations, like that of  the steel plate 
pool, have shown considerable  strength.  In general, how- 
ever, these associations while numerous seem to show great 
stability only when the number of  producers to be combined 
is small.  Even then their power  must be characterized by 
moderation.  The influence of  the Steel Corporation seem 
to have been directed towards this end.  This conservative 
policy has probably  been  due to a  realization of  the essen- 
tially unstable character of  a pool. 
In Germany a  similar disposition toward moderation in 
prices is noted by  Professor Jenks  in the case of  the great 
coal combination of  Westphalia.  During the late nineties 
when the demand  for coal exceeded all previous  demands, 
prices remained uniform.  It was claimed by the syndicate 
that moderate prices  in good times prevented  low prices in 
periods of  depression.  In the steel trade of the same coun- 
try  a  like tendency  is noticeable.  During the prosperous 
months of  the summer of  1906  the  German Verband  re- 
fused to advance the piice of  billets, sheet-bars, slabs, skelp, 
and  other half-rdled  material  five per  cent.'  The career 
of  this  combination  shows  that  its -attempt  has  been  to 
steady  rather  than  to raise  prices.  The influence  of  the 
German. government  has probably  been  responsible  in  part 
for this moderation.  Aside  from this governmental influ- 
ence, however,  the effect of  abnormally  high  prices  seems 
everywhere to be disastrous to the permanent business wel- 
fare of any combination. 
1  Iron Age. Aug.  16, 1906,  p. 418. 
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That the  general  level  of prices  is  higher  than would 
have  been  the case  if  pools  or mutual  understandings  in 
regard  to prices  did  not  exist  is  probably  true.  These 
organizations have  had  an appreciable influence on market 
conditions.  The persistence  of  competition,  however,  re- 
duces this power to comparatively narrow limits.  A writer 
in the Iro~t  Age says: 
It is very doubtful if  an agreement as to prices has ever been 
faithfully kept.  While the established price  in  one particular 
product  may,  to  all  intents and  purposes, be  faithfully kept, 
concessions are  made  on  closely  allied  manufactures  in  the 
buyer's  favor.  In the closing months  of the nail  pool,  while 
the established price of $2.55  on  wire nails was probably kept, 
prices of  smooth and barb wire were cut to ridiculous fipres 
in order to stimulate sales of  nails.' 
Even in the case  of the rail  pool  the ~l~aintenance  of the 
agreed price has gone hand  in hand with great reductions 
in the prices of  allied  material.  During the depression of 
1904,  rail  makers  while  adhering to the  pool  agreement 
made concessions to the buyers of steel rails in the shape of 
low prices on angle bars, bolts, and spikes.* 
In the case of crude material,  pools  are often rendered 
inoperative  for other reasons.  The number  of  producers 
is relatively large, and pools are therefore more difficult to 
maintain.  The temptation, too, on the part of the members 
to evade agreements by converting crude into finished mate- 
rial is also great.  It has been the yielding to this tempta- 
tion which  has weakened all pools for the control of  billet 
and ingot prices.  On the whole, the influence of pools on 
prices  in  general  seems  much  less  than is  generally  sup- 
l Iro~t  Age, Jan. 7, 1897.  p.  12. 
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posed.  For short periods of  time,  and in  particular lines, 
their  influence  may  be  great.  Their power,  however,  to 
exert a permanent control over market conditions seems at 
present  rather limited. 
3 14. The laws with  respect  to pooling are not  entirely 
satisfactory.  If  all the anti-trust laws on the statute books 
were enforced, thousands of  members and hundreds of  offi- 
cers of  these  associations would  be  defendants in civil  or 
criminal suits.  Yet pools are as numerous as ever.  This 
condition is not  a healthy one, as obedience to the law is a 
cardinal prerequisite to good citizenship.  It is not possible 
by  law  to prevent all price agreements,  nor is  it advisable 
to attempt it.  In an industry like  that of  iron and sted, 
subject  to great  fluctuations  of  trade, the  high  prices  ol 
prosperous  times  afford  a  powerful  inducement  to enter 
the field on the part of  outsiders, who in periods of  depres- 
sion must themselves be driven out, or drive out older pro- 
ducers.  Such  a  condition  is  conducive  to great  waste. 
Manufacturers would seem to be justified  in making some 
agreement  to protect  themselves,  and  to prevent  wasteful 
industrial  warfare.  It  would  seem  that  some  statutes 
might be  devised enabling manufacturers to co-operate for 
self-protection,  and at the same time prohibiting the forma- 
tion of  conspiracies  to exact tribute. 
CONCLUSION 
IN  the light of  what has been said in the preceding pages 
some mention may be made of the Steel Corporation in its 
relations  to the  trust  movement  in  general.  During  the 
last eight or ten years this movement  has bulked  large in 
the industrial affairs of  the United  States.  The apparent 
success of several of  the larger combinations has led some 
of  the ablest business men and economists to the conclusion 
that the trust has become an established factor in the indus- 
trial  life  of  the  nation,  and  that  trusts  are economically 
beneficial.  Some, however,  have  vigorously  disputed  this 
conclusion,  and  have  contended  that  the  larger  business 
combinations have grown and maintained their ascendency, 
not by superior efficiency as producers, but by the employ- 
ment  of  means  giving  them  advantages  monopolistic  in 
nature over independent  concerns. 
How  far the alleged  economies  of  consolidation  really 
lower their cost of  production  and improve their competi- 
tive efficiency depends  in large part  upon  the industry  in 
which  the combination is  formed.  It has been  noted that 
the iron and  steel  industry  is  characterized  by  conditions 
which  make  large-scale  production  economical.  Though 
this condition has tended to limit the number of  producers 
to a  relatively  few  large companies,  it  is doubtful  if  the 
competitive  strength  of  such  a  combination  as the  Steel 
Corporation is greater by virtue of  mere size than that of 
some of  the more  important  independent  companies  with 
only a fraction of its capital.  The reports of  the American 
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Iron and Steel Association  certainly  do not  show that the 
larger organization  is  gaining on  its  smaller  rivals  in  its 
share of  the country's trade.  While "  trusts are taken  to 
mean manufacturing corporations with so great capital and 
power  that they are at least thought by  the public to have 
become a menace to their welfare and to have, temporarily 
at least, considerable inonopolistic power," '  it must be said 
that the Steel Corporation, the largest of the trusts, is meet- 
ing a considerable, and probably  growing, competition. 
LVhatever question Inay be  raised  as to the efficiency of 
the trust  as a  producer, there  is little  reason  to doubt  its 
power  to steady prices.  It has already been seen that one 
of  the most potent factors working for consolidation in tl~c 
iron and steel  indcstry has been  the violent  fluctuation  in 
the denland for goods resulting in great variations in prices. 
These price  variations have been  greatly  reduced  since the 
formation of  the Steel Corporation.  While this organiza- 
tion has no n~onopoly  control over market conditions, it has 
been enabled appreciably to steady market values by  virtue 
of  its large volume of  trade, and has been  itnpelled toward 
this policy by business considerations.  Such an influence can 
hardly  be  said  to  be  prejudicial  to public  welfare.  The 
uncertainties and wastes due to alternating periods of  pros- 
perity  and  depression, while  greater  in  the iron  and  steel 
industry  than  in  most  other  lines  of  business,  have  b:en 
considerable in all departlnents of  industrial  activity. 
.4n  organization,  however,  whose  trade  is  sufficiently 
large to influence market conditions will strive for a  fuller 
and lnore monopolistic  control over these conditions.  Thc 
advance  of  the  Steel  Corporation  in  the  Lake  Superior 
region seems indicative of a desire  for ultimate  possessioll 
1 J. Itr.  Jenks,  The Trust  Problcttr,  p.  8. 
of  the country's best  sources of  iron ore, and through this 
for more absolute control of  the steel  trade.  The posses- 
sion of  these deposits of  ore will be difficult to secure; and 
as we have seen, the influence which the Steel Corporation 
is likely to wield over market conditions in the near future 
will probably be in association with independent producers. 
What effect monopoly power would have upon the policy 
of  the  Steel  Corporation  is  difficult  to say.  There  is  no 
reason,  however,  to believe that  it  would  have  a  radically 
different effect upon this organization than upon any other. 
As has  been  noted  in  the  preceding  pages,  the  business 
policy  of the company  has  thus  far been  characterized  by 
a  judicious  conservatism.  Prices,  as we  have.seen,  have 
not  tended  to increase.  In the fifth  annual  report  of  the 
corporation it is stated that the average prices received dur- 
ing  the  year  1906  for  all  steel  products  shipped  to  the 
domestic  trade  exceeded  by  five  and  three-tenths  per  cent 
the average received in  1905, but were eight per cent lower 
than the prices which prevailed in  1902.  This comparison 
of  the  prices  of  1906  with  those  of  1902  is  significant. 
These years  were  the  two  most  prosperous  years  in  the 
history of  the iron and steel industr~  of  this country.  In 
1906 the price of  ore was greater than in  1902; the wages 
of  labor  were  higher; freight  rates  had  been  raised;  and 
the  demand  for  iron  and  steel  was  greater  than  in'  any 
previous  period.  N~twithstanding  all  these  conditions, 
prices  were  eight per cent  lower  than in  1902.  It is  un- 
likely that such a showing would be  made by  an organiza- 
tion relieved  from the pressure of  actual or potential  com- 
petition. 
It should be noted  in closing that the Steel  Corporation 
has set a worthy example to other combinations in its an- 
nual reports.  These reports are issued to the stockholders, 
and give with considerable detail the income  and expendi- 1~8  THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION  [4~ 
tures  of  the  organization.  Such  an  acknowledgment  of 
the rights of  stockholders to more detailed information con- 
cerning business operations than is usually supplied by large 
consolidations  has  inspired  much  public  confidence in  the 
corporation.  Recent  exposures  have  shown  the  possible 
menace to public welfare in the secret and unqualified exer- 
cise of  the power lodged in great capitalistic organizations. 
The publication by the company of  a detailed report of  its 
financial  condition  brings  the  policy  of  the  consolidation 
into a wholesome accord with the growing demand for pub- 
licity  of  corporate accounts. 
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